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 Bioethics is a practical enterprise intended to produce morally acceptable so-
lutions to clinical case problems.  Although answers can be derived from deductivist 
or principle-driven methods of deliberation, these solutions may be too abstract to be 
accepted as appropriate to the circumstances, clinically effective, or suitable to those 
stakeholders affected by the decision. Furthermore, it has proven difficult to identify 
the best moral principle to apply to each case, because of the variation in detail and 
nuance impacting each situation. 
 In this dissertation, I exemplify the difficulty in practical bioethics delibera-
tions by presenting in detail the activities of a practicing ethics committee, working 
at the clinical level of private medical practice in the field of assisted reproductive 
medicine. In descriptions of over forty cases, I show the difficulty this committee 
  
faced in solving routine cases and even more when attempting to solve the novel 
cases that arise with some frequency in this unique field. 
 This research leads me to recommend a more procedural approach, based on 
the process of reflective equilibrium described by John Rawls, but supplemented by 
the contractualist version put forth by T. M. Scanlon. In this deliberative process, a 
wide variety of factors are considered: moral theory, particular details, paradigm 
cases, information from policy boards or professional organizations, diverse points 
of view, and public input. From this style of reasoning, useful mid-level principles 
can emerge, providing justification for bioethical solutions and encouraging consen-
sus, which can also play a legitimizing role in decision-making.  
 I conclude that this inclusive kind of deliberation is more likely to occur at 
the level of the professional organization or the national commission, where broad 
diversity in participation and information, as well as public input, can take place. 
Decisions or principles achieved from this wider level of discourse will be more le-
gitimate and can then be used to guide ethics committee members functioning at the 
private level.                                             
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INTRODUCTION 
Bioethics is more than an abstract investigation of the moral problems arising in 
medicine and health care; it is also a practical enterprise intended to offer solutions to 
real cases, and to provide a guide to action in particular situations. Health care profes-
sionals, their patients, and those associated with their cases must make considered and 
acceptable decisions about medical treatments and options in practice settings where 
value-laden conflicts are involved. Some conflicts can be easily resolved while others 
may be so difficult as to require legal adjudication, but to be credible each case resolu-
tion must be backed up by moral reasoning. It is the duty of bioethicists to offer valida-
tion for their decisions and to defend their actions by providing ethical justification.  
However, identifying a specific theory, a method, a principle, or a process by 
which to justify specific bioethical decisions has proven difficult. Some bioethical 
problems are rare but urgent; that is, they arise out of active circumstances in which 
the decision-makers must act without taking time for consultation or reflection. Other 
problems are novel; that is, they present themselves to decision-makers without prece-
dent. Disagreement about the best approach for problem-solving abounds, although it 
is generally agreed that examining cases through the lens of traditional moral theories 
has not proven satisfactory, since they often produce conflicting solutions. Over the 
past twenty-five years, the literature in the field exposes increasing interest in generat-
ing and selecting appropriate methods for confronting bioethical decision-making. The 
proponent of each new method hopes to show that its use might work to better deliver 
more consistent, thoughtful, supportable and morally acceptable answers. It is thought 
that the implementation of a correct method can in itself yield justification for the so-
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lutions it produces by the way reasons and principles are elicited from its use; however 
none of the current methods has yet proven reliable in generating acceptable results in 
practice.  
The most supportable bioethical decisions are not necessarily delivered by fol-
lowing an idealized step-by-step method. I believe they are more likely to emerge pro-
cedurally, in a process of moral reasoning where more attention to context and detail 
takes place and where diverse points of view and public input are included. In this dis-
sertation, I show that building support for these judgments is a complex enterprise, as-
sembled upon a mutually supportive set of moral reasons, beliefs, and principles. The 
specific method used is not as important as the support structure that backs up the de-
cisions and actions.  
Certain backing principles stand out as most useful in providing a foundation 
for this justificatory structure. I call them mid-level principles, because they are spe-
cific to problems in biomedicine and are derived from and relate to actual issues that 
have arisen in the health care arena. Statements such as “always protect the privacy of 
the patient,” “always obtain informed consent,” or “do no harm,” are examples of such 
principles. Even more specific situational rules, such as the set of physical criteria for 
brain death used to validate non-resuscitation policies and the specialty-specific rule 
that “reproductive medicine may not be used for sex selection” (to choose the sex of 
one’s child) are good examples of mid-level principles. Maxims and rules of this na-
ture, while not necessarily morally explanatory or complete, serve to organize respon-
sive and practical reasons to back up bioethical decisions. These types of mid-level 
principles have status in biomedicine, because they often carry a scientific basis or be-
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cause they are derived from the experiences and deliberations of professional experts 
and supported by their professional organization. If a judgment violates one of these 
principles, it is apt to be more controversial and less likely to be taken as valid. 
However, in practice it can be difficult to identify and extract the most appro-
priate and useful principle to apply to the particular case at hand, because several 
might fit, or seem to apply to certain cases even while conflicting with one another. 
Sometimes the principle might prove too vague to provide a specific answer or too 
general to give a meaningful answer for a particular case. Even worse, the citing of a 
mid-level principle can provide a sense of justification to a decision which is nonethe-
less wrong. This is why the mid-level principle is useful as a basis, but must be sup-
plemented with moral reasoning to create broader explanation for specific case 
problems. 
The most solid of these principles are those that are developed out of a great 
deal of experience and put through the public and legal debate generated by controver-
sial cases. For example, the importance of “advance directives” or “living wills” as 
tools of patient autonomy in matters of fulfilling choices on death and dying evolved 
out of the now familiar cases of Karen Quinlan in 1976 and Nancy Cruzan in 1983. 
Over time they became firmly established as basic to bioethical decisions in similar 
cases, although controversy has not been eliminated.1  
                                            
1 See Gregory Pence’s Classic Cases in Medical Ethics (1995) for a case-oriented text in which the full 
array of developments in well-known cases leading up to the development of new mid-level principles 
is presented. In particular, the Quinlan case of 1976 was the first to legally allow the disconnection of 
life support to a comatose patient as an extension of an implied right to privacy. In the Cruzan case, the 
Supreme Court in 1990 recognized the right of a dying patient to refuse life-sustaining medical support 
based on prior intent (3-33). 
 3
In this dissertation I review the various methodological approaches and argue 
that although each has positive features, none are reliable producers of consistently 
valid results. One possible reason for this is that there is no such thing as a valid an-
swer, fully justifiable, in the arena of practical ethics, because each case displays its 
own unique set of characteristics, important to different people in different ways.  The 
methods reviewed here are theoretically interesting, but ill-suited for the daily imme-
diacy of problems facing clinicians because sometimes they deliver logically sound, 
but not necessarily reasonable or practical solutions. For example, if following a de-
ductivist perspective, one might insist on absolute confidentiality at all times, although 
the public good could sometimes require a breach in that principle. In other words, 
context and circumstances make a difference. On the other hand, one might follow a 
less stringent contextual or principle-based method only to find that they can deliver 
plural answers, often conflicting with one another, making it difficult to assess the 
overall “validity” of the ethical judgments.  
The problem is not inherent in any specific method, but lies in the structure of 
justification itself. Better results occur when reasoning is built over time, incorporating 
multiple styles of reasoning, made available for public scrutiny and including diversity 
in public input. Bioethical decisions are most supportable when built by this sort of 
procedural structure rather than when deduced or inferred by a specific method, be-
cause they garner wider support from more diverse sources. In general, the enterprise 
is most closely related to the process of reflective equilibrium, developed by John 
Rawls, where useful mid-level principles are said to emerge from deliberations in 
which contextual details, paradigm cases, and an array of applicable higher level 
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moral principles are all taken into consideration in a revisable process.2  The results 
are defensible by their inclusion in a framework of mutually supportive reasons, be-
liefs, and explanations. Many of the current methodologists have recognized how the 
incorporation of a Rawlsian process can lead to a firmer sense of support for out-
comes. However, I argue in this dissertation that the procedure can be augmented by 
employing ideas from the work of T. M. Scanlon. His model of reflective equilibrium, 
referred to as “deliberative processes,” differs from Rawls’s by emphasizing the social 
and public aspects of the inquiry at stake while relying on practical reasoning based in 
human cooperation and the need for human interaction.3  This Scanlonian reflective 
equilibrium, as I refer to it in the body of the text, is not a method as such, but a style 
of reasoning that in practice encourages the development of the most defensible judg-
ments, especially when undertaken at the widest levels of discourse, both professional 
and public. These judgments then filter down to provide the basis for daily decision-
making at the clinical level.  
It is important to note that using such a broad style of reasoning to examine 
problems in biomedicine is not practical at the clinical level, in my estimation. When 
novel questions arise that have not yet been pressed through this process, clinicians 
find ethical judgments more difficult to make, less useful, and less valid overall.  Fur-
thermore, clinicians at the bedside or outpatient level do not normally have much time 
to consider the problems they confront and generally have no experience in ethical de-
                                            
2 John Rawls sets out this approach to moral justification in A Theory of Justice, 1971. 
3 T. M. Scanlon’s What We Owe Each Other, 1998, is devoted to showing that moral solutions in gen-
eral (not only bioethical decisions) are most justifiable when they are backed up by socially shared 
moral principles, produced by reasonable people motivated by mutual interests. 
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liberations of the broad nature discussed here. In this dissertation I give many exam-
ples of the difficulty in doing ethical deliberation at the clinical level. 
In general, I argue that better deliberations at the level of national commis-
sions, professional organizations, and public bodies will promote better problem-
solving to pass down to the more modest level of the practical decision-maker. Those 
higher-level deliberations ought to follow a model of Scanlonian reflective equilib-
rium that I present here.  
I set out my case in three sections. First, in Part One, I evaluate the well-known 
methodological approaches, pointing out their strengths and weaknesses, while docu-
menting the benefits of the coherentist approach, where moral answers emerge and 
justification for them is forged by a process-driven system of reasoning. 
In Part Two, I present in detail the activities of an ethics committee, at the level 
of the doctor’s office, or inpatient clinic, as it works to resolve problems presenting in 
the practice setting of assisted reproductive medicine. My research is unique in docu-
menting how ethics deliberations actually transpire in this basic level of a clinical set-
ting, and in noting the techniques used by untrained clinicians in decision-making.  
The practice of assisted reproductive medicine (referred to here as ARM) ex-
ists in a climate of highly technical and innovative privacy, unregulated by the federal 
government. The treatments and techniques in this specialty are generally unpubli-
cized unless some new practice makes news. Because this work occurs at the level of 
the private outpatient clinic, it carries no formal duty to be ethically reviewed; physi-
cians engaged in private practice are expected to comply with basic professional stan-
dards, but are not required to subject their professional decisions to the review of 
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others. It is unusual to find a private practice that voluntarily subjects its internal deci-
sions to an ethical case review mechanism. Thus I was lucky to participate in and ob-
serve the activities of one such ethics committee at a private suburban ARM clinic for 
several years, documenting the methods, principles, and rules by which it generated 
decisions. My primary goal in this section is to describe and analyze the committee’s 
processes of clinical deliberation, illustrating its dependence upon mid-level principles 
passed down from higher level decision-making bodies, usually the professional or-
ganization or the expert commission. Although the clinical participants of the commit-
tee worked diligently to establish their own internal rules, apply ideas taken from 
paradigm cases, and elicit professional policies to ground their decisions, they faced 
difficulty in setting out consistently defensible decisions, especially in novel situa-
tions. Specific actions in similar cases were not always internally consistent; further-
more, they also sometimes varied from the recommendations of the professional 
organization. This, of course, does not mean they were wrong decisions, but it serves 
to illustrate the difficulty in finding principled reasons for moral judgments in real 
cases with practical implications. The lack of a larger context for case evaluation and 
comparison caused the group to look outside itself for useful principles and policies, 
rather than to seek a formal method or system of discussion internally. Citing appro-
priate mid-level principles to back up a decision or action was sometimes impossible 
at this level of deliberation; the participants needed more ready-made, previously 
worked out guiding principles to structure their discourse.  
The most common problem in this ethics committee was to formulate explana-
tions or defenses for rejecting treatment to a client. Members of the committee fre-
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quently resorted to a barely articulated emotion, expressed as the “yuck factor.” This 
led me to add in this section an analysis of the work of one of the foremost critics of 
the science and practice of fertility medicine, Leon Kass. His arguments against com-
mon ARM practices (such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo manipulations in 
general) have rarely been accepted by the public, or at least have had little effect on 
curbing the practices, but continue to force extensive public debate as to their overall 
value. His writings give voice to the “yuck factor” and provide an example of how 
negative public input and dissent is important in shaping the basis for effective justifi-
cation, whether accepting or rejecting specific treatments or practices. 
Finally, in Part Three, I set out in more detail how my account of Scanlonian 
reflective equilibrium can best allow for a model of the deliberative process that can 
expose unjustified decisions or build and deliver a fuller, more complex, and more co-
herent structure of justification. Here I show how certain background assumptions and 
styles of decision-making can serve to cloud the larger moral issues. In the activities of 
the clinical bioethics committee (examples presented in Part Two), certain worries 
about negative publicity, personal reputation, and a desire to avoid grappling with 
moral abstractions outside of their medical expertise caused inconsistencies in deci-
sions and difficulty in stating defensible reasons for their actions, although to be sure 
most of the decisions were fair and thoughtful. I show that their reliance on expert ad-
vice from higher level ethics commissions and policy boards exemplify the value in 
having access to a body of general decisions worked up in a broadly based public and 
expert framework, so as to provide better policies for the lower level private practitio-
ners to rely upon.  
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I conclude that Scanlonian reflective equilibrium is the most effective way to 
secure morally justified results because it can obtain the fullest base of support. It 
works from the case-specific level up to a more general, principle-based response by 
taking into consideration the larger moral principles at stake, the social goods, and the 
opposing viewpoints that might affect overall reasoning. Furthermore, it allows for lo-
cal judgments and a great deal of range in admitting pertinent information, with flexi-
bility in determining the scope of the problem at hand, so that the correct mid-level 
principle can emerge from discussion and not be applied by rote. Here I emphasize the 
value of publicity in making the content and scope of the debate open to all points of 
view. It is within the full process of reasoning that a moral account is created that can 
buttress the associated ethical decision or action.  
The overall approach is procedural, emphasizing a plural, rather than individ-
ual, structure of justification and insisting that a broad range of theories, principles, 
practices, viewpoints, and experiences work together to create majority viewpoints on 
important moral issues (although rarely can full consensus be expected), while incor-
porating concerns for human rights and goods  and discouraging human harms. 
However, expecting this complexity in deliberation is more than can be usually 
provided by a localized, clinic-based ethics committee; it is more plausible at the pro-
fessional or national commission level where more diversity in views and backgrounds 
can be included. 
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PART ONE 
PROBLEMS IN DERIVING MID-LEVEL PRINCIPLES 
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CHAPTER ONE 
  THE RANGE OF BIOETHICAL METHODS 
As bioethics has emerged as a field over the last thirty years, various practice 
models have been introduced, each attempting to provide a method by which to pro-
ceed in the actual problem-solving activities demanded by the increasingly technical 
and difficult biomedical cases emerging in our scientific age. However, these models 
are usually discussed in the abstract, but rarely observed in practice. The cases they 
purport to solve are usually after the fact discussions of well-known incidents. And yet 
most bioethical decisions are made at the ground level: the hospital bedside or the doc-
tor’s office. Only when controversies develop within the health-care system are some 
cases elevated to higher-level discussion, either at the hospital ethics committee re-
view or legal review. Only rarely do cases in the private physician’s office become 
subject to public controversy; and yet, this is where many novel cases are seen and 
where the first steps in moral adjudication are taken. Clinicians are rarely trained in 
ethical methodology and no specific approach to problem-solving is taught, even 
though hospitals in the U.S. are now mandated by their accrediting organization to 
conduct ethical reviews of difficult cases. In any event, no clear method has emerged 
as the most effective way to proceed.  
In a very general way, the various methods, and the techniques supporting 
them, are often categorized by philosophers in the field into three types: deductivist, 
contextualist, or principlist.4  However each method, whatever the type, depends on 
the use of tailored mid-level principles, sometimes employed deductively as a starting 
                                            
4 See Norman Daniels “Wide Reflection Equilibrium in Practice” (1996) for an overview of the types of 
approaches and how they compete for priority in the field.  
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position for working out a solution, or after the fact as a means of justification for the 
results.5  In theory, each type of method provides defensible ways to deliver ethically 
based medical decisions, but in practice, each has proven difficult to employ. When a 
mid-level principle is applicable to a case and simply needs to be brought to bear, then 
any method might appropriately be used. But in more novel cases, or cases with un-
usual circumstances, in which a group finds itself unable to generate an appropriate 
principle, the use of a method, in and of itself, doesn’t seem to offer much assistance 
in moving forward, and without locating a principle, deliberators feel unsure that their 
decisions are ethically sound. In this chapter I describe the prominent methods and 
their advantages and disadvantages. 
Deductivism 
The first category, deductivism, relies on the notion that justified moral judg-
ments are derived from applying a theoretical moral framework in a “top-down” sort 
of way. Proponents believe that a localized moral problem can’t be solved in isolation 
from the larger, more universal moral framework under which the case ought to be 
subsumed. Here the moral principle precedes the case. Traditional moral theories 
(such as consequentialist, deontological or virtue approaches) are emphasized, because 
                                            
5 In this dissertation, the term “mid-level principles” is meant to apply to the specific rules and maxims 
that are used to defend practical decisions in bioethics, as opposed to grand principles in ethics like the 
utility principle. Examples range from broad statements like, “Do no harm,” “Don’t deceive,” and “Re-
spect the autonomy of others,” to more detailed and scientifically developed “standards for brain death” 
used to make medical decisions about withdrawing feedings or transplanting organs or the rules for ob-
taining “informed consent “ so as to prevent violation of human autonomy in medical actions. These 
mid-level principles are basically formulized reasons set out to defend decisions. These precise formu-
lations carry great weight in justifying bioethical decisions, because they are taken as akin to statements 
of fact about medical justification or as providing proven ethical reasoning for treatment decisions. 
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it is assumed that the maxims and rules that make up a complete moral system are ap-
plicable to bioethics, just as they are to any other moral endeavor.6
As David De Grazia put it in an often cited 1992 paper (well known for its 
analysis of the various bioethical methods), the use of a comprehensive moral frame-
work can produce the best-supported outcomes (not necessarily best outcomes for 
those involved but best supported analytically) because the applicable principles, as 
derived from the theory, are applied to specific cases in a logical way.7  Such a 
framework is successful when it is complete enough so that no reliance on moral in-
tuition is necessary, because critics emphasize that intuitions are often in conflict on 
important social matters and can produce no firm basis for their inferences (512). 
However, deductivism, in this strong form, has been claimed to be irrelevant to 
bioethics because it has not shown itself able to provide unifying answers, either in 
specific case problems, or for larger social debates, for three reasons. First, squeezing 
the details of cases into a fit with the larger theory is inherently difficult. Abortion de-
bates, for example, might take the most important feature to be the problem of “kill-
ing” an infant, or they might take a different feature as most important: the presumed 
right for an expectant mother to make decisions over her own body. Second, different 
moral theories can offer different answers to the same problem; for example, one the-
ory might consider goods more important than rights.8  A third and more basic reason 
                                            
6 This is often described as a ‘top-down’ approach, because an overriding principle, such as “maximiz-
ing utility,” is applied to a problem. See more on the distinctions between top-down and bottom-up 
methods in Daniels: “Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (96-100). Also, on the ambitious nature of attempt-
ing this approach as public policy, see Kymlicka (245-250). 
7 See De Grazia’s 1992 “Moving Forward” (511-539) where he promoted the use of mid-level princi-
ples in an overall coherentist scheme. 
8 For example, in the well known problem of paternalism in medicine, a consequentialist approach 
might support lying or misleading a patient about her prognosis for the sake of protecting her, hoping to 
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for the failure of deductivism in bioethics is that general theory is thought to be too 
remote from actual cases, where specific facts lend particular details to situations, so 
that the use of an overriding or general principle cannot be adequate to cover any 
group of similar cases even if such a general principle could be developed, because of 
the way slightly different features, or a peculiar emphasis on some features, tend to 
vary in individual cases. Nevertheless, some versions of top-down, or deductivist, ap-
proaches retain a place in the current debates over the merit of the various bioethical 
methods. 
The best-known proponents of deductivism are the team of K. Danner Clouser 
and Bernard Gert, whose approach is tempered by an attempt to integrate moral theory 
with common sense morality. They insist that less deductive methods are apt to ignore 
a moral imperative that calls for ethical decision-makers to be impartial, rational 
agents who accept universal moral rules if they are to be taken seriously. Clouser ar-
gues that bioethics is not a special arena of morality in which the provisions of univer-
sality and impartiality can be rescinded. Of his and Gert’s standpoint he says: 
Ours is a general ethical theory rather than one that is articulated spe-
cifically for biomedical ethics. We regard this as a strength of our ap-
proach since it shows the unity of all of morality and does not involve 
questionable ad hoc constructions specifically created for biomedical 
ethics (Clouser 1995, 226). 
 
While stressing universalizability, they anticipate exceptions, although those must fol-
low the rule of being logically extractible from a generalizable public system. Clouser 
                                                                                                                             
promote the overall good, while a deontological approach might focus more on the right of the patient 
to know the truth even if immediate suffering is caused. See Jecker (113-124) for a discussion on the 
advantages and disadvantages of deductivism and foundational theories in bioethics. 
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describes morality as a system where violations of the rules are only permissible when 
exceptions are publicly and consistently applied. 
The benefit of such a firm system is that the answers are justifiable by its foun-
dationalist supporting framework; in other words, ethical decisions are justified by the 
basic structure of the moral system from which they are derived. Foundationalist ac-
counts of morality provide the strongest support for moral judgments in a logical 
sense, but at the cost of individual suffering, when a specific case is forced into an un-
satisfactory decision as a result of the “one size fits all” requirement. As a theoretical 
method, the answers seem to ensure certainty, but as a practical method it does not of-
fer necessarily correct solutions to real problems, because the structure itself can vary 
so widely – not only from consequentialist to deontological, but perhaps even to some 
version of natural law – all of which produce various results. Benjamin Levi pointed 
out in 1996 that deductivist approaches in bioethics are “easy to dismiss” because 
“even the most simplistic theory can generate answers. What we are looking for are 
reasons to believe that a particular deductive theory is valid” (11). 
Furthermore, the judgments derived from deductivism are not always as clear, 
specific and useful as advertised because, as De Grazia puts it, “deductivist theories 
(including those limited to some specified domain) are indeterminate. That is, even 
with knowledge of relevant facts, deductivist theories cannot determine an answer for 
each moral problem” (1992, 514). It is not always possible to achieve consensus, even 
within groups who share similar deductivist belief systems. 
When discussing deductivist theories in the abstract, it is easy to miss another 
reason for their lack of success: the difficulty in producing or arriving at a useful and 
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specific mid-level principle to apply to a specific case, presumably deducible from the 
general theory. Clouser and Gert have attempted to actualize their project by providing 
a list of rules as stand-ins for their whole system, presumably to be used by actual 
committee problem-solvers. These rules are meant to finesse the problem of deriving 
mid-level principles, but it is unclear how they break down into specific and helpful 
maxims for solving particular cases. Each rule is a general directive derived from one 
large overriding principle of avoiding harm against human beings in general, such as 
“Don’t kill, “Don’t deceive,” “Don’t cause pain,” “Don’t break promises,” (Clouser 
1995, 230). However, it is not set out clearly how one should decide whether “Don’t 
kill” precludes abortion, or whether “Don’t deceive” determines how much informa-
tion to give a patient in terminal episodes of illness. It is simply not clear how Clouser 
and Gert’s rules can lead to an appropriate principle or maxim by which to solve this 
problem, especially if the maxim is intended to satisfy the particular needs of the pa-
tient or her extended family, or more universal expectations of the medical staff, on to 
the public at large. As Andrew Lustig said in his 1992 critique of Clouser and Gert’s 
approach, “Any judgment Gert renders is likely to be ad hoc at worst, merely empiri-
cal at best, and thus hardly compelling to all rational impartial observers” (509). This 
explains why deductivism in general is thought to be impractical. Instead, bioethicists 
have shown more interest in the other end of the spectrum: taking the particular details 
of cases more seriously and assessing cases individually. This approach is referred to 
as casuistry. 
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Casuistry 
Casuistry, in the generic sense, is supposed to be a means of developing the 
reasoning for a case decision over time, by immersion into the particular circum-
stances of a case. Pertinent principles are thought to be disclosed as they emerge out of 
deliberating in context about specific and particular details. Here, instead of beginning 
with an ethical theory, principle, or set of rules and applying them top-down, the 
proper starting position is to sort out the relevant aspects of the case at hand, identify 
the moral issues at stake, and then reason upwards toward capturing an appropriate 
principle or value that might back up, or justify, the decision. As the factual details are 
filled out and amplified, the most accurate maxim or mid-level principle takes on 
weight, so that in the best case scenario, conflicts between principles are overcome. 
Defenders compare the process to that employed in the legal system where precedent 
and paradigm cases assist in deriving the most accurate way to support decisions for 
specific cases. 
Leaders of this approach are Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, who pub-
lished their main defense of casuistry in 1988.9  Jonsen argued more recently (in 
2000), that they had “hoped to ‘resuscitate’ casuistry from the disrepute and neglect 
that had almost deprived it of a living place in moral reasoning.” The two were op-
posed to what they called “the tyranny of principles,” particularly the popularization of 
the set developed by Beauchamp and Childress (which will be presented here shortly). 
But more recently (in 2000), Jonsen had come to realize that the two had left the im-
                                            
9 Besides Jonsen and Toulmin’s  Abuse of Casuistry in 1988, see Toulmin’s historical overview adapted 
for Jecker, Jonsen and Pearlman in 1997 (101-109), and Jonsen’s condensation of his 1986 overview in 
the same volume (158-161). 
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pression that they “rejected principles as an integral part of moral reasoning.”  This 
impression was wrong, he said, because the two had, in fact, intended to “restore” a 
fuller picture of moral reasoning, while emphasizing the importance of particular cir-
cumstances as the “foreground” of the total picture, but not totally displacing the 
“relevant maxims and principles in the midground and ethical theory and cultural 
ethos in the background” (Jonsen 2000, 349-350). The reason for the priority of con-
text and circumstance was to ensure that appropriate backing principles were devel-
oped, but not forced onto situations.  
Casuists complain that the advocates of principle-driven approaches to cases 
cannot explain why certain principles should or should not apply or have or have not 
emerged as the prevailing explanation for various results. They have further pointed 
out that the leaders of principled methods, specifically Beauchamp and Childress, have 
problems in defending how ethical principles are supposed to give authority to case 
decisions. In the prominent 1989 text written by Beauchamp and Childress, the door 
was opened to admit various weighting schemes as an answer to the questions that had 
been raised by the more contextualist proponents of casuistry. The two admitted that 
various interpretations, definitions, weighting schemes, and the level of stringency ap-
plied to the “relevant moral terms” would affect the choice of moral principles used 
for decision-making (5). Jonsen complains that this uniqueness of circumstance is too 
often overlooked by those who should know better, since philosophers ought to take 
circumstances seriously and refrain from collapsing similar cases into exactly the same 
categories. To be similar does not mean to be exactly alike according to Jonsen al-
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though it isn’t clear how similar contexts must be related to one another to forge a uni-
fying relationship to any specific moral principle (1996, 38).10   
For casuists, principles are important in the abstract, but they do not stand 
alone in providing substance or direction to moral decision-making. As Jonsen ex-
plained, “Circumstances are not, as the etymology of the word suggests, things that 
‘stand around’; they are as integral to the moral analysis as are the principles” (40). 
Instead of assuming that consistency requires that similar cases should have similar 
solutions, Jonsen noted that even in the soundest of reasoning, multiple conclusions 
are possible, necessitating more complex reasoning in order to attain the best outcome 
in each particular case. A particular case could be so singular as to require its own ap-
plicable maxim rather than be subsumed under a more general principle. 
In casuistry, maxims are developed out of the specifics of contextual details, in 
other words, from the bottom up. Although all bioethicists rely on “cases” to define 
and refine their approaches, casuists like Jonsen take each case and associated maxim 
as distinctly individual:  
[Maxims are] expressions of moral or prudential advice; the circum-
stances were the existential facts being addressed in the case at hand. 
Out of these two materials the minor arguments were constructed…I 
am certain that ethical evaluation of cases very often, if not always, 
dwells upon these minor arguments rather than on the grand arguments 
of principle. (43). 
 
Defenders of casuistry believe that it offers a more realistic method of how cases are 
decided in real-life situations, with an added benefit of modesty. It does not claim 
status as a theory but remains grounded as an inductive method, enabling it to remain 
                                            
10 See Jonsen’s defense of moral circumstances in the 1996 collection  Philosophical Perspectives on 
Bioethics edited by L.W. Sumner and Joseph Boyle. 
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somewhat exempt from debates about “grounding,” whether and how its results can be 
justified. At the same time, it can join with most of the other methods in claiming to be 
a sort of coherentist project. Jonsen suggests coherentism is the basis for defending his 
work: 
Moral judgment is a patterned whole into which principles, values, cir-
cumstances, and consequences must be fitted. The particular judgment 
itself must be fitted into a larger set of judgments about moral suitabil-
ity of behavior and practices. Fittingness suggests how we ‘morally ap-
preciate’ the circumstances of a case…Principles, values, 
circumstances and consequences must be seen as a whole. The judg-
ment about them comprises all of them (45). 
 
Carson Strong, a supporter of casuistry, states that a primary benefit of casu-
istry is its ability to detect the morally important features of specific cases as it works 
to form comparisons with more general paradigm cases. As an essential technique of 
casuistry, this allows for a thoughtful process of locating the most useful backing prin-
ciples from among a variety of conflicting possibilities, all of which might apply to the 
case, until a degree of resolution has been reached. Resolution occurs when a comfort-
able fit with a paradigm case and an assessment of the level of any related harms and 
suffering that may be applicable to this specific case has been accomplished. The 
problem is that more than one justificatory principle is available in many cases, and 
different scenarios can produce conflicting decisions, although the correct path is said 
to emerge from deliberating over these sorts of details. However, as Strong admits, the 
justification for each decision is bound to its particular case, and cannot necessarily be 
generalized to other similar cases, making for a weak foundation. Casuists intend that 
their solutions gain validity by the reasoning used and the analogies to paradigm cases, 
but not be held accountable to absolute consistency. Strong describes the process as 
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one in which argument makes it “reasonably clear what course of action should be 
taken” (2000, 331). 
However, the problem for Strong, and for casuistry in general, is that there are 
many cases in which, as he admits that casuistic factors “can vary from case to case” 
so that “casuistry simply does not provide an answer” (331). One reason for the possi-
ble variance in outcomes is that morally defensible reasons vary among fair-minded 
individuals and weighting facts differently can as easily lead to moral deadlock as to 
moral agreement. 
 A second, more technical problem for casuistry is that paradigm cases don’t 
always exist to enable the procedure to take shape. It is much easier to work out a 
moral decision when it can be based on history, both legal and social. However, novel 
cases underpin the study of bioethics; new technology and research create new types 
of cases over time, necessitating the creation of new paradigms. How is one to begin 
the deliberations toward applicable moral principles in a contemporary case in which a 
woman became pregnant years after the death of her husband by use of his saved and 
frozen sperm, or where a divorced couple cannot reconcile the ownership of their cre-
ated and frozen embryos?  The reason these new cases make headlines and are diffi-
cult to solve is that they haven’t previously been put through a private or public 
process of moral examination so that some reasonable paradigm stance can be estab-
lished. 
 A third problem for casuistry, one mentioned by De Grazia, is that by its de-
pendence on paradigms and previous moral reasoning on issues, it may be too accept-
ing of current beliefs and practices, thus uncritical of the status quo. If casuistry 
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depends on practical wisdom, a sort of intuitionism, to determine which ethical norm 
applies to which specific case, it is weakly grounded to be sure, although, in fairness, 
that problem can be said to apply to deductivist methods also. However, according to 
De Grazia, casuistry is particularly “rooted in traditions and practices, not in pure rea-
son or a special faculty of moral intuition (516). Associated with this concern is that 
the focus on specific cases encourages the casuist to miss the more global aspect of 
bioethical problems, such as organ selling in the undeveloped world, or environmental 
concerns worldwide as they relate to health policy, or the moral status of under-
represented minority groups, as in ensuring the representation of women in research 
medicine. 
 Strong accedes to the need for stronger justification in casuistic ethical deci-
sions through an appeal to moral principles as well as through analogy to paradigm 
cases, and also by ensuring that the judgments are upheld by discursive argument. He 
insists that,  
No casuist in bioethics has argued for ethical reasoning that fails to 
consider principles, rules, and the plurality of ethical concerns relevant 
to biomedicine...There is no need to assign an epistemic priority either 
to judgments about cases or to principles (2000, 337). 
 
However, it can be said that the role of principles, as well as the means of locating cor-
rect principles for individual cases, is underdetermined by this method.  
 Principlism 
The lack of acceptance of both the overly deductivist theoretical approach and 
the inductive casuistic approach helps to explain the popularity of “principlism,” 
wherein specific mid-level principles are thought to enable practical, but well sup-
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ported, case-solving.11 Principlism usually refers to a set of four mid-level, but gen-
eral, principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. These were dis-
seminated by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress as tools for identifying and 
solving bioethical problems, although the term has grown to be used more or less ex-
pansively to encompass all principled, but less deductivist means of bioethical prob-
lem-solving. Principlism is the best-known method, due to its brevity, clarity and ease 
of use, and perhaps more theoretically, because it is the main proponent of coherentist 
justificatory standards for verifying its results.  
Continued interest in principlism derives from the likelihood that mid-level 
moral principles, extracted from common sense morality, are more useful for decision-
making than the deductive attempt to apply theoretical principles. The specific set of 
four mid-level principles are thought to provide a comprehensive and universally ac-
ceptable set of tools for grounding decisions while avoiding the inconclusiveness and 
the abstract nature of deductivist theories. The principles are not only supposed to lead 
to correct decisions, but to provide an ethical justification for the decisions, although 
admittedly not as strong a justification as might be possible if moral answers were de-
rived from traditional theory. Nevertheless, when a good reason for action is backed 
up by one or more of the principles, it is thought to provide validity to practical solu-
tions, especially in the everyday, pressure-filled necessity to resolve biomedical cases. 
The original proponents of principlism, Tom L. Beauchamp and  James F. 
Childress, first published their method in the well-known Principles of Biomedical 
                                            
11 The term “principlism” is intended to apply to a  principle-based approach to bioethics (usually the 
four principles defined by Beauchamp and Childress) and was claimed to be coined by Clouser and 
Gert in their 1990: “A Critique of Principlism” (219-236). 
 23
Ethics, in 1979.12  The basis for the selection of their list of four overriding principles 
had emerged from a federal conference on moral issues in human experimentation in 
which Beauchamp had participated. The group’s discussions were held at the Smith-
sonian Institution’s Belmont Center, inspiring their 1979 report known as the “Bel-
mont Report.”13  In the report, respect for persons (or autonomy), beneficence, and 
justice were set out as three foremost standards of reference for the solution of the bio-
ethical problems at stake, specifically in the arena of research involving human sub-
jects.  
Later, as Beauchamp and Childress developed their more general version of 
these principles, they augmented the framework to add non-maleficence as a separate 
principle in itself (not just as the flip side of beneficence), because the notion of “do 
no harm” holds such a venerable position in medicine and consists of a demanding ob-
ligation in itself. They also expanded on the principle of respect for persons to elevate 
individual autonomy as a paramount ethical principle. Thus their well-known list of 
principles - autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice - have become the 
basic guidelines considered in practical bioethics, taught to health care professionals, 
and cited as justification for decisions. They have become such successful tools that 
they are often referred to as the “Georgetown mantra,”14 to be recited whenever an 
ethical problem is up for debate.  
                                            
12 The authors introduced their ideas in the first edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, in 1979, but 
their updated and expanded third edition, published in 1989, secured the place of principlism to the 
health-care community. Recently (in 2001), their fifth edition was published. 
13 See the discussion in Moreno’s Deciding Together (86) about the activities of “The National Com-
mission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
14  Barry Hoffmaster said in 1991: “The influence of Beauchamp and Childress’s view of what medical 
ethics is has been so great that those working in the field now talk about ‘the applied ethics mantra,’ i.e., 
the reverential intoning of their four principles” (231). For other references to the “Georgetown” man-
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One reason for the popularity of the four principles is that they appear to not 
only offer justification for ethical decisions, but to support them in a practical way by 
encouraging group consensus more successfully than has been achieved by the advo-
cates of more top-down or bottom-up practitioners, although it has been duly noted by 
critics that the consensus and the validation obtained by the reference to the principles 
is often shallow, as opposed to deeper commitments supposed to be obtained when 
ethical decisions are justified by principles derived from abstract ethical theories. 
Nevertheless, a decision that is backed up by one of the well-known principles, and 
then further supported by group consensus, is certainly more supportable than one 
having no justificatory back-up at all, especially when practical decision-makers, in 
the heat of medical practice, are generally unprepared to cite ethical theory or sit 
through a drawn-out, casuistic type process.  
Beauchamp and Childress suggested that even as the mid-level principles work 
to justify a moral decision, they are themselves justified by higher-level ethical theo-
ries, adding another layer of justificatory support. The authors introduced their princi-
ples as general enough so that both rights-oriented, deontological perspectives and 
goods-oriented consequentialist perspectives could be encompassed by the overall 
method; neither approach is considered superior to the other, but neither is totally ig-
nored. In fact, they stated in their book that one of the authors considered himself to be 
a rule-utilitarian, while the other claimed to be a rule-deontologist, causing no prob-
lems in application of the principles (1989, 44). One supporter, Robert Veatch, argues 
                                                                                                                             
tra, see Jecker et al (147); De Grazia, “Moving Forward” (518); Hoffmaster (4); and Moreno, “Deciding 
Together” (76). 
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that the principles can be thought of as means of bringing both of the predominant 
ethical theories to bear on problems: 
Some principles, such as beneficence and non-maleficence, identify the 
maximizing of good consequences and/or the minimizing of bad ones 
as right-making characteristics of actions. . . . [Other principles] focus 
instead on the formal structure of the action or rule…these nonconse-
quentialist principles are related to formalism or deontological ethics 
(1995, 200). 
 
Beauchamp and Childress’s intent was to offer a “composite theory,” in which the 
four principles were to be each taken as binding but none would have priority over the 
others, so that they would serve as surrogates for consequentialist or deontological 
theorizing. The authors’ reasoning seemed to be that the principles were general 
enough to be flexible and yet comprehensive enough to stand in for broader theory, al-
lowing deliberative outcomes to take support from the idea they were backed-up by 
this composite theory, even though no specifics were cited and no method given abso-
lute authority. Thus they avoided the sense of requiring any deductivist application of 
theory and didn’t have to take a stand on the major ethical theoretical standpoints. 
Besides this somewhat obscure justificatory appeal, the principles were popu-
lar because their intuitionist basis appeared to allow experience and common sense to 
be used as modifiers in interpreting how they were to be applied. Supporters have 
taken the intuitionist basis as offering a non-deductive but relatively clear basis for 
moral reasoning, because of its reference to a sort of dialectic between moral experi-
ence and moral theory, while critics see the same intuitionist foundation as a weakness 
since it suggests, in the words of Andrew Lustig, “principles and rules themselves are 
somehow ‘obvious’ at the moment of moral insight and decision” (49). If moral deci-
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sion-making were ‘obvious,’ then the moral differences noticeable in the various solu-
tions to so many bioethical cases would disappear. However, the intuitionist project 
has deep appeal to critics of foundationalist projects, particularly relativists who doubt 
the human ability to step outside their culture in order to take an objective moral 
standpoint. As Benjamin Levi points out, human moral capacities to identify and de-
liberate about moral problems vary and may be therefore founded in our social lives. 
He sees this as a benefit of principlism:   
It is in part this very recognition of incompleteness that distinguishes 
principlist theories from deductivist theories. Most principlists recog-
nize that we must rely on intuitions at some point and freely admit that 
in a secular pluralistic society it is important to subject how ethical 
principles are interpreted and applied to a dialectical process of emen-
dation (18). 
 
Of course, this positive benefit of the intuitionist basis for principlism is also its weak-
ness when one questions why the four principles are the only ones that have emerged 
as important to bioethical decision-making. Levi points out that certain other widely 
known principles, for example, the principle of “care,” have been excluded from the 
mantra, causing criticism by proponents of such views.15
Some supporters promote principlism by pointing out that it is not deductivist 
in its application, in spite of its elevation of four predominant principles, allowing con-
textual (casuist) decision-making into the process. Although theoretical underpinnings 
are cited as justificatory support, they do not seem to be required as basic to the actual 
use of the method. As De Grazia said, “It [the principlist method] acknowledges the 
lack of a supreme moral principle or set of explicitly-related principles from which all 
                                            
15 See Levi 1996, pp. 16-19, for mention of these criticisms, for example, the exclusion of virtue and 
other ethical approaches from the principlist list. 
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correct moral judgments can be derived” (1992, 523). To Beauchamp and Childress, 
each principle was set out as a prima facie duty, and yet they acknowledge the neces-
sity for one or more to be overridden on occasion due to circumstances, to be taken as 
action-guides rather than rules. As they said: 
A composite theory permits each basic principle to have weight without 
assigning a priority weighting or ranking. Which principle overrides in 
a case of conflict will depend on the particular context, which always 
has unique features (51, 52). 
 
The advantage of this approach rests in the flexibility and allowance for those 
casuistic, case-specific details to take their place in the process. But the flexible, free-
floating nature of the principles also has a cost:  how can one determine the weighting 
scheme for the principles, or determine which one should override the other, in cases 
where they conflict?  Beauchamp and Childress tried to solve this problem by provid-
ing a list of conditions meant to assist in comprehending how their procedure worked, 
although the conditions do not necessarily provide the clarity required for actual prac-
tice.  
The main criticism of principlism is that it is ineffective in situations where  
the various principles collide, offering different possible outcomes for the same prob-
lem or arguments about which principles should supersede the others. This can pro-
duce a classic dilemma: often the application of beneficence clashes with autonomy 
causing contradictory resolutions to a case. Furthermore, principlism’s defenders have 
not shown how more specific, mid-level principles or rules can be derived from their 
abstract initial “first” principles, especially in novel bioethical cases and situations. 
Conflicting solutions can be developed without violating any of their conditions, espe-
 28
cially by variances in how much weight to give each principle at any one time or for 
any one case. 
Richard Davis states that the principles cannot be effective surrogates for 
moral theory if each stands alone; instead, they must function in an inter-related sys-
tem, or they cannot offer clear direction for moral action (89).16  It appears that if the 
principles allow enough context, so that details count, they are not strong enough to be 
useful; if they are meant to be strictly applied, they conflict with one another. And if 
they stand as individual rules, they don’t make sense as to why one is applicable and 
not another. Thus the strongest criticism directed towards the principlist approach is 
that the lack of a system for determining the weight of each of the four principles 
makes it impossible to determine how they should be applied consistently, allowing 
for the generation of several, possibly contradictory, moral conclusions about an indi-
vidual case. Figuring out how the principles can be used to produce more specific mid-
level principles, or how to use them to “specify norms” requires more explanation. 
Specification of Norms 
By 2001, Beauchamp and Childress recognized the need to “reduce the 
amount of intuition involved” in using their method (19). They also suggested that 
their “dialectical process” was backed up by an inferred use of “Rawlsian reflective 
equilibrium to add requirements of coherence” to the overall project (200, 15-21).17   
Admitting that their principles were light on content and might not satisfactorily re-
                                            
16 See Davis’ article “The Principlism Debate: A Critical Overview” (94-95) for a discussion of the use-
fulness, or lack thereof, of these conditions in achieving clarity and direction for the overall method. 
17 See David De Grazia’s assertion that reflective equilibrium underpinned the work of Beauchamp and 
Childress in his aforementioned 1992 article, p. 520. Also Norman Daniels discussed its use in detail in 
his 1996, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Practice” (96-114). 
 29
solve hard cases, they adopted suggestions presented both by De Grazia and Henry 
Richardson, which attempted to define the weight and scope of the principles and tai-
lor them for use in individual cases. 
Henry Richardson had shown concern in 1990 about how the abstract nature of 
the four principles (or any general principles) could be narrowed into solving the re-
quirements of a specific problem. He agreed with De Grazia,18  
The idea is to think of principles and specification united. That would 
mean roughly, that a small number of principles – perhaps Beauchamp 
and Childress’ four – would, through specification, branch into more 
and more specific norms, reaching down into judgments about specific 
cases (1992, 528). 
 
Richardson’s goal included the idea of moving beyond the top-down, deductive rule 
application, or the alternative, bottom-up, balancing of principles schemes, and instead 
consider how general norms could deliver guides to action by becoming more specific 
to situations. He was opposed to the popular notions of “balancing” or “lexical order-
ing” of the basic mid-level principles as if one could find moral trade-offs among 
them; instead he suggested narrowing the initial norm down into a more specific, but 
closely related extension of the more general starting principle, to see how, for exam-
ple, autonomy could be detailed into helping to solve a specific case problem. For ex-
ample, if one assumes that it is wrong to withdraw hydration from a badly deformed 
infant on the grounds of beneficence, a conflict arises if the parents believe they have 
a right to make a decision to withdraw hydration. Following Richardson’s style, one 
could begin a specifying process which would lay out alternative thinking and add de-
tails about the child’s suffering, chances of recovery and so on until a more specific 
                                            
18 See Henry S. Richardson, “Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems,” Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 19 (Fall 1990): (279-310). 
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norm develops. Perhaps it would be wrong to withdraw hydration when suffering is 
apparent, but in this case due to an unconscious state, it could be permissible.  
To Richarson, a specified norm adds such information as “where, when, why, 
how, by what means, to whom, or by whom the action is to be done or avoided,” in a 
way so that the initial principle would not be lost, and the connection between it and 
the more specified maxim would be made transparent (1990, 289). This process seems 
to provide more clarity as to why one principle is used and another neglected, besides 
functioning as a “bridge between a general precept and a concrete case,” according to 
Richardson. Specification allows for making concrete decisions without “generating 
unacceptable implications,” or losing the “underlying motivation” and retaining con-
sistency among a set of similar problems (283-284).  
However, Richardson asserts that conflicting principles cannot be balanced in 
many cases, as if some middle ground exists (say between providing or withholding 
nutrition. for example), nor can weighting them offer a solution because each choice 
has opposite results. Here, one principle must be chosen over the other. In these tough 
cases, Richardson supposes that the ethical agent will be able to move progressively 
toward a reflective and specific action-guide by narrowing the more generic principles 
for each particular set of circumstances. In this way, Richardson hopes to have pushed 
the reader to consider the fact that most moral rules are non-absolute and not taken as 
binding until the context is understood.  
Richardson further admits that very restrictive uses of moral rules are not rea-
sonable because real life conflicts among moral rules are common, explaining why the 
qualifiers “most of the time” or “generally speaking” are so often used in prescribing 
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moral conduct so as to allow for exceptions.” However, he believes the need for ex-
ceptions is lessened when “specifying” is adequately done because then “it will be suf-
ficiently obvious what ought to be done” (294). He looks to reflective equilibrium as 
the basis for justifying these moral decisions because it allows flexibility in the appli-
cation of his scheme of specification. He believes that his process of specifying is 
simply reflective equilibrium brought “down to the level of concrete cases” (300).  
In the following chapter, I provide a broader explanation of coherentism, and 
more specifically reflective equilibrium, in this context to show how it offers a basis 
for justifying non-deductive moral decisions, whether casuistic or principlist, as in 
Beauchamp and Childress’s and Richardson’s styles of principle-based methodologies.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 COHERENTISM 
For a method of bioethics to be successful, we have now seen that it need not 
deductively produce moral absolutes. Instead it must achieve something more like rea-
sonable moral accuracy along with public consensus or acceptance, because, like pub-
lic policies in other fields, the results must be supported by good reasons and 
judgments and must be accepted by those individuals who are most affected if they are 
seen as valid over time. As Ana Smith Iltis stated in her recent (2000) introduction to a 
discussion of method in bioethics,19 the attainment of “useful” judgments, not techni-
cally “true” or “right” judgments, is the primary goal, because the judgments not only 
impact real people in an immediate way, but also occur in real public settings, rather 
than in academically abstract arenas. She calls for a “step away from theory” and to-
ward “choices, decisions and actions” because to many participants, “bioethics is about 
resolving cases in ways which can be justified to those involved but not in ways that 
are necessarily right.” (272-273). 
It is this practical approach that has encouraged interest in coherentism as a ba-
sis for justifying the approaches of most methodologists in the field, whether contex-
tualist or principlist. Deductivist methods are supported by a foundationalist structure 
in which their rules and maxims are derived from some core, foundational principles 
or beliefs giving justification, if not certainty, to their solutions to moral problems. 
The advantage is that the suggested action is supported by the citing of a more basic 
                                            
19 Iltis was promoting a special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy that was devoted to 
this subject in June 2000.The participants referred to by Iltis in this citation include Tom L. Beauchamp, 
Albert R. Jonsen, Carson Strong, Bernard Gert, C. Culver, K. Danner Clouser, and Henry Richardson.  
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and general principle. However, as I have already shown, even deductivist solutions 
can be thought wrong when different perspectives toward basic principles are at stake, 
or when the impact of the application of the principles on the afflicted person and fam-
ily cause contradictory responses. 
Coherentism is a distinctive and acceptable alternative to foundationalism in 
bioethics, because the justification for a moral decision is based upon a wider array of 
reasons. In coherentism, a belief (or an action) is justified by assessing how it fits into 
a whole system or web of beliefs and how they interrelate. Features such as consis-
tency with other held beliefs, connections to broader theoretical concerns, supporting 
links to the reality of known good or virtuous outcomes all work to add support to one 
another in a justificatory circle. In coherentism, the work to justify moral judgments 
does not only go from top-down (principle to application) but also bottom-up (from 
context-driven case to principle). The agent analyzes the principles and rules at hand, 
the larger available theories, and his or her own “considered” judgments, so that the 
outcome is defensible by its inclusion in a framework of mutually supportive beliefs 
and explanations. Practically speaking, the process of justification becomes more than 
a matter for an individual agent or committee to deliver by working through a prob-
lem; instead a more complex point of view, one that includes the standpoint of the af-
flicted party, is given credibility when it is supported by all those involved—the 
patient, family, the medical community and the greater public.  
The problem for foundationalism is that an answer might seem logically cor-
rect (as when the clinicans refused to withdraw hydration from the previously men-
tioned sick infant due to beneficence), but be nevertheless unacceptable to those who 
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face and must live with the consequences. Coherentism can surmount that problem by 
including the desired end result into the moral calculations (in this case a peaceful and 
painless death). If patients and their families, as those most directly affected by bio-
medical technologies, are not a willing part of the process, or if public objections are 
aroused, then even judgments deemed “right” from a moral perspective will be disre-
garded, since most people are unwilling to accept moral principles imposed upon them 
from above.  
Of course, coherentism has weaknesses as a form of justification for moral de-
cisions since there is no way to dismiss the possibility that culturally bound internal 
beliefs have not biased the outcome. If a group begins a deliberation with a point of 
view (say that abortion is murder), then coherentism provides very little reasoning 
power to include alternative positions. However, because it insists on investigating a 
whole set of possibilities, it is not necessarily restricted to narrow viewpoints. The best 
known coherentist method in ethics is reflective equilibrium, articulated by John 
Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, 1971. I describe it greater detail in the next chapter, 
especially its advantages in bioethical methodology. 
Principlism is a coherentist project because of the way it seeks support from a 
wide variety of theories and principles. Beauchamp and Childress correctly recognized 
that if their principles were to be successful, they must be used in a dialectical process, 
one “consistent with both a rule-utilitarian and a rule-deontological theory,” and not as 
an applied set of rules (62). They were trying to avoid obligatory rule-applications, be-
cause they realized that such rules, by their nature, must occasionally conflict, requir-
ing arbitration by some unnamed “derivative” rules, in a vague “process.” How could 
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such a vague process lead to justifiable moral judgments?   Critics were quick to pro-
claim their original set of rules to be too free-floating, essentially based in intuition, 
omitting the reasoning that might fully support their ideas.20  
The weak justificatory basis for their method did not initially trouble the au-
thors, although it has continued to trouble their critics. To Beauchamp and Childress 
such theoretical squabbles weren’t important. They underestimated the importance of 
moral justifications on a practical level, calling the use of competing moral theories “a 
trivial difference in specifying the material action-guides that must be followed in 
making particular moral judgments” (45). And yet they grasped that citing some rea-
son or principle to back up judgments was valuable to their methods, offering dialecti-
cal discourse as a preferred way to locate good reasons for actions. However, the way 
they described dialectical reasoning sounded like they were seeking something like a 
coherentist scheme. They wrote:  
Moral experience and moral theories are dialectically related:  We de-
velop theories to illuminate experience and to determine what we ought 
to do, but we also use experience to test, corroborate, and revise theo-
ries. If a theory yields conclusions at odds with our ordinary judgments 
– for example, if it allows human subjects to be used merely as means 
to the ends of scientific research – we have reason to be suspicious of 
the theory and to modify or seek an alternative theory…cases provide 
data for theory and are theory’s testing ground as well. Cases lead us to 
modify and refine embryonic theoretical claims, especially by pointing 
to inadequacies in or limitations of theories (15-16).  
 
Not only does this description sound coherentist, it was, perhaps, as David De Grazia 
later argued (and as I will explain later on), a sort of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium 
                                            
20 Beauchamp and Childress adopted the notion of “self-evident” basic duties of common morality 
taken from the work of W.D. Ross, but they glossed quickly over the details of how to figure out which 
duties were binding in which situations. See p. 52 of the 1989 edition of Beauchamp and Childress for 
their discussion on the role of intuition in their work. 
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they sought although the two authors did not seem particularly aware of the process in 
their 1989 edition. 
By 1990, when Henry Richardson introduced his ideas on how to “specify 
norms,” as a way to handle the conflicts inherent in applying any given list of princi-
ples, duties, or rules, he had mentioned “bridging principles” as the “mid-level norms” 
that allowed for deriving a “specified” principle from a more general principle, but he 
also noted that such a step seemed to depend on intuition, making the process “beyond 
the pale of justification unless something more was added” (1990, 284, 286-288). He 
was the first to point out that it was Rawlsian reflective equilibrium that had provided 
the means by which to move beyond the overly intuitionist structure advanced by 
Beauchamp and Childress for the use of their four “first” principles.21
Later, in 1992, David De Grazia went further in linking Beauchamp and Chil-
dress’s procedure to a process of reflective equilibrium, albeit in an unclear and unde-
veloped fashion. He complained of the vagueness in Beauchamp and Childress’s 
endorsement by saying, “At the same time, principlism, as presented by Beauchamp 
and Childress, has weaknesses, one of which is…that to the extent that reflective equi-
librium (which does allow for discursive justification) is to be used, it is not clear in 
what ways and at what levels” (1992, 524). De Grazia has since promoted Richard-
son’s proposals on principle specification as a way of achieving coherence in the over-
all set where mid-level principles, background theory, moral reflection, and judgment-
making all have a place, while avoiding the inherent weakness of reliance on intuition 
                                            
21 Richardson proposed a “coherence standard for the rationality of specification” which he claimed 
carried the “Rawlsian idea of wide reflective equilibrium down to the level of concrete cases.” He felt 
that this provided the “argumentative support” for his linkage between general principles and specifica-
tions (1990, 300). 
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as a moral foundation. He recognized that intuition could not determine a correct 
moral solution, nor could it determine whether a “specification” of a principle was 
correct. Rather, he promoted the idea that intuitive notions were “testable” by their 
overall coherence with a plausible “set of norms” and that when norms and notions 
conflict, one or the other must be revised to increase coherence and defuse contradic-
tions (528-529). This was basically a description of reflective equilibrium.  
In their most recent fifth edition, published in 2001, Beauchamp and Childress 
took the criticisms of their method to heart and began to openly adopt a “coherence 
theory,” specifically reflective equilibrium as a basis for their project. In their explana-
tion, they say, 
Method in ethics properly begins with our “considered judgments,” the moral 
convictions in which we have the highest confidence and believe to have the 
lowest level of bias…Whenever some feature in a moral theory that we hold 
conflicts with one or more of our considered judgments, we must modify one 
or the other in order to achieve equilibrium (398). 
 
They go on to explain the importance of “paradigm judgments and the need to con-
struct “action guides” that are coherent with the whole context of the problem at hand.
 This approach goes a long way toward saving the project of principlism from 
being nothing more than a checklist by which to assess biomedical activities or judg-
ments. However, Beauchamp and Childress have still not shown why their four prin-
ciples should be the basis of the process, nor how to go on when “paradigm 
judgments” are not available. How does one move from a core concept like “auton-
omy,” or “beneficence,” to make a specific decision such on the correctness of ex-
perimenting with stem cells for Parkinson’s Disease for example?  While reflective 
equilibrium provides a means to justify a decision, it is not clear which specific princi-
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ples are to be made part of the process in the first place, or how one is to “specify” 
down from the general to the specific. Before we turn to these questions, something 
more needs to be said about reflective equilibrium, especially how to be sure that 
one’s “paradigm judgments” or “set of norms” are accurate to begin with. 
Reflective Equilibrium 
In describing reflective equilibrium in his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls took it as the end result of a process of moral deliberation in which one’s per-
sonal views are contrasted with alternative views and compared to greater moral theo-
ries opening the door to reasonable revisions to be brought into the system until 
finally, one’s viewpoint is no longer revisable. He put it this way:  
This state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed 
conceptions and has either revised his judgments to accord with one of 
them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding con-
ceptions)…One is to be presented with all possible descriptions to 
which one might plausibly conform one’s judgments together with all 
relevant philosophical arguments for them (Rawls 1971 48-49). 
 
The equilibrium reached by this process was said to offer a reasonably good basis, or 
at least a modest justification for moral judgments, which is a considerable claim since 
any hope for isolating absolute foundations was not seen to be plausible by Rawls. 
In practice, reflective equilibrium is said to be obtained when one’s personal 
moral convictions are held up to certain selected moral principles for comparison and 
moved through a revision process until stability is gained. The selected principles are 
acquired by testing various conditions to see what principles are yielded; assessing the 
sorts of judgments that might be produced by applying the principles; considering how 
specific cases and situations might impact the judgment at stake; then revising either 
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one’s personal opinions or revising the principles applicable to the case until some 
kind of balance is obtained in which the principles and judgments coincide (1971, 18-
20). Rawls avoided either a “top-down” or a “bottom-up” approach, saying of his 
method: “we work from both ends.” The outcome can be taken as dependable because 
he said, “we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their 
derivation” (20).  
In trying to make this system of reflective equilibrium work to solve problems 
in bioethics, it is important to remember that Rawls was working in a different sphere: 
creating a theory of justice. Here he “selected” his overriding moral principles from 
his well-known thought experiment, wherein he advocated imagining oneself in an 
“original position” behind a “veil of ignorance” choosing the principles of justice to 
govern  society. The special principles derived from this experiment were said to take 
precedence over other moral principles if the goal of justice was to be achieved, and so 
they supersede everyday moral maxims. Furthermore, in order to work on a specific 
moral problem, it seemed to Rawls that the moral agent must be rational, have “con-
sidered” moral convictions, must be able to compare her moral convictions to what-
ever larger principle is at stake, take into consideration the salient details of the 
situation, and note any discrepancies or gaps between her personal conviction and the 
principle. The agent must then examine these discrepancies, thereby altering either her 
previously formed conviction or revising the principle to make it more closely related 
to the particular situation. If the principles and convictions match up then moral deci-
sion-making is successful; if not, one must return to checking one’s interpretations, as-
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sessing the capacity of the principles, and/or assessing the strength of one’s convic-
tions. As Rawls said: 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the con-
tractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and con-
forming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a 
description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable condi-
tions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly 
pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilib-
rium (1971, 20). 
 
This particular description of reflective equilibrium has been called “narrow” by those 
critics who believe that Rawls intended something more defensible than a simple fit 
between one’s personal moral judgments and more abstract principles. Norman 
Daniels, for example, pointed out that the method actually depended upon implicit 
background theories; in particular Rawls’s conception of personhood, society, and ra-
tionality. To Daniels, these background assumptions needed to be made explicit, so 
that it would be apparent how their role insured diversity in ideas and elevated the 
process of reflective equilibrium beyond banal circularity. He sought a requirement 
that background theories be more than “reformulations of the same set of considered 
moral judgments” already in play (1996, 22-23). One way to broaden the scope of rea-
soning would be to widen Rawls’s original scope into “wide” reflective equilibrium 
where the inclusion of many moral points of view are brought into play, in order to 
achieve a fuller account of morality, not just a circular local equilibrium. One way to 
do this, according to Rawls, is to insist upon a “condition of rationality” by the agent. 
Not any argument or set of considerations can be considered rational; some are more 
“feasible” or “reasonable’ than others (1974, 289). By ensuring that an inquiry has 
taken into consideration viewpoints outside the customary, and a variety of standard 
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moral theories, Rawls’ wide reflective equilibrium can surmount local and habitual 
moral customs, and avoid accusations of relativism. He believes that reflective equilib-
rium is a means of elevating moral reflection beyond bias and traditional thinking, by 
insisting that “no judgments are immune to revision” (1974, 288). 
Practically speaking, reflective equilibrium, as a means to solving moral prob-
lems is supported by the fact that individuals can hold within themselves a variety of 
contrary and dissenting moral positions at any one time, necessitating some internal 
give and take similar to reflective equilibrium if one is to attempt internal consistency. 
Group opinions enlarge upon the number of possible outcomes, illustrating a reason 
one can doubt the possibility that an individual can establish objective moral first prin-
ciples for her or himself, let alone provide such principles, or moral truths, for others, 
giving support to the requirement in reflective equilibrium that many perspectives 
must be considered to reach a valid conclusion. Rawls disavowed any attempt in his 
project to assert epistemological assumptions about the existence (or lack) of objective 
moral truths, but he did assert that the adoption of reflective equilibrium as a justifica-
tory method could provide the most satisfactory foundation for morality while holding 
metaphysical claims in abeyance.  
This fuller picture of reflective equilibrium, in the wide rather than the narrow 
sense, shows that it can provide satisfactory justification for the sort of “useful” judg-
ments required in bioethics, in spite of the complexity of the process taken perhaps too 
simply by its followers in bioethics methodology. The disadvantages in using reflec-
tive equilibrium as a practical tool for decision-making have been alluded to: specifi-
cally that it is too subjective, too dependent on intuition, too mired in relativism, 
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supported by an unrealistic conception of rationality, and that its underlying motiva-
tional principle is non-moral. The responses to these objections are similar in that re-
flective equilibrium (and coherentism in general) gain accuracy depending on the 
wideness and variety of moral input taken into consideration. More specific responses 
to these objections follow. 
Critique of Reflective Equilibrium 
Some critics argue that reflective equilibrium is too subjective. The intent in 
reflective equilibrium is to ensure that biased, selfish or parochial moral judgments 
must be discarded when faced with the consideration of broader and more universal 
principles; however, the procedure does not necessitate such an outcome, since there is 
no external fixed principle, such as the categorical imperative or the principle of util-
ity, no ideal observer, nor an Archimedean point by which to test the result. As Rawls 
said, “there is no point at which an appeal is made to self-evidence in the traditional 
sense either of general conceptions or particular convictions. I do not claim for the 
principles of justice proposed that they are necessary truths or derivable from such 
truths” (1971 21). Thus, the possibility always exists that either the principles at stake, 
the moral judgments being compared, or even the background rationality constraints 
might rest on faulty premises—specifically, the subjective beliefs of the agent—so 
that even though a comfortable coherence is attained, allowing for a firm judgment, it 
might nevertheless be morally wrong. R. M. Hare criticized Rawls as “advocating a 
kind of subjectivism, in the narrowest and most old fashioned sense… He is making 
the answer to the question 'Am I right in what I say about moral questions?' depend on 
the answer to the question 'Do you, the reader and I agree in what we say?” (82). 
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Norman Daniels thinks this problem is overcome because the process can be 
compared to scientific inquiry, where the amount of scientific convergence for an idea 
is taken to be tantamount to knowledge itself, while questions of truth are put off for 
future exploration. Convergence on the outcome of a moral process can be considered 
strong evidence of its acceptability and usefulness, while not constitutive of moral 
truth. To Daniels, challenges can always be made on the substance of a problem, but 
otherwise, he argues: “Do we really have moral truth, given convergence in wide re-
flective equilibrium?' is an idle worry in the absence of any specific research capable 
of destabilizing the equilibrium. In the absence of some particular, plausible way to 
challenge the convergence, the questions is tantamount to strong and unfruitful skepti-
cism” (1996, 37). 
Rawls does concede however that it is difficult to presume that his theory and 
its results can necessarily be extended into "non-liberal" or "non well-ordered socie-
ties," different from our own, perhaps thereby relinquishing the possibility of achiev-
ing objectivity by this method. 22
A second criticism of reflective equilibrium is that it is too dependent on intuition 
for moral reasoning. It is said to be too dependent on subjective moral beliefs for its 
starting place, and even more for privileging the place of moral intuition. Rawls does 
not take intuitive moral beliefs to be foundational, in the sense of Sidgwick, Ross or 
Moore,23 where self-evident propositions play a role, but neither does he totally dis-
count their place in formulating moral principles:  “There is no reason to suppose that 
                                            
22 See also the discussion in Rawls’s  “The Law of Peoples," written in 1993, and republished in 1999 in 
The Collected Papers, edited by Samuel Freeman (529-564). 
23 See his exploration of the role of intuition in his essay "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," 
written in 1980, republished in The Collected Papers as above, (343-346). 
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we can avoid all appeals to intuition, of whatever kind, or that we should try to. The 
practical aim is to reach a reasonable reliable agreement in judgment in order to pro-
vide a common conception (1971, 44-45).  
David Lyons (in his 1972 response to Rawls’s theory) criticized coherence 
schemes in general, noting their reliance on arbitrary intuitions as moral convictions:  
The justificatory force of coherence arguments is unclear. Suppose one 
assumes that there are such things as valid principles of justice which 
can be justified in some way; suppose one believes moreover, that a 
coherence argument explicates our shared sense of justice, giving pre-
cise expression to our basic moral convictions: one may still doubt 
whether a coherence argument says anything about the validity of such 
principles. For pure coherence arguments seem to move us in a circle, 
between our current attitudes and the principles they supposedly mani-
fest…To regard such an argument as justifying moral principles thus 
seems to assume either a complacent moral conventionalism or else a 
mysterious 'intuitionism' about basic moral 'data' (146-147). 
 
The Rawls defender, Norman Daniels, noted the force of the intuition objection when 
he worried that “Once the foundational claim about moral judgments is removed, 
however, we have nothing more than a person's moral opinion, however considered 
(1996, 83). 
The best answer Rawls has for this line of attack (as well as for the criticism of 
subjectivity) is to depend upon the wideness of the reflective equilibrium; in other 
words, the insistence on a variety of alternative viewpoints enlisted to encourage the 
examination and possible revision of initial judgments. His further defense is that no 
one begins moral inquiry from outside their belief system; prior moral judgments are 
always influential in the development of any moral theory, so that there is no point in 
ignoring them or pretending not to have them. However, wide reflective equilibrium is 
intended to provide a check on these basic intuitions so that neither the end result, nor 
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the overall theory, is dependent upon them. An additional constraint imposed by 
Rawls is to insist that primary moral intuitions, when taken into account, must be 
“considered,” “reflected upon,” or “reasonable,” because they may not be accurate or 
defensible from the outset (1971, 19-20). 
The third criticism of reflective equilibrium comes from the challenge of rela-
tivism. Since a certain degree of subjectivity and intuition are inherent in the process, 
how can reflective equilibrium surmount the idea that its solutions are accurate only 
for certain cultures or specified groups?  To Rawls universality is not necessarily the 
highest goal for moral judgments, because that would presume that all human goods 
are similar or can fit into a small set, or that all similar human dilemmas can be an-
swered by single moral formulations. Rawls is not monistic in this way, but instead 
takes a pluralistic view of individual and societal goals, so for him it is impossible to 
reduce the many goods that humans need and desire into one or even several common 
aims that can take precedence over the others (1971, 5). Although he accepts that hu-
man needs are rooted in an expression of plural moral goals and he acknowledges per-
sonal differences in individual goals, desires, conceptions and life plans, he denies 
total skepticism about the possibility of achieving broadly general terms of moral con-
sensus, as long as they do remain general and applicable to all. 
In 1990, R.B. Brandt criticized coherence theories for their relativism, espe-
cially the inescapable influence of society in the moral codes developed from them, 
and asked how such theories could possibly adjudicate among conflicts. He asked 
whether people would not choose to be led by specific moral codes for themselves and 
their own society (264). Presumably, groups would tend to formulate quite specific 
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moral rules to oversee their own happiness and well-being. To Brandt, Rawls’s moral 
pluralism is a serious shortcoming because “what we know about variations of moral 
beliefs around the world and their probable causes” should urge us to seek generally 
applicable answers (273).  
 But such general answers might be too restrictive. Because it is a fact that even 
one’s “considered” judgments can be strongly influenced by the norms of society, care 
must be taken to override those that are wrong or harmful to others. Brandt concedes 
that a useful moral theory “will not ignore ‘considered opinions’ and indeed will wel-
come them as reasons for further reflection, without holding that agreement with them 
is decisive for a normative theory” (277). Because of the variation among human aims, 
the goal of coherentist theories is not to reduce multiple goals into a single common 
good, like happiness, but to formulate procedures where overlapping forms of consen-
sus can occur without restricting their diversity. Even that broad definition of diver-
sity, however, may show the process to be confined only to liberal societies, which 
include a certain liberal conception of the person as a moral agent. As Daniels admits, 
He [Rawls] says that justice as fairness rests on acceptance of a particu-
lar ideal of the person and on a conception of the function of justice in a 
heterogeneous nation-state in which there may be disagreement about 
conceptions of the good…Whether or not justice as fairness would 
emerge in a wide reflective equilibrium involving people from dis-
tinctly different moral and political tradition is not something Rawls is 
ready to comment on, at least until the ideals of the person and other 
'background theories" of the other tradition are made explicit. In princi-
ple, however, the door is open to some form of relativism with regard 
to justice (1996, 116). 
 
Jurgen Habermas, in his 1995 exchange with Rawls, asserted that even if the 
Rawlsian approach were taken by other societies to be a natural means of assessing 
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morality, that would not indicate any proof of a more general and universal moral ba-
sis for it, because, he argues, the approach has a functional foundation, not a moral 
one. Presumably, a theory is less relativistic when consensus occurs, but neither con-
sensus nor majority agreement entails that a universal moral truth has been obtained 
(121-122). Of course, Rawls believes that one of the positive features of his “selected” 
principles for justice is that they are universal, and that the universality was produced 
by the special standpoint, the veil of ignorance, from which they were obtained. He as-
serts that anybody who can imagine a similar scenario would accept the same ideas. 
But the principles in bioethics weren’t devised from such a stringent standpoint, laying 
them open to even more skepticism than one might identify in the Rawlsian project 
(1971, 132). Can universal bioethical principles be formulated?  Many critics from 
other countries claim that autonomy, as one example, is too Western, too American, to 
be given the status we might want for such principles.  
This is a serious problem, ignored by the supporters in bioethics of the use of 
reflective equilibrium: whether the procedure can be removed from its original con-
text, where the main claim that lifts it above relativism is its dependence upon the spe-
cially derived principles suitable for providing an interpretation of justice. It is the use 
of those special principles that provides substance to the judgments that are derived 
from the process, and it is not clear that without such substantively defended prior 
principles, the process can deliver the necessary coherence. 
A fourth criticism of reflective equilibrium is that Rawls depends too much 
upon a notion of rationality that might not be reflected in the considerations of the av-
erage agent engaging in moral thinking. Rawls distinguishes between "reasonable-
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ness" and "rationality," where both are necessary as background conditions for his 
theory. To be rational was to take "effective means to achieve one's ends" (1971, 401) 
and to "rank options according to how well they further purposes" (143). But to be 
reasonable is put forth as conceptually prior to rationality because making and offering 
reasons is an activity that necessitates social cooperation: 
Fair terms of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutual-
ity: all who cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in 
some appropriate fashion as judged by a suitable benchmark of com-
parison. This element in social cooperation I call the Reasonable. The 
other element corresponds to the Rational: it expresses a conception of 
each participant's rational advantage, what, as individuals, they are try-
ing to advance...Familiar examples of such principles are: the adoption 
of effective means to ends; the balancing of final ends by their signifi-
cance for our plan of life as a whole and by the extent to which these 
ends cohere with and support each other; and finally, the assigning of a 
greater weight to the more likely consequences; and so on (1980, 316). 
  
This explanation is broader than many ascribe to Rawls, which is that his definition of 
rationality is limited to narrow self-interest. He goes to great lengths to make this dis-
tinction in his later work, because he understood that rational behavior can sometimes 
include non-moral acts when they are seen to promote one's individual goals and aims, 
whereas reasonableness requires a moral component, because other persons must be 
persuaded through dialogue to share the point of view. Agents must have the ability to 
exercise these faculties in order to deliberate in reflective equilibrium. But a problem 
lies when attempting to link this definition of rationality to reflective equilibrium: that 
of motivation. If moral behavior is motivated by the basically individualistic goal of 
achieving one’s personal ends, it seems to preclude altruism. 
The fifth and final criticism of reflective equilibrium to be considered here is 
the problem of non-moral motivation. Rawls believes that his “original position” 
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thought experiment spins off certain desirable principles because of his associated be-
lief that humans will always try to maximize their own access to goods or interests. 
While this desire may be thought to be selfish at heart, the realization that one must al-
low access to others in order to maintain one’s personal access to goods encourages 
fair play. Overall, it is supposed to be the desire to pursue one’s own goals that moti-
vates moral behavior because a rational person ranks “options according to how well 
they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires 
rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed” 
(1971, 143). 
Individuals in this Rawlsian type of social contract are thought to be motivated 
to behave fairly only because their own goals might be blocked if fair access isn’t of-
fered to everybody; the ethical content of the goals is not deliberated (11-12). Morality 
is a by-product of social cooperation. The plethora of goals can't be narrowed or adju-
dicated by any specific ethical principle or code of conduct, because of the danger that 
to reduce the multiplicity of goals into one, or even a few, means an inherent loss of 
freedom for some participants. Thus the principles at stake are those by which the di-
vision of advantages is acceptable to all – in other words moral principle has now be-
come nothing more than procedure. 
This is the most serious criticism of the use of reflective equilibrium in ethics, 
because it seems to undermine the possibility of altruistic goal setting. However, con-
trary to what some critics have argued, Rawls does understand that the personal aims 
and goods motivating self-interested, and yet conceivably moral, deliberations are not 
restricted to material or social benefits; they can include religious, humanitarian, 
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scholarly, or artistic goals, making self-interest a misleading term for the motivational 
impulse (1975, 275). Norman Daniels assumes there is a distinction between self-
interested, rational life-plans and moral life plans, because rationality is supposed to 
favor self interest when it conflicts with morality, staying directed upon the immediate 
satisfaction of personal goals, not universal goods. To Daniels the definition of moral-
ity must attempt universal inclusivity, while goals of maximizing one’s personal utility 
remain local in nature (1996, 294). But Rawls does not accept this gap between the lo-
cal and universal, at least when diverse people with diverse goals use reason to delib-
erate about and achieve their various outcomes. 
A different problem for a notion of rationality as coinciding with self-
interested goals, especially as it is supposed to motivate one to act morally, according 
to Barry Hoffmaster, in 1991, is that the procedural framework of self-interest doesn’t 
help to distinguish moral from non-moral problems. Psychopaths, for example, are 
perfectly rational in framing their life choices, but immoral decisions might be in-
cluded in their ideas about their personal best interest. Furthermore, sometimes moral 
decisions seem irrational when they don’t further our own needs and desires. Hoffmas-
ter says that “rationality in this sense [the Rawlsian account] helps to give form to the 
problem, but it is unable to provide a solution…it provides no substantive guidance for 
actually making the decision” (227). 
How then, with all these criticisms, can reflective equilibrium be put forward 
as the most advantageous way to proceed in bioethics?  Perhaps because bioethical 
problems are a mix of moral and non-moral, dependent on local custom and knowl-
edge, and new technologies, so that reflective equilibrium as a procedural approach of-
 51
fering fewer moral absolutes and more emphasis on diversity of goods and outlooks 
appears to be more practical. It can, in the abstract, incorporate a broad array of opin-
ions, beliefs, principles and facts into a procedure designed to thoughtfully constrain 
and narrow the diversity into useful, practical and immediate solutions to problems. 
But to be realistic, care must be taken to ensure that the process is wide enough to cap-
ture more than local, intuitive and customary viewpoints, and that reasonable answers 
are derived so as to avoid bias, discrimination and so on.  
How can such general precautions work? The only possibility is for some sort 
of conscientious procedure to be in place, one that sets out a process by which diver-
sity in moral opinion, moral principle, and moral theorizing be available and taken into 
consideration by rational actors. Unfortunately, this seems unlikely to be used at the 
level of the clinical ethics committee setting, which is the first and most basic arena 
for this type of problem solving. At that level, medical personnel do not have the in-
clinations or the training to pursue problem-solving through this detailed and broadly 
organized format. 
 In Part Three I will show that reflective equilibrium as a practical method for 
solving bioethical problems can be improved by adding a requirement for publicity. 
This means that when solutions are unstable or less valid at a local level, they can gain 
credibility and justification after wider levels of discussion and public input. But be-
fore I can make that case, I first must introduce the role of mid-level principles for the 
justification of bioethical decisions and then explore the actual way bioethical prob-
lems are worked through in the actual clinical setting.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 IDENTIFYING MID-LEVEL PRINCIPLES 
The advocates of principlist methods in bioethics, whether in the more or less 
deductivist frameworks, rely on moral statements at the mid-level range to justify the 
outcomes of their reflective equilibrium procedure in specific cases. For Beauchamp 
and Childress this might mean that a principle of beneficence or autonomy is invoked 
to defend a solution. To De Grazia and Richardson, it meant that a more specific and 
well-accepted maxim was produced, such as whether “informed consent” was ade-
quately obtained in a case of withholding nutrition. Even to contextualists, the ability 
to cite a general mid-level principle is a useful way to ward off dissent and gain accep-
tance for a particular decision. But finding the best and most appropriate principles for 
the case at hand is not always easy, especially if a principle covering a certain type of 
case has not yet risen to the level of general acceptance. 
Even more difficult is to cite a link between the local mid-level maxim and a 
broader, more theoretical principle on which to base the justification for a decision. 
Keeping in mind that the process of reflective equilibrium was said to require some 
input from general moral theories or broad principles to invigorate the back and forth 
dialogue, it is difficult to see how these are to be introduced on the practical bioethics 
procedure discussed here. 
Advocates of coherentist models, in the abstract, do not often offer details 
about which principles (whether broad or mid-level) ought to be considered when un-
dertaking the process of reflective equilibrium. Epistemologically, the structure of be-
lief is stronger when one or more starting principles are justifiable outside of its 
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relation to the other beliefs within the system under construction. In other words, it is 
useful to have a strong, fundamental core principle such as in those utilitarian or deon-
tological frameworks to avoid circularity. As I have shown, Rawls intended his special 
“selected” principles of justice, taken from his “behind the veil” thought experiment, 
to be the primary principles useful in preventing just such a circular outcome. He also 
advocated the inclusion of “broad standards and first principles” as tools to encourage 
reflection about the adequacy of moral thinking on the problem under investigation 
(1974, 288). The term “principlist” usually refers to those who take Beauchamp and 
Childress’s four principles as stand-ins for those broad standards or first principles, 
because they allow for an independent reference point, while constraining the ethical 
debate from deviating too far from its bioethical intention. These four principles can 
be taken as “first” principles in this setting because they have achieved their status by 
having emerged from a semi-public, ethical, deliberative process; although the com-
mittee process from where the Belmont Report emerged did not include the kind of 
special circumstances contributed by Rawls’s thought experiment to lend credence 
(and perhaps objectivity) to the principles derived from it. Nevertheless, there is no 
particular reason to find fault with the four main principles or to search for reasons to 
add to or subtract from them. The bigger and more important problem is to figure out 
the most appropriate and more specific mid-level deciding principle for a case, or set 
of like cases, and defend it, whether by its relationship to one of the four Beauchamp 
and Childress principles or on its own stature. 
De Grazia, for example, expressed no concern about the source or basis of any 
principle taken to be used in a reflective equilibrium process; in fact, he proposed that 
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Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles, or any other general principles, could 
readily stand in place of Rawls’s principles of justice to create a viable deliberative 
process, as long as a “specified” mid-level principle was the result. Indeed he stated 
that “different sets of principles might yield similar, or identical specification;” al-
though to him Beauchamp and Childress’s set were a “plausible starting place” (1992, 
532-533). 
Likewise, Henry Richardson, the main proponent of specification, did not limit 
the use of first principles in his model to any specific set. His assumption appeared to 
be that an agent starts with his or her own personal “ethical precepts,” expected to be 
“very general and abstract” (1990, 284). He says, “we may suppose that the deliber-
ators or discussants start with a set of ethical norms to which they are in some impor-
tant way initially committed. For our purposes, it does not matter where these norms 
come from, whether they change over time, or how they are grounded, if at all” (1990, 
284-285). For him, the problem was not the difficulty in identifying correct starting 
principles, but in figuring out how to work through the inevitable conflicts that result 
when principles are interpreted and used to articulate judgments. He suggested that 
appropriate principles are a product of the deliberative process, rather than a necessary 
external reference point. Starting principles are not fixed, but are revisable in the 
course of reflective equilibrium, as long as the specification used to solve a concrete 
case is recognized as honoring the original principle or its best revised version. He ex-
plains:  
The reason that the models of application and balancing do not exhaust 
the field is that they each suppose that the set of norms invoked in ethi-
cal discussion and deliberation is held fixed [but] as also implied by the 
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Rawlsian idea of wide reflective equilibrium, our norms are subject to 
revision. The model of specification starts from this recognition of re-
visability...This stability is essential to the claim that the initial norms 
are in some way brought to bear on concrete cases by means of more 
specific norms (1990, 290).  
 
As a more concrete example of specification, Richardson would take from Beauchamp 
and Childress’s general principle of respect for autonomy a more specific formulation: 
“respect the autonomy of patients by following their advance directives whenever they 
are clear or relevant.”  However even this mid-level formulation is unclear when ap-
plied to specific cases. He acknowledge the difficulty: “whether all cases of following 
such advance directives are cases of respecting autonomy may well be, because of the 
vagueness of the latter notion, too indeterminate to settle” (2000, 290). In any case, he 
thought that by sharpening or specifying a norm, while keeping the link to its more 
general, initial norm transparent, one could keep the justificatory procedure accurate. 
This accuracy was especially necessary if more than one initial norm could be seen as 
applicable to the specific case. In the case of this example all three of the other princi-
plist norms — beneficence, non-maleficence and justice — could be seen to be the 
most important basis for the application of the norm in cases where advance directives 
are taken to be the valid reason for a solution. 
Richardson is committed to clarifying a link between the specified norm and 
its parent principle, so that the “underlying rationale of a norm being specified can be 
laid out” and so that it would be clear if the specification was a concrete exemplifica-
tion of the original moral idea, or an expansion or revision of the original (1990, 292). 
This clarity is necessary because the problem with universal formal principles is that 
they don’t allow for necessary qualifications, (whether it be thought of as narrowing, 
 56
specifying, or sharpening), when they are couched as absolute statements such as “it is 
always wrong to lie,” or “one must always respect the patient’s autonomy.” Richard-
son asserts,  
the norms to which we are commonly committed are not plausibly 
viewed as formally absolute in this way. Rather, they are typically 
qualified, at least implicitly, by variants of “generally” or “for the most 
part”. This sort of looseness is a common feature of our norms as we 
find them, whether they be prohibitions, positive duties, or ends (293).  
 
Thus Richardson has a problem not only in specifying one general norm into a con-
crete action-guide, but in deciding which general norm is applicable to which concrete 
case for the specification process. Sometimes the choices are contradictory. For exam-
ple, when deliberating about a case of withholding a feeding tube, should one consider 
autonomy first (if the patient had written an advance-directive allowing death by star-
vation), or beneficence (if the patient seems to be uncomfortably in need of sustenance 
enabling forced feedings) or is there a better, more close-to-hand maxim to provide the 
answer?  One choice means starving a patient, one means force-feeding. It isn’t clear 
how specification solves this problem.  
Richardson underestimates the difficulty of making these choices by asserting 
“once our norms are adequately specified for a given context, it will be sufficiently 
obvious what ought to be done. That is, without further deliberative work, simple in-
spection of the specified norms will often indicate which option should be chosen” 
(294). Such a statement seems simplistic, especially when one envisions new types of 
problems for which paradigm cases and multiple analyses have not yet been produced. 
As Richardson has admitted, it would be hard to see how “specification could be any-
thing but a special employment of intuition” unless “the superiority of one specifica-
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tion over another could thereby be defended” (300). He hopes that such a defense 
emerges from the use of reflective equilibrium, although he has not yet offered an ex-
planation in its full complexity. However, even if he does, he has not given a way to 
ensure that the best set of “initial norms” can be enlisted, and even more disturbing, he 
doesn’t explain how one is to identify and weed out principles that are totally wrong in 
the first place, despite their cultural acceptance. For example, for many years it was 
thought beneficent to paternalistically refuse to divulge to patients their grim outlook 
in cases of terminal illness. Now that is thought wrong because it violates autonomy. 
How is one to choose when customary norms bias our outlook? 
Such counter-examples leave Richardson’s detailed version of specification 
lacking in validity, unless he can show that the first principles themselves are derived 
from a reasoned argumentative process, or from some other foundational approach (as 
are Rawls’s first principles) so as to provide strength to the justificatory process. And 
then, even if the justification for this process is acceptable, the next question is 
whether it provides usefully applicable, pragmatic solutions to bioethical problems. 
Carson Strong, a critic of the technique of principle specification, said recently 
that the practice of specifying principles “fails the test of usefulness; that is, it does not 
provide a practical method for arriving at justifiable resolution of specific cases in 
which principles conflict” (2000, 324). Speaking as a defender of casuistry, he points 
out that specification does not rule out the possibility that an agent is biased from the 
outset, so that she might lean toward certain specifications of principles that suit her 
predilections in a case, because “one must choose between alternative ways of specify-
ing principles, and this choice requires a prior decision concerning how priorities 
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ought to be assigned to the conflicting ethical principles in the context of the case in 
question” (327). 
For example, in the case where one must consider whether to withhold nutri-
tion from a malformed newborn, Strong points out that tacit principles about whether 
neonates have rights have been assumed from the outset. The facts of the case might 
be less important than the unspoken principles, so that one agent might tend toward 
withholding feeding, if he or she already has taken the standpoint that a cognitively-
damaged child has no rights, by virtue of its lack of a mental state, whereas another 
might insist on providing nutrition, even to a severely brain-damaged infant with no 
potential, because of the presupposition toward rights being granted to all life, even 
the unborn embryo. Specifying is unlikely to resolve such cases of conflicting primary 
principles. Casuists like Strong are not opposed to a process of derivation of principles 
to guide actions in bioethics, nor are they opposed to the practice of specifying norms, 
as long as each case is worked out from the bottom up, considering all the salient de-
tails and distinctions. Strong even takes such casuistic methods to be compatible with 
coherence models of justification. His complaint is more simply that specifying norms 
is not in itself enough of a method to be practicable: 
How are we to decide which of these (or other possible) specifications 
we ought to accept?  How do we decide which side of the issue the 
specifications should endorse – should they support or oppose provid-
ing nutrition and hydration in this case?  Proponents of specified prin-
ciplism would reply that we should choose the specifications that best 
enhance coherence among our total set of judgments and norms. How-
ever, how do we decide which specifications do this?  Herein lies the 
main difficulty with specification as a decision process: it requires 
some method, other than or in addition to the specification itself, for 
deciding which of the possible judgments about the case at hand yields 
the greatest coherence with our other judgments and norms (329-330). 
 59
 
For Strong, the casuist agent should first look for a useful paradigm case for the sake 
of comparison, then identify the main ethical values at stake. The next step is to out-
line alternative courses of action, followed by the final specification of the “morally 
relevant’ distinctions among the several similar cases, allowing for a particular, justi-
fied, decision for the specific case. Justification for the decision arises by expressing 
particular values in a “variety of ways” (331). To adopt such a procedure is akin to a 
coherentist model, according to Strong, although his notion of justification is some-
thing that emerges by comparing cases to larger values and paradigms, “bottom-up,” 
and not from a full-blown coherentist model where revision occurs “from both ends.” 
For him “the strength of the conclusions depends on the plausibility of the compari-
sons with the paradigm cases” (331). Validity can be found in case-by-case analysis, 
and not in consistency, so two similar cases might be treated differently, but both be 
equally justifiable: 
My description of casuistry given here and previously (1988; 1997; 
1999) are not expressed explicitly in terms of coherence. Nevertheless, 
the casuistic reasoning process illustrated here seems to yield a set of 
coherent judgments about the cases considered. Thus, casuistry can 
help us decide which prioritization of values in a case is most coherent 
with our other judgments (334). 
 
If we are searching for a “useful” method, Strong’s might be more practical than 
Beauchamp and Childress’s, or Richardson’s, because he seems to describe more ac-
curately how cases are actually resolved in clinical settings. It is easier and more natu-
ral for the clinician to call up cases for comparison either from his or her own 
experience, or from well-known published sources, so as to locate the most appropri-
ate initial principle or action-guide to begin the discussion. The problem is when the 
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paradigm case at hand might be inadequate, too simplistically understood, or too dif-
ferent in detail, or the clinician might not be aware of the best case available. As 
Strong said, this sort of casuistry might “make use of specified principles,” but they do 
not resolve the case or justify the outcome. He does not believe that specified princi-
plism is the type of method that an agent can actually engage in for decision-making:  
No one has shown that it is feasible, or even possible, to arrive at  
justifiable resolutions of concrete cases by specifying principles within 
wide reflective equilibrium, whether using casuistry or not. In the ab-
sence of a demonstration that specified principlism actually works, the 
claim that it is the most promising method for resolving cases is unjus-
tifiable (339). 
 
Tom L. Beauchamp has recently responded to Strong’s attack by arguing that princi-
ples and paradigms should not be seen as two exclusively disconnected moral entities. 
Rather, pertinent moral principles are contained within the paradigm, because cases 
become paradigms by virtue of their incorporation of various moral principles, max-
ims, and so on. He complains: 
Casuists sometimes write as if cases lead to moral paradigms, analo-
gies, or judgments entirely by their facts alone or perhaps by appeal 
only to the salient features of the case. But no matter how many salient 
facts are stacked up, we will still need some transferable value premises 
in order to reach a moral conclusion…When philosophers now speak 
about “the top” (principles, theories) and “the bottom” (cases, individ-
ual judgments) in moral philosophy, it is doubtful that these poles can 
be either a starting point or a resting point without some form of cross-
fertilization and mutual development (Reply to Strong 346-347). 
 
It is interesting that in critiquing casuistry this way Beauchamp did not give priority to 
his own set of four principles. Indeed he said, “In this model, no level of moral reason-
ing- comprehensive theories, principles, rules, or case judgments – is regarded as hav-
ing priority or as serving as a foundation for all the other levels” (347). In this 
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formulation of the coherentist process, even Beauchamp’s own four principles are not 
to be thought of as action-guides, but simply as tools for entering into dialogue. 
And yet, neither Strong in his defense of casuistry, nor Beauchamp in his de-
fense of principlism, nor Richardson in his description of specification, have answered 
how one is to proceed when a paradigm case is not available. How is a mid-level prin-
ciple to be located for a novel case in bioethics whether one begins with a more gen-
eral first principle or not?   For example, how does one go about deciding the case of 
the first “test-tube” pregnancy (Louise Brown), or the first insertion of a mechanical 
heart (Barney Clark), at the clinical level before the cases have been tested legally and 
debated publicly?  That is the subject of Part Two, where I will explore how ethics de-
cisions are made in an actual clinical setting, where both typical and novel cases pre-
sent themselves to a scientifically knowledgeable group of experts in the field of 
assisted reproductive medicine. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CASE SOLVING IN THE CLINICAL SETTING 
Very little has been published describing how actual clinical practitioners go 
about the practice of ethical decision-making on the job. Ethics panels with a broad 
mandate — those devoted to public policy — are better publicized, while the work of 
hospital and private clinics are not. In addition, most of the literature devoted to 
method is non-descriptive, abstract, and refers to ethics commissions writ large – the 
sort devoted to delivering national policy frameworks or providing oversight to public 
functions. Even though many important paradigm cases are described in bioethics 
texts, such as Beauchamp and Childress’s, the actual steps of a decision-making 
method are left unclear, other than to outline the steps taken in legal processes. By 
presenting a case analysis retrospectively, the textbook writer has the advantage of de-
livering a ready-made outcome for discussion, already set up for acceptance or rejec-
tion of the associated reasoning. However, in the clinical setting, comparable to the 
experimental work in a scientific laboratory, the clinician has to “work up” a case 
from scratch, a much more difficult and unpredictable situation, especially when simi-
lar paradigm cases are not available to provide guidance.24
Whether the ethics discussion is directed towards public policy or individual 
case-solving, one can assume that the work is done in group settings, with all the rami-
fications of interpersonal engagement entailed by the diversity and multiple relations 
                                            
24 An example of a prominent work devoted to method in the abstract is Jonathan Moreno’s Deciding 
Together, 1995, (7, 88-105), which provides a description and analysis of ethics in public policy. The 
distinct nature of the work of smaller and localized ethics committees, who must consider action in in-
dividual cases, is mentioned, but without details explaining what actually goes on in their decision-
making processes.  
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within groups. It is also clear that the deliberations of public committees vary in their 
rules and procedural content, regardless of whether they follow an established method 
or model for decision-making. Furthermore, they vary in their goals, since hospital-
based committees, for example, must not only make decisions on current cases but 
most likely spend time in retrospective evaluation and review of previous cases, so as 
to defend against future mistakes and litigation, as well as engage in educational and 
policy development for their institutions. Some semi-public ethics boards or commis-
sions are devoted to the policies of single professions, both larger ones, such as the 
American Medical Association (AMA) or the American Nurse’s Association (ANA), 
or more focused subspecialties, such as the American Society for Reproductive Medi-
cine (ASRM), which I discuss more specifically later.25  In commission work, real 
cases are only reviewed in an abstract sense, with no immediate consequences for the 
patients involved, though perhaps with more public import, while in committee work, 
actual decisions are directed towards immediate problems.  
In either case, the decisions affect the patient, and his or her family. Over time, 
the evolving role of ethics committees have intruded more and more into the tradi-
tional physician/patient relationship, both offering help and advice to the physician be-
leaguered by worries over lawsuits, but also interfering with the physician’s formerly 
clear sense of offering his or her expert advice to the less knowledgeable patient, albeit 
often paternalistically. As scholars like Moreno have pointed out, once the formerly 
sacrosanct decision-making power of the physician gave way to the democratizing in-
                                            
25 In this dissertation, I follow Moreno, in using the term “committee” to refer to the smaller, more pri-
vate hospital or clinic-based ethics groups, deliberating on local, individual cases, as opposed to “com-
missions” which are larger, more public bodies (1995, 7). 
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put of other parties, including the patient and family, there was no turning back to 
more private decisions. Moreno notes the impact when the values of autonomy and 
beneficence clash:  
The ethics committee movement may be seen in part as a creature of 
the transition from the traditional medical ethics that supported an im-
pregnable doctor-patient relationship to a new consensus about medical 
ethics...the democratic pluralism of ethics committees itself symbolizes 
the democratic pluralism that conditions modern doctor-patient rela-
tions. In a departure from the past, patients are now thought of as free 
and equal partners in that relationship. The transformation of the physi-
cian’s role has, after all, taken place over a relatively short time, and 
has initiated a period of uncertainty and anxiety about values which has 
given rise to the ethics committee (1995, 36). 
 
Moreno further notices that recommendations about what method, what membership 
model, what practices for decision-making (consensus, voting, the issuing of majority 
and minority reports, or any other model) are not set standards that have evolved into 
the stage where one style or model must take precedence over another. Even more 
problematic has been defining the role of the trained ethicist, who may or may not par-
ticipate in such groups, and if so, might be paid or not, might take part as a member of 
the full committee or act only in an advisory capacity, might take part in the discus-
sion and vote for specific outcomes or might only offer a range of suggested solutions. 
Commissions, as opposed to committees, are public, or semi-public bodies, 
and generally prefer to use the deliberative process to attempt to achieve consensus, 
according to Moreno, rather than basing their final decisions on up or down type vot-
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ing, because voting emphasizes disagreement. Ethical judgments are too important, or 
too meaningful, to be determined by a win/lose process. 26  As Moreno said, 
The usual reluctance to subject ethical questions to a vote seems to 
stem from a sense that ethics should not be reduced to a simple matter 
of preference…some believe that there are truths about moral questions 
just as there are truths about scientific questions, and that, like science, 
ethics cannot be governed by a majority view. For them, there is some-
thing discomfiting about voting on ethical issues; it seems tasteless or 
in some ill-defined way inappropriate to do so. Others worry about the 
“tyranny of the majority” and wish to protect those with sincerely held 
but non-conformist moral values from majority dictates, hoping that 
consensus will preserve a degree of flexibility in social relations. One 
manifestation of this flexibility may be a general decision to reach a 
“compromise” (13-14). 
 
But once this type of consensus is reached, it often has the status of policy or at least 
has created a paradigm by which good reasons for similar future judgments can be de-
veloped. Such policies are unlikely to be toppled from their prominence unless serious 
legal and/or public dissent occurs. For example, the recommendations that emerged 
from the previously discussed Belmont Report (from which the four Georgetown prin-
ciples were taken), devised for the purpose of constraining and regulating human re-
search, have become more broadly construed over time resulting in their institution  as 
guidelines for public policy, in all arenas of bioethics. 
Such power by commission has not gone unnoticed, especially by private phy-
sicians whose independence has become constrained by the advent of ethical inquiry. 
Their generic (non-specialized) professional organization (the AMA) has questioned 
the role and aims of ethics boards in general, as well as the quality and usefulness of 
                                            
26 Moreno’s expertise lies in the area of public policy implications and the relative importance of 
achieving consensus, rather than in moral theory or method per se, and his book is heavily weighted to-
wards describing the implications of consensus as a public policy tool.  
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the ethics advice directed towards them in the clinical setting.27 Donald F. Phillips, an 
ethics contributor to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), re-
cently asked: 
Can a field like biomedical ethics, which rejects the idea of ethical ex-
perts and encourages the assimilation of different viewpoints and per-
spectives, ever agree on what should comprise a body of knowledge to 
be shared by those who practice within the field?  Can consensus be 
reached on what constitutes quality in ethics consultation or how it 
should be measured?  What kinds of training and skills are required to 
do ethics consultation (1866)? 
 
From the standpoint of the physician expert, the bioethicist’s claim to expertise is 
shaky, especially among ethicists untrained in biomedicine and lacking sophisticated 
medical knowledge. Phillips cites his colleague Joel Frader, a physician and a clinical 
ethicist, who outlines some of the problems physicians have in taking advice and criti-
cism from outside their field. Frader questions the moral authority governing those 
making ethical decisions and asks,  “For whom does the consultant work?  Whose 
moral ‘rules’ should the consultant use, especially in hospitals that have a clear reli-
gious or ideologic tradition?” He names other sources of competing values that can 
emerge from the history, mission or cultural identity of the institution and from the 
subspecialties (1866-1867). 
An ironic byproduct of the growth of bioethics is that in a quest to avoid time-
consuming and costly litigation, hospitals encouraged the development of ethics com-
mittees, only to now question whether the ethicists themselves have become a target 
for litigation, because of their direct and immediate impact on human health and life 
                                            
27 See “Ethics Consultation Quality: Is Evaluation Feasible?” in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Vol. 275, No. 24, June 26, 1996, (1866-1867). 
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decisions. Along this line, Sheryl Stolberg recently reported in the New York Times on 
the growing concern about the power of bioethicists:  
bioethicists themselves are coming under scrutiny, and the kinds of 
bargains they strike with scientists and companies are raising questions 
about their independence…the field has yet to develop rules on work-
ing with industry. Some bioethicists accept corporate donations for 
their university programs, and others work as paid consultants for bio-
technology companies, leading colleagues to charge that they are being 
used as public relations tools and damaging the field’s credibility 
(“Bioethicists,” Aug 2, 2001, A-1). 
 
Given this upsurge in criticism and doubt about the status of decisions made by ethics 
committees, it is important to consider how their judgments can be thought credible 
and justifiable, especially when immediate and hurried case decisions are made. With-
out an understanding of the underlying method used, it is unlikely that the results pro-
duced by it can be easily defended. Moreno defends consensus as the best way of 
offering a defense to the public about the internal decisions made by ethics commis-
sions. But as Jan Crosthwaite emphasizes in a recent essay in the journal Bioethics, it 
is important to distinguish between “informed moral judgments” and “right answers” 
in ethical inquiry, whether consensus is achieved or not.28  She takes the position that 
neither expert opinion nor carefully designed procedures provide sufficient constraints 
so as to ensure accuracy in results, although she has not attempted to investigate 
whether verification procedures in themselves (such as those constituted by the reflec-
tive equilibrium process) might work to provide credibility to outcomes. About those 
outcomes, she said, “There is no independent verification of their correctness...The 
only validation for moral judgements is in the reasoning which supports them…Where 
                                            
28 See Crosthwaite’s discussion of the difficulty in listing the appropriate responsibilities in professional 
ethics and the associated duties for the professional ethicist  (361-379). 
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judgements are validated largely by the reasoning which supports them, it is particu-
larly important that they be presented in the context of all the options or alternatives” 
(372).  
Here it seems as though Crosthwaite is prescribing the inclusion of diverse 
points of view to add validation to a policy or a case decision, just as reflective equi-
librium requires. Likewise, it can be said that Moreno’s consensus goal isn’t very 
valuable if the published judgments have not included input from a variety of sources 
and people, otherwise they are subject to the taint of seeming to be only the opinions 
of pressure groups or lobbyists. But Crosthwaite’s fear is more specific: that a lack of 
humility, even in professionally trained philosophers, might detract from good moral 
reasoning and encourage the expression of ungrounded opinion. Moreno depends upon 
the process as being at least one way to add credibility to the moral judgments derived 
from it, encouraging objectivity. He advocates the inclusion of diverse points of view 
as an important factor for gaining credibility and an indicator of overall success when 
consensus is achieved, but emphasizes the importance of the deliberation itself: 
In practice this approach would be represented by questions such as: 
Have all relevant facts been gathered?  Have all important arguments 
and points of view been aired?  Has the discussion presented equitable 
opportunities for all group members to participate?  And so forth. This 
approach emphasizes the deliberative process rather than its prod-
uct...But why should it be assumed that a superior group process will 
tend to yield a superior product?  We are intuitively inclined to believe 
that a result reached by an intensive, informed, and open group discus-
sion of a difficult ethical problem will be superior to a result reached 
by, say the flip of a coin (1995, 129-130). 
 
While not giving a specific answer as to how one could measure success in attempting 
to answer bioethical questions, Moreno has taken the process as providing its own in-
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ternal support, as an indicator of correctness. While not advocating a specific method 
of decision-making, he does name principlism, supported by casuistic reasoning, to be 
the most useful technique. For him, it is unnecessary to seek an independent stand-
point, or moral principle, by which to assess and validate moral judgment, because he 
insists that the “formalistic differentiation between the process of moral deliberation 
and the justification of the results of moral deliberation is untenable” (45). As to moral 
principles themselves, Moreno takes them to be the larger values by which a group 
coheres, but not specific tools to engage in logical decision-making. He adopts a vague 
sort of reflective equilibrium as the “natural” style for working out moral problems by 
committee, while warning that the process alone cannot guarantee firm outcomes, es-
pecially when confronting new issues. He says, 
In extending a moral consensus into new and controversial territory, we 
open ourselves up to the problem that values may be less stable than is 
desirable from the standpoint of the overlapping consensus. For in-
stance, until the diverse members of the liberal polity are comfortable 
with the idea that artificial hydration and nutrition is a life-sustaining 
treatment that may be forgone if the patient or appropriate surrogate in-
sists, the values underlying this highly articulated principle of clinical 
ethics will be unstable (63).  
 
But it is in exactly such “unstable” and “controversial” territories that a locally based 
ethics committee is likely to be engaged. Lacking a mid-level principle by which a 
group of ethicists with diverse backgrounds and attitudes can be “comfortable” is the 
problem frequently undertaken by ethics committees, because they encounter tough is-
sues and novel problems, before society, as a whole, has adopted a position. 
One might ask at this point whether it is worthwhile to continue to place value 
on extracting or locating mid-level principles by which to assess cases. It seems plau-
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sible that a committee could bypass principles and assess moral problems in a case-by-
case casuistic style, acceptably for those involved. It is likely, however, that when a 
number of cases are heard, similarities will be noticed, comparisons will be made and 
inconsistent results revealed. Recommendations for future cases tend to be drawn from 
such experiences, often leading to the creation of guidelines and rules to assist future 
deliberations. In other words, mid-level principles tend to emerge. The harder question 
is how to accurately apply those rules to future problems and how to be sure the rules 
are morally sound. It is in this area of application where difficulties ensue because this 
practice occurs at a local level, sometimes involving novel cases where a handy prin-
ciple or rule has yet to be developed. In Part II, I describe some of these local delibera-
tions and show the difficulty of identifying mid-level principles and also in applying 
the best one to pertain to specific case situations. 
Few studies have been made of practicing ethics committees at the local level 
and it is rare to find articles in the bioethics literature describing their actual activities 
in order to ascertain exactly how they work through these deliberations. In one 1992 
example, Cynthia B. Cohen surveys twenty-eight health care institutions, describing 
their ethics committees in terms of their size and make-up; however, nothing is re-
ported about their methods or processes for decision-making. Cohen describes the use 
of varying models for case review, from large group discussion all the way down to 
individualized consulting, but she presents no actual data about the review process in 
itself. She writes 
Great ferment and experimentation characterize the case review func-
tion of ethics committees today. An informal telephone survey of 28 
representative ethics committee members from health care institutions 
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around the country revealed that request for ethics committee case re-
views increased at 20 of these institutions during the last year. More-
over, 12 among those surveyed indicated that their ethics committee 
was switching from the use of one model for reviewing cases to an-
other. They were choosing from among three basic structural models 
that are distinguished from one another by whom they authorize to 
carry out the review: the committee as a whole, a team derived from the 
committee, or an individual consultant (294). 
 
Cohen believes that a “full committee model” is better able to provide multiple per-
spectives using a broader range of reason and justification for their decisions, than 
small teams or individual consultants, although the larger bodies are slower and less 
responsive than the smaller models. However, she does not explain how actual deci-
sions are made, what method of reasoning or set of principles worked in gaining spe-
cific judgments, and how she measured the quality of the decisions overall. 
In a more recent and data-oriented article, Diane Hoffman and her team present 
the results of a study in which the group investigated the participants and their associ-
ated skill level in all of the hospital-based ethics committees in the state of Mary-
land.29  These investigators were particularly interested in analyzing the competency 
of the providers of ethics consultations, the ethicists themselves, by their experience, 
education, professional discipline and institutional support structure. However, spe-
cific cases and their outcomes were not analyzed in this study. Furthermore, the only 
investigation of the methods or processes used by the various ethics bodies was (simi-
lar to Cohen) to determine whether ethical judgments were primarily derived from 
group consultation or by the use of subcommittees or individual consultants. Hoffman 
and her fellow authors were concerned with the experience levels of those involved in 
                                            
29 This 2000 study by Diane Hoffman, Anita Tarzian, J. Anne O’Neil (“Are Ethics Committee Members 
Competent to Consult?”) is a result of the state of Maryland’s unusual interest in and legislative over-
sight over measuring costs and outcomes in their state’s health care industry. 
 72
this work, finding little proof of a coherent skill set or knowledge base among ethics 
practitioners. They write, 
There are no data on whether those currently performing ethics consults 
possess the minimum competencies recommended by the Task Force. 
In fact, aside from their professional disciplines, there is little empirical 
literature describing the backgrounds of ethics committee members per-
forming consults. No studies to our knowledge, have provided evidence 
as to whether those performing ethics consults possess a set of skills 
and knowledge base believed necessary to competently perform a bio-
ethics consult. There is considerable disagreement, in fact, as to 
whether those doing consults possess the “necessary” skills to perform 
the task (30-31). 
   
The investigators found in their study that fewer than one third of the groups estab-
lished as ethics committees had a “formally trained philosopher or bioethicist in their 
membership,” and that few members received any “training, apprenticeship or educa-
tion,” or even formal orientation or apprenticeship to assist them in their work (35). 
Furthermore, the institutional support for these committees appeared to be minimal, 
both by budget and staffing. The authors admit they did not study outcomes and had 
no independent way to measure the actual effectiveness, quality, or acceptability of the 
judgments made by these unskilled practitioners, both because they did not observe 
the committees or consultants in action and assess their decisions, and because there is 
no evidence that ranking the training and skill of ethicists measures the accuracy of 
their outcomes. Common sense, experience, and familiarity with such work might be 
as effective as training in producing accurate ethical decision-making, or it may not. 
From this study, we cannot learn whether certain methods or processes deliver better 
judgments. 
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Only one article on this topic provided some actual information about the  ethi-
cal reasoning of clinicians, although these were not trained ethicists, nor members of 
formal ethics committees. In 1996, Soren Holm and his colleagues presented the re-
sults of their study of ethical case analyses by bedside clinicians, none of whom were 
trained in philosophy or bioethics. The authors enlisted seven separate teams of nurses 
and physicians at five different Danish hospitals to discuss “representative” cases, 
each involving an ethical problem. The issues included the appropriateness of full dis-
closure of a health problem, and the role of family in health decisions (informed con-
sent and the role of paternalism). The authors monitored the style of ethical discussion, 
the level of ethical reasoning and the amount of agreement obtained by the various 
teams. 30   Interestingly, although each team attained group consensus as to an appro-
priate action for their case, the seven teams did not all come to the same conclusions 
about identical cases, even though each team was made up of similarly matched 
groupings of physicians and nurses. Each team was found to use more then one type of 
ethical argument to defend their judgments: a mixture of deontological and teleologi-
cal reasoning was common, even while reaching different conclusions. Holm et al 
wrote:   
In their moral reasoning health care personnel are neither consistently 
consequentialist, nor consistently non-consequentialist. Their moral 
universe contains both kinds of considerations, as well as considera-
tions about the importance of building or maintaining relations with pa-
tients, and about a professional responsibility towards the patients and 
their families (Holm et al, 172). 
 
                                            
30 The case examples used for this test of clinical reasoning were typical problems of paternalism, con-
fidentiality, and autonomy in hospital settings; the type commonly seen both in the U.S., and Denmark 
where the study was conducted. 
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The teams tended to begin “casuistically,” by listing the facts and details of the cases 
until certain mid-level principles seemed to emerge from the discussions — principles 
such as, “it is wrong to end life actively;” or “patients have a right to be told the truth.” 
It was striking to the authors that the largest proportion of the discussion was devoted 
to clarifying contextual details (the mental state of the patient, their degree of medical 
knowledge, quality of life and family dynamics) before decisions could be rendered. 
Also the teams worked more on elucidating their professional responsibility and duties 
than expected. And yet, the seven team’s decisions were split by as much as four to 
three in their final choices of solutions to the case problems. Although the teams were 
not pushed towards one method or another, it was expected that their expertise and 
familiarity with these sorts of problems might yield more unanimous results, but that 
was not the case. Even when citing large, universal, theory-based principles, or relying 
on context, or when looking to their own experiences, the discussions did not lead to 
consistency in the overall decisions. 
Holm and his colleagues speculated about the possible influence that one pow-
erful point of view may be held over others; in this case, the verbal dominance dis-
played by physicians over nurses in the discussions. However, it could not be said that 
this was the cause of the lack of overall consistency because, while nurses were less 
assertive, they were not disengaged from the process. Holm et al said “Twenty of the 
21 discussions were “real” discussions with long exchanges of arguments and counter-
arguments. There is good reason to believe that the individual participants were pre-
senting the best possible case for their point of view, and that they were putting for-
ward the ethical arguments they perceived as most cogent” (172). It was not clear 
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whether the differences displayed were because of the different professional character-
istics of the participants, their gender roles, or if some other social inhibitors repressed 
some types of input, but it is also not clear that it made a difference in the final an-
swers. More problematically, no method or form of discussion emerged victorious. As 
Holm et al put it, “The different choices made in these fairly similar groups indicate 
that the different moral considerations are played off against each other in complex 
ways, and there do not seem to be any simple priority rules which can resolve the par-
ticipants’ ethical worries” (172). 
This study, then, casts doubt on the idea that any particular method would re-
sult in defensible case solutions, although, at least in hospital ethics committees, it can 
serve as a reminder that some larger review process ought to be available to assess 
overall outcomes; perhaps a higher ethics committee to review ethics committee deci-
sions. 
Most hospitals have voluntarily complied with accrediting requirements de-
manding the inclusion of ethics panels in their institutions; also their troublesome 
cases are often vetted by legal counsel to ensure they do not blatantly run afoul of the 
law. However, physicians in private practices are under no obligation to hold their 
cases up to formal ethical review. Traditionally, the professionally trained physician 
has been expected to perform ethically, as a calling, but without much oversight, at 
least within the boundaries of the private practice. Only in controversial cases, when a 
lawsuit ensues, does the patient/physician relationship become public enough to bring 
troublesome issues to light. As I have said, many physicians consider the interest taken 
by bioethicists and by non-medically trained, self-professed experts into their work as 
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intrusive and uninformed. Celebrating the 1997 anniversary of the advent of the origi-
nal AMA code of ethics for physicians, the organization’s internal house ethicist, 
Linda Emanuel, challenged bioethicists to develop their own standards of ethical com-
pliance by saying:  “physicians have thought of ourselves as the unique center of ac-
countability [to professional standards] for long enough. Now physicians’ new 
partners in health care delivery must be held accountable to professional standards” 
(1268). On the same occasion, another physician and bioethicist, Mark Siegler, said:  
“The future of medical ethics is up for grabs. During the past 30 years, there is little 
evidence that traditional medical ethics has improved the practice of medicine or the 
care of patients. There has been too much talking, philosophizing, legalizing, and re-
form. The time is ripe for a very different approach” (1267). However it is still not 
clear whether adopting special standards or methods can calm the criticisms of the 
medical profession, or whether medical clinicians are better at performing medical 
ethics than those outside the profession. 
One arena where ethical problems abound but ethical review is not mandated is 
the private clinic, where physicians make autonomous decisions without much over-
sight. Of these, the most fascinating spheres of action are clinics specializing in as-
sisted reproductive medicine (often known by the acronym ARM). They are on the 
scientific cutting edge of research-oriented practice, and face novel issues regularly, 
although like other groups of private physicians, they are under no requirement to 
have their internal work reviewed by ethics boards. Many physicians in the field 
choose to seek certification and comply with the professional rules established by their 
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specialty association, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), 
founded in 1944 (also publishers of the association’s journal, Fertility and Sterility). 
Clinics for reproductive medicine (known more familiarly as fertility clinics) 
are designed to not only treat the underlying physical problems preventing pregnancy 
and childbirth, but to sometimes bypass those problems by creating a possibility for  
reproduction outside of the afflicted patient, whether the underlying infertility problem 
can be treated or cured or not. For example, instead of treating the infertile woman, 
they may suggest a donor egg to be fertilized and carried by a surrogate. Thus their 
“treatments” are not always devoted to the afflicted party. 
Assisted reproduction often entails what can be thought of as laboratory re-
search with human embryos, or at least, it sometimes works with human embryos in 
ways that are restricted by the federal government when federally funded. Such activi-
ties are not restricted when privately funded and have been carried out for many years 
in clinic settings, producing such routine current practices as in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) to achieve pregnancy. This disparity in oversight tends to be misunderstood, 
even by those patients participating in and benefiting from the practice.31   As Carol A. 
Tauer complained in a 2001 essay, “There are no federal restrictions on either type of 
research when carried out in the private sector. Extensive experimentation on repro-
ductive technologies, most involving human embryos, occurs in clinics that treat infer-
tile couples” (146-147). Where no government regulation of practice exists, no 
necessity of ethical oversight exists either. This disparity in regulation can be better 
                                            
31 Many of the pros and cons of research and regulation in the field of human reproduction, including 
Tauer’s, are set out in the volume Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research, edited by Paul 
Lauritzen, 2001, (145-161). Also see the recent New York Times editorial by Skloot warning the public 
about the lack of regulation in the field (A-35). 
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understood by realizing that from the standpoint of the consumer, practical research 
done with the immediate goal of pregnancy in mind seems more directly applicable, 
useful and therefore more defensible than research done in the laboratory for more dis-
tant goals. That attitude has allowed for basic, technical, and highly sensitive research 
into the origins of life to be conducted at the clinical level. 
But a stronger reason for this laissez-faire attitude comes from the privileged 
position given to procreative rights in our society. The birth of a healthy child result-
ing from the use of IVF and related techniques is the explicit goal of human embryo 
research which is of much value to society. As Carol Tauer admits, “Making such 
techniques safer and more effective is precisely the reason the research is proposed 
and conducted. This goal, the eventual birth of a healthy child, may be considered one 
of the strongest moral arguments to justify human embryo research” (147). 
Even though some critics complain that such procreative rights have been 
taken to an extreme, to the detriment of other social goals such as human justice (not 
to mention the religious goal of some groups in protecting the human status of em-
bryos, and the worry over the possible commodification of important family relation-
ships through the case of surrogacy, egg and sperm donations and the like), it is 
nevertheless clear that our political system has consistently favored procreative rights 
over the other values listed.  
     One well known defender of procreative liberty, John Robertson,32 supports repro-
ductive experimentation as basic to human freedom. He says, “Reproduction is so cen-
                                            
32 Robertson wrote his book Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies in 
1994 and then published two law review articles in 1995 defending his pro-rights philosophy. This 
quote is taken from “Reproduction and Rights: A Response to Dorothy Roberts.”  
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tral to personal identity and individual well-being that both morality and law would--
or should--recognize a strong presumption in favor of individual autonomy in repro-
ductive decisions. As a result, efforts to limit their use must satisfy the strict scrutiny 
generally applied to infringement of fundamental rights (1024). Of course, one might 
question whether the acceptance of such a “fundamental right” would necessitate that 
every type of related research, or the development of every conceivable technology to 
assist reproduction, must be accepted as ethical simply because it provides the treat-
ments that support such a right. From that point of view no regulation is acceptable, 
while from a less radical standpoint, regulation could be seen as an acceptable means 
of providing boundaries to the research without necessarily infringing on any human 
right of procreation. To Robertson, such regulation would only be permissible if it 
could be shown that “tangible, non-symbolic harms” were at stake, if the research 
were allowed to proceed. As we have seen, it is controversial whether embryo research 
not directly related to achieving a pregnancy, or whether any therapeutic cloning re-
search, is so threatening to the public good as to justify government regulation over 
private clinics. One way or the other, it is clear that the absence of government control 
over these types of private research activities has contributed to the tendency by the 
general public to ignore their existence. Tauer worries that public fears over big issues, 
like cloning, have distracted them from noticing other, perhaps more worrisome, re-
search enterprises, such as embryo research related to IVF in the private sector. She is 
one who believes that these technologies ought to be regulated by the government and 
finds it strange ”that a federal government so bent on outlawing any use of federal 
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funds for research involving IVF is at the same time so uninterested in regulating these 
procedures and research on them in the private sector” (148). 
It is not unusual for a private clinic to accept some form of self-regulation, 
such as certification within the norms of its association or (in the case of specialized 
practices, like office-based surgical clinics) to comply with national accrediting bodies 
such as the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Health-Care Organizations 
(JCAHO). (JCAHO does not provide accreditation for normal office-based physician 
care, nor the research that takes place in that setting, but it does seek to address the 
safety of surgeries performed outside the hospital.) Private clinics are not required to 
seek such accreditation, but might choose to do so if they care to situate themselves 
well within the accepted boundaries of legal and customary practice. Beyond accredi-
tation or certification, it is quite unusual for physicians in group practices to open up 
their decision-making to ethical inquiry – not only from external sources, but even 
more by their own associates in their own practices. This explains why so little pub-
lished information exists documenting the internal functions of these medical groups. 
However, one private clinic specializing in assisted reproductive medicine has allowed 
me to observe and participate in their internal ethics reviews. 
Introduction to the Clinical Observations 
In the next section, I present my observations and analysis of several years of 
ethics committee deliberations at a private outpatient “fertility” clinic, identified here 
as ARM Clinic (for Assisted Reproductive Medicine). But first, I must clarify my ob-
jectives and briefly introduce my findings. 
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The clinic’s ethics committee had been active for a year or so prior to my in-
volvement, but members had no special training in how to conduct case reviews, nor 
did they initially include anybody with experience or training in bioethics. When I 
joined the group, I acted more as an observer and occasional consultant (with voting 
privileges), but I did not attempt to advise in the use of a method or style of delibera-
tion. My interest was initially directed towards four general questions. Did they use 
any established model or specific mode of discussion to arrive at their conclusions?  
What sorts of internal rules or mid-level principles guided their process?  How did 
they come to closure on a case: by consensus or majority rule?  Did they have any 
means of morally assessing their conclusions? 
I had some preconceptions as I joined the committee. First, I suspected from 
my experience as a registered nurse that committee members would be familiar with 
the four Georgetown principles taught in many nursing and medical schools and I sup-
posed because of that they would use some form of principlism as a model, but this 
turned out to be only partly accurate. The physicians were more aware of the princi-
ples than the nursing staff and often mentioned “autonomy” as a basic tenet underlying 
their work, but no specific method was implied by that. The style of reasoning was 
more casuistic in nature with a specific case presentation, including contextual details, 
followed by an open-ended discussion. 
Second, I thought that the practice guidelines would include more “mid-level 
principles” of the sort I have discussed already, because these types of rules tend to 
ground many medical practices. However, fertility research engenders novel situa-
tions, making it difficult for clinicians to obtain timely guidance from the higher stage 
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thinkers at the commission or the professional organization levels of practice, thus 
ARM clinic created some internal rules to support their decision-making, but found 
these rules often inadequate or stressed by the details of the case problems at hand. 
Third, I found that the ethics committee desired consensus and worked hard to 
achieve it, but in some difficult cases resorted to a majority vote system. Consensus 
offered the highest comfort level to the group in assuming that the correct moral deci-
sions had been made. Issues that were decided by a vote implied dissent and there was 
less confidence in the outcome. Furthermore, the same problem was more likely to re-
turn for discussion again in new cases. 
It was clear that outcomes were also dependent on personal points of view and 
styles of the members. An outcome could vary by the variable attendance of members, 
since the physicians, particular, varied in their willingness to attempt new treatments 
and push the boundaries, and strong opinions could push more timid members into 
agreement. Over time, several firmly made constraints on the practice became more 
nuanced as more cases and more discussions led to new outlooks. 
My reactions to the case decisions themselves are varied; some seem correct to 
me, others do not. The problem is that the case deliberations do not often deliver a 
principle or a moral reason by which validity can be measured, and even if they did, it 
may not necessarily be persuasive to others.  It should be pointed out that I did not at-
tempt to evaluate the cases theoretically, in terms of their deontic or consequentialist 
characteristics, although I do attempt to indicate how different types of reasons were 
informed by those attitudes. In general, medical treatments in infertility are judged 
from a consequentialist standpoint—the physical consequences to those involved and 
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how the treatments can increase or harm their over all well-being—with the birth of a 
healthy child being the best indicator of success. But these treatments and choices 
produce deontological  and social challenges encompassed by asking what the world 
would be like if these methods for producing children become widespread.  
In any event, the theoretical implications of committee deliberations are com-
plex, as will be seen in the case studies, since the participants, both patients and clini-
cians, raise provocative problems from both consequentialist and deontological 
perspectives. Cases of risk to the participants in treatment were more easily handled in 
a consequentialist perspective, but more troublesome cases to the committee, such as 
homosexual parenting or creating an unrelated child from donor egg and sperm, 
tended to produce uncomfortable objections that I consider more deontological in na-
ture. However, the committee was not always able to formulate these sorts of objec-
tions or uncomfortable reactions into a clear rationale; this created a group of cases 
that I refer to as being settled by the “yuck factor,” described in more detail in the case 
studies and in a chapter devoted to the problem, both in Part II. 
Overall, evaluating each case for its theoretical characteristics is not the goal of 
the case studies produced here. Of more interest is noting occasions when or if mid-
level principles or rules or any sort of processes emerged that were useful to the com-
mittee in their deliberations.   
One reason it was difficult to assess or grade the committee decisions by their 
methodological or theoretical consistency is that many of these issues have not yet 
been considered at the public level wherein a wider array of points of view can be es-
tablished. It was clear in some cases that when a decision-maker confronted a new 
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situation of this nature without a paradigm situation for comparison, he or she tended 
to rely on personal perspectives such as their professional experience, liberal or con-
servative tendencies, religion, etc. It is for this reason that I did not focus in my obser-
vations on whether the decisions were morally adequate or not, but on how the group 
attempted to reason towards that goal. Selecting the most appropriate moral principle 
by which to defend their decision was not usually foremost in the group deliberations. 
Instead, other significant issues interfered; such as, defining the importance of the in-
ternal practice goals, deciding how rigidly to adhere to practice rules, defining the 
stakeholder so as to choose whose desires should be preeminent (the status of the prin-
ciple of autonomy), screening out medical problems to better evaluate moral problems, 
and assessing the consistency of the outcomes in similar cases (where some members 
were more desirous of adhering to rigid rules, while others were more willing to enter-
tain contextual distinctions). These concerns were important to the integrity of the 
group process and to the cohesion of the working members. 
Instead of assessing the decisions themselves, I chose in Part II to present a 
wide variety of cases illustrating how they tended to cluster into certain types of prob-
lems and how committee members managed them (sometimes reasoning towards con-
sensus, sometimes presenting varied arguments resulting in a majority-rules vote), so 
as to enable a focus on the process itself. Whether final decisions can be labeled 
“wrong or right” in retrospect, decision makers must grapple with desires and choices 
in parenting that affect real people’s immediate life plans. By displaying some details 
of the decision-making process, I hope to illustrate the difficulty in the notion that 
moral validity can be produced by applying some specific bioethical method to prob-
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lems in biomedicine. The case studies portrayed here lend credibility to my idea that 
no prescribed method in bioethics can guarantee perfection, or even adequacy, in 
moral results. On the other hand, improving the deliberative process by incorporating 
tenets of reflective equilibrium can work to improve the acceptibility, usefulness, sta-
bility, and strength of the decisions made. 
It is questionable whether this wider degree of deliberation can occur at the 
level of the private outpatient clinic. It would be rare for such a clinic to have access to 
a trained ethicist or to the various ethical theories and methods pertaining to their 
work. Furthermore, a clinic, even a hospital, would normally lack diversity in view-
points as well as membership by the nature of their make-up, and yet this is where 
novel cases enter the gate for deliberation. Better deliberations occur when problems 
are allowed broad, even national consideration. However, this often doesn’t occur un-
til inconsistencies become apparent, causing the legal system, professional organiza-
tions, or national commissions to engage in discussion. At that level, certain principles 
or guidelines become established, providing structure for those on the first level of pa-
tient intake. Even then, care must be taken to ensure that the deliberations are inclu-
sive, so that the answer is applicable to like cases. Otherwise they seem arbitrary or 
too narrow to be explained. This is where it is useful to follow the outline of the Scan-
lonian reflective  equilibrium that I present in Part III.  
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PART TWO 
IDENTIFYING METHOD AND MID-LEVEL PRINCIPLES IN THE 
CLINICAL ETHICS SETTING 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
ETHICS DECISIONS AT A CLINIC FOR 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 
 Several years ago, a well established and highly regarded clinic for assisted re-
productive medicine, situated in the suburbs of a large metropolitan area, decided to 
create an internally established ethics committee for the discussion of their troubling 
cases. This clinic, which I will hereafter refer to as ARM Clinic (ARM stands for As-
sisted Reproductive Medicine) has willingly included me in their monthly meetings 
since 1998, both as a participating nurse ethicist, and as a graduate student observer of 
their procedures.33  The overt reasons for establishing the committee were to set prac-
tice guidelines and review difficult cases that fell outside their established guidelines. 
Another, more tacit reason, seemed to be for the professional purpose of encouraging 
collegiality, both among the physician-owners, and among their professional staff, so 
as to forge basic group values, prevent internal wrangling, and possibly settle dissent 
over the types of cases accepted into their practice. The clinic’s culture is somewhat 
conservative; that is, it shuns negative publicity of the sort that might portray it as be-
ing an on-the-edge, anything goes, rule-defiant organization; instead the physician-
owners have attempted to project a less radical image. This clinic is unlikely to 
achieve the kind of notoriety spread out in the morning paper and discussed as trend-
                                            
33 In private correspondence, dated January 26, 2003, ARM Clinic allowed me to use the anonymous 
examples from their private deliberations presented in this paper. I am very grateful to the physician-
owners and staff members for their willingness to allow me to disclose for the sake of analysis some of 
their operations and activities. My intent is to maintain strict confidentiality, so I have withheld  identi-
fying information about the patients. 
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setting. Achieving collegiality was important to the physician/owners, for the sake of 
their business and personal relationships and also to merge their professional staff 
(nurses, technologists, social workers, etc.) into a culture where their variety of reac-
tions to their work could be dealt with openly and incorporated into a well-functioning 
corporate whole. Some of the health-care workers in this field exhibit more flexibility 
with the rapid pace of change and the adoption of new technologies in the practice 
than do others, who despite their expertise in the field seemed sometimes to be as 
alarmed by the constant evolution of technology in their field as an outsider might be. 
The physician-owners promoted the idea of inclusion and consensus, not only among 
themselves, but for the whole staff, so that the ethics committee has functioned as a 
sort of release valve for the discussion of “hot” topics. A broader but unstated value 
may have underpinned the initial creation of the ethics committee: a desire by the phy-
sician practitioners themselves to come to grips with the rapidly changing climate and 
complex internal dynamics of their chosen work, as it intersects with the boundaries of 
science and ethical choices. Those who work in the field have proven to be as inter-
ested, and at times as troubled, by the implications of their own work, with its new 
scientific and human possibilities, as are those making observations from outside the 
profession. It was noticeable to me upon joining the committee that different practitio-
ners had internalized different values, probably as a result of personal differences in 
religious backgrounds, cultural experiences, and  education and training. The physi-
cians usually express a more careful, thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sometimes  more 
liberal stance, as compared to at least some of the staff nurses, who appear to have 
maybe just “taken a job” only to find themselves disturbed by some of the moral ques-
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tions at stake. In some instances, I was surprised to hear members questioning the ba-
sic morality of such practices as surrogate mothering or sperm donating that are inte-
gral to the work of the clinic, as if they had not previously understood the implications 
of their own work.  
The monthly meeting was organized to allow any staff member to bring up a 
practice question or troubling case before the full committee.  Generally, however, is-
sues were added to the agenda by the case-nurse or attending physician, who brought 
cases up presumably because of their anomalous features, or their unusual context, or 
their lack of fit within ASRM practice guidelines for various reasons, or their overall 
novelty to the practice. When setting up its ethics advisory committee, the clinic had 
adopted certain conditions on its overall practice of medicine, mostly taken from (and 
sometimes more conservative than) the policies and standards already developed by 
their association, ASRM.34  These policies did not always prove sufficient for deter-
mining whether a physician should accept a case, or proceed with treatment, because 
they were not always up to date with the real cases presenting at the clinic, or they 
were sometimes too general to seem to fit a specific problem. 
In its current operating rules and procedures, the committee is open to all the 
physicians in the practice (although they do not all choose to attend every time), the 
                                            
34 Moreno points out that private ethics committees of the nature I am describing here are expected to be 
developed on behalf of patient protection:. “Whereas ethics commissions focus on policies that are to 
apply across institutions, ethics committees are creatures of particular institutions. Their legal and bu-
reaucratic authority is established by administration or by a medical staff organization, but their ulti-
mate responsibility is supposed to be to the patients. They are expected to be respectful of legal 
constraints, disciplinary integrity, and institutional protocols but also to be critical of them and, if nec-
essary, to appeal to higher sources of guidance, such as philosophical reflection. Perhaps the only ele-
ment of the modern ethics committee’s mission that is taken as mandatory is the protection of patients’ 
personal autonomy” (1995, 88). This goal of defending autonomy seemed to me to be less obvious at 
ARM Clinic than the goal of creating an internal basis for accepting or rejecting cases along with a ra-
tionale for doing so that would be acceptable to their patients.  
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social worker, the specialized nurses who manage certain programs (the egg donor or 
gestational carrier programs, for example), the responsible case nurse (each patient is 
assigned to a specific nurse for the duration of her care), a chaplain (who ministers at a 
nearby hospital), and a nurse ethics specialist (myself). The committee’s format is that 
individual cases are presented by each attending physician, but for the sake of objec-
tivity, the doctor does not vote on his or her own cases, but is instead bound to accept 
the vote of the rest of the committee, which includes at least one of the other clinic 
physicians. Otherwise, the case will be tabled until another physician is available. In 
this way, the full committee has voting power, but can be effectively swayed by the 
power of one of the physician-owners, who obviously carries the most responsibility 
and liability for actions and treatments offered at the clinic. The meetings are gener-
ally informal, incorporating lively discussion in a relaxed give-and-take style, both on 
the factual-contextual issues at stake, and on the more philosophical issues adding 
content to the case. The format is not set in stone, but changes from time to time. Con-
sensus is not set out as a formal goal, although it is striven for, and most cases do not 
require a formal vote, although sometimes a vote on a case or an issue is necessary 
when unanimity does not clearly emerge, or when it seems useful to make the differ-
ences of opinion and the reasons for them more explicit. Physicians tend to dominate 
the discussion and their opinions tend to take priority, while nurses and other staff 
members are more likely to listen quietly and deferentially, although sometimes the 
physician-presenter’s point of view is overruled, either by a fellow physician or by the 
other committee members. These ‘losses’ are accepted in good grace, although are 
known to be rehashed by the physicians privately. Occasionally a case is tabled to al-
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low for more thought; rarely a case decision is changed by the introduction of new 
facts or appeals by other physician members at a later date. 
I joined the committee as a nurse bioethicist in March of 1998 and have par-
ticipated in a few more than 100 cases since then. 35  I made specific notes on 87 cases 
(having omitted taking notes on some of the more procedural and pro-forma cases). 
While participating in and observing the ethical deliberations at ARM Clinic, I wanted 
to learn in contextual detail about the types of cases and issues handled there, so as to 
more clearly understand how the research and the medical treatments offered in this 
unregulated setting affected bioethics overall; also to learn what broad internal rules or 
specific mid-level ethical principles were applied or developed from the ethical dis-
cussions at this clinical level; and to ascertain or uncover any overt or tacit method by 
which the group made their decisions. Furthermore, I wondered how the members of 
the clinic justified their decisions overall. 
My findings on these questions, especially the various informal rules and 
methods, will emerge in the following case presentations; however, my overall con-
clusion is that this group did not, and probably could not, engage in the kind of moral 
reasoning described in Part I of this dissertation. Even those members familiar with 
the Georgetown Principles, for example, could not find a way to “specify” them down 
into more particular principles or applications for the cases at hand. It is not a matter 
of training or knowledge, but the fact that reasoning on the immediate level of the pri-
vate clinic is very difficult, both because of the concrete impact of the decisions and 
                                            
35 In joining the committee, I emphasized my interest in making observations of their activities and in-
teractions, their methods and results, for my own research as a graduate student at the University of 
Maryland at College Park. However, as an experienced Registered Nurse with competence in the field 
of ethics, I also contributed to their deliberations. 
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because novel cases appear here where the deliberators don’t have access to wide 
opinions or paradigm cases to help them think through the ramifications. Furthermore, 
private clinics do not and cannot rely on diverse membership, including minority rep-
resentation, although this clinic was unusual in not only forming an ethics committee, 
but inviting an outside ethicist (myself) and a chaplain with no particular medical 
knowledge. In fact, adding lay members from the public does not seem prudent to pri-
vate clinics for fear of negative publicity or lawsuits.  
My observation of the clinic’s ethics committee activities leads me to argue 
that the style of reasoning most conducive to well-accepted and morally valid out-
comes (what I introduce later as Scanlonian reflective equilibrium) must occur at a 
more public, more diverse, more abstract, and thus probably a national level. Mid-
level principles generated at that scale can then be made available to help guide the 
decision-making at the level of the ARM clinic. I will show in the case discussions 
how members of the committee looked for paradigm cases and mid-level principle 
published by their professional association to help them in their endeavors. 
In order to present the results of my experiences, I have categorized the cases, 
not only by topic, but by a larger bioethical framework in which they occurred. The 
first group, including about half the cases, involved what I call “risk and consent” is-
sues, where the primary concern consisted in calculating the acceptable amount of 
medical risk to the patient, or to the donor participants.36  When a certain level of risk 
or impact on health is at stake in treating infertility, the primary framework for ethical 
                                            
36 In many cases, it is important to be reminded that the infertile patient is not the only one undergoing 
treatment in assisted reproduction; in fact, he or she might not be treated at all, but be replaced by an 
egg or sperm donor, or a gestational carrier (this term is preferred to that of “surrogate” in reproductive 
medicine). 
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discussion becomes informed consent. During the four years I have served so far on 
this committee, forty-one cases, or about half, fell into this category. The “risk and 
consent” category can be further subdivided into two general sub-topics.  One is risk  
related to age, of which I heard twenty-one cases; the other is risk due to more general 
health-related causes, of which I heard twenty. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion 
of these cases. 
The second group consists of more complicated cases involving what I refer to 
as relationship issues. Here are the more novel cases in the field of reproductive medi-
cine, involving a variety of ethical issues: homosexual parenting; “baby creation” 
(when a baby is created for parents with no genetic relationship by use of donor sperm 
and donor egg); mixed genetic fertilizations (when sperm pooling or mixing of em-
bryo donations from more than one donor is used for reproductive purposes); and in-
terfamily or transgenerational donations. Each of these sub-categories involves 
unfamiliar and even extraordinary changes in familial relationships, causing ethical 
controversy. Altogether I have collected data on thirty-five of these cases. (Some of 
these cases exemplify interesting ethical discussions in more than one sub-category; 
i.e., they might appear in both a discussion on the ethics of homosexual parenting and 
on the ethics of “baby creation,” for instance.)  Chapter Seven is devoted to a discus-
sion of these more novel issues. 
A small group of eleven cases involve broader policy concerns. I do not dis-
cuss them separately, but they will be introduced when they fit into the case discus-
sions. They include more policy-oriented issues, such as the appropriate limitations on 
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sperm or egg donations, or the delineation of institutional responsibility for the upkeep 
of frozen embryos. 
Following are three figures displaying my categorization of the distribution of 
cases heard at ARM Clinic. 
 95
Table 1 
Ethics Cases Over Four Years at ARM Clinic 
Category: Risk and Consent
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Table 2 
Ethics Cases Over Four Years at ARM Clinic
Category: Relationship 
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Table 3 
Ethics Cases Over Four Years at ARM Clinic: 
Category: General Issues 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
 RISK AND CONSENT 
The types of clients requesting the services of assisted reproductive medicine 
are not generally thought to be incompetent in any way, nor do they generally lack any 
capacity for making their own autonomous health-related choices, although some of 
them, whether patients or donors, might lack enthusiasm for treatment and have been 
encouraged to participate, or pushed to the point of coercion, by other parties. How-
ever, some may lack sufficient medical information or knowledge to ensure that their 
choices are considered and thoughtful. The hopes and dreams of would-be parents, or 
the financial desires of donor and surrogates, may sometimes override their common 
sense. For these reasons ARM Clinic has put guidelines in place by which to attempt 
to screen for the most obvious indicators of reduced competence, such as previous 
medical and/or social histories thought to limit suitability. The most important of these 
indicators is the age indicator—capturing those who fall under the age of legal ac-
countability or fall over the age limit after which age is seen to be a medical barrier to 
a healthy pregnancy and birth. The clinic has depended heavily upon psychological 
and social screening, both by written testing and evaluation and by one-on-one inter-
viewing conducted by licensed social workers or psychologists, to seeking treatment 
or offering their services as donations. (The reliability of these services in weeding out 
susceptible patients is the topic for a different work, but in general, they appear to pro-
tect the clinic effectively from legal liability.)  However, despite psychological screen-
ings and medical evaluations, some cases fall outside the mainstream. There may be 
doubt as to the suitability of the client to undertake risk, or doubt as to how to evaluate 
 99
the reasonable risk to be assumed, or to estimate properly the chances for successful 
treatment. Out of the 41 cases I have categorized as “risk and consent,” half consist of 
patients whose age has either reduced their opportunity for parenting, or increased 
their pregnancy risks.  
Aging Issues in Achieving Pregnancy 
Reproductive medicine has not yet managed to induce pregnancies in women 
consistently past the age of about forty-four years, regardless of their previous status 
of fertility. In a January 2002 committee report, ASRM reported, “In a recent multi-
center review of 431 initiated IVF cycles in women ≥ 41 years, there were no clinical 
pregnancies in women ≥ 45 years and no deliveries in women ≥ 44 years of age” (3).37    
However, many women of that age, or on the cusp, are desperately anxious to proceed 
with attempts to attain pregnancy despite the grim facts. Some have been in treatment 
and want to give it ‘one more try’; others have missed previous opportunities for par-
enthood due to their personal life story and are reluctant to give up. Women of this 
age, or older, are often able to carry a pregnancy by use of an egg donor, but find it 
difficult to give up the hope of carrying their own genetically related child. Following 
are some case examples taken from ARM Clinic, set forth to try to bring out the ethi-
cal issues at stake, and to elicit the committee methods as they emerge from their dis-
cussions.  
                                            
37 See “Aging and Infertility in Women, A Practice Committee Report,” produced by ASRM, January 
2002. The reports, produced regularly by the association, carry a disclaimer that says: “A Committee 
Opinion offers consensus-based (or evidence-based when there is sufficient evidence available) guid-
ance relative to a given practice activity. This guidance, in addition to scientific and clinical informa-
tion, may take into account issues of ethical and financial concerns.” The reports carry great weight 
with affiliated members. 
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Example 138
In a typical example, a 45-year-old woman had previously used IVF to freeze 
embryos, but had not become pregnant after two attempts to use them. Because her 
physical, hormonal, and other medical indicators were good (she was referred to as a 
“high responder”), she wanted to try to produce more eggs for IVF. She was aware of 
the expense (which can easily be more than $10,000, depending on all the medical cir-
cumstances and medicines involved). Her case was presented to the committee be-
cause she was barely over their age guidelines of 44 years and 11 months. After some 
deliberation about her medical history (that she was a “young 45,” not a typical person 
of that age), the ethics committee decided to give her “another try for the sake of clo-
sure.” Discussion ensued as to the ethical implications of offering ‘closure’ as a solu-
tion, when the statistical chances were slim. One physician felt it was wrong to offer 
false hope, noting that by accepting the fees the clinic might seem mercenary, even 
though the patient understood and signed off her informed consent. The committee 
was clearly more motivated by beneficence than greed, simply unable to say no to a 
sad and wishful applicant. Some worried about the clinic’s legal position when the 
procedure failed, as it was likely to do, and the woman might, in a litigious world, file 
a lawsuit. Nevertheless, sympathy won out in this case, and the committee agreed to 
allow a last  attempt, as long as the issues were once more clearly laid out for the pa-
tient, consent forms were signed and she accepted ‘closure’ after this last trial (5/99, 
Case 1). Although no pregnancy ensued, the patient was satisfied. 
                                            
38 For the sake of reference, I have numbered the cases sequentially as I present them, but they are also 
identified by the case number and date assigned to them in my own personal notes. 
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Example 2 
 In a similar example, but one that illustrates how contextual issues add to the ethical 
reasoning, a 44-year-old woman, having had two successful pregnancies culminating 
in childbirths, followed by a tubal ligation, had after a divorce married a man who 
very much wanted a child of his own. The committee agreed to allow a trial to stimu-
late egg production, primarily again because of the personal sympathy aroused by the 
case, but this time by preparing the patient more actively to face her ovulatory failure, 
while encouraging her to evolve towards an eventual pregnancy enabled by a donor 
egg with her husband’s sperm. This solution would allow the couple to carry, bear, 
and raise his child together. The woman was within the age guidelines set by the clinic 
to carry a surrogate pregnancy (at ARM Clinic, the preferred term is “gestational car-
rier”), because despite the normal ovulatory failure by age 44 or 45 in most women, 
many are able to carry a pregnancy in their older years with the assistance of reproduc-
tive medicine. Here, the approval by the ethics committee included a notion of achiev-
ing “closure” for one medical procedure, but also adding counseling and information 
so as to allow a possible second level of success (10/99, Case 3).39
Example 3 
In another case where sympathy or beneficence overruled the clinic’s self-
imposed age limit, a political refugee had been forced to abandon her children in a 
war-torn country after having also been sterilized by tubal ligation against her will. 
                                            
39 Recently, new research has been published assessing the risk to the mother in achieving pregnancy in 
“advanced” ages. See Richard J. Paulsen et al in the November 13, 2002, JAMA, where the conclusion 
in this research was that “Appropriately screened women aged 50 years or older can successfully con-
ceive via oocyte donation and experience similar pregnancy rates, multiple gestation rates, and sponta-
neous abortion rates as younger recipients…there does not appear to be any definitive medical reason 
for excluding these women from attempting pregnancy on the basis of age alone” (2320). 
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Here, after immigrating and entering into a new marriage, she wanted another child, 
and against the odds, the committee decided to allow her to try for a pregnancy (5/99, 
Case 3). 
In discussion, the medical staff often found themselves frustrated by the grow-
ing number of patients who delay pregnancy attempts while approaching their age bar-
riers to fertility, and yet appear surprised when they realize that the reproductive 
limitation exists for them. Overall advances in the field have apparently led many oth-
erwise fertile women to misunderstand the age limit to their capacities and “put off” 
the decision to engage in reproductive activities until it is too late, although it is true 
that the deadlines have been somewhat extended by scientific success. Furthermore, 
the actual physical risk to a prospective mother embarking on a pregnancy in her mid-
40’s appears to be acceptable to most women in this situation, probably because of an 
assumption that in modern medicine, serious risks rarely lead to death, so that the 
overall reward of achieving parenthood is deemed worth the trial. However, certain 
medical risks such as preeclampsia and gestational diabetes are increased, causing in-
formed consent procedures to be taken very seriously by ARM Clinic (Paulsen 2322-
23). 
The concerns about aging and risk are similar in cases where infertile women 
have given up attempting their own egg production, but still intend to attempt to carry 
a pregnancy with donor eggs. Here, the physical age of pregnancy has been pushed 
into the 60’s in some clinics. ARM Clinic has somewhat arbitrarily determined that 
their age cut-off for such cases should remain at 49 years, 11 months, although the 
new research may encourage reconsideration. Besides the physical risk of pregnancy, 
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however, committee members have raised the concern about whether a mother of ad-
vanced age might find herself too old to raise her child to adulthood (if the average 
age of death in the U.S. takes place in the mid to late 70’s, then the chance for a 
woman who bears a child at 60 to live long enough to raise the child to age 20 or so 
seems statistically weak). More basically, committee members feel that post-50 preg-
nancies, by their distance from the norm, raise energy and health considerations too 
variant from traditional understandings of what “natural” pregnancies are thought to 
be. These concerns by the committee go beyond the consequentialist or the procedural, 
and are more deontological in nature because they seem to many members to be 
wrong despite any possibility of good produced by the overall outcome. However, the 
expression of good reasons proved difficult in these cases. Committee members ques-
tioned whether the clinic ought to push aside age boundaries set by nature and asked 
about the broader implications when doing so. (What would the world be like if the 
capacity to have late age pregnancies were available to all?  Is it right to meddle with 
nature in this way, even if there are no untoward consequences?)  However, the hesi-
tance in allowing late-age pregnancies seemed illogical to committee members with a 
more consequentialist outlook. They pointed out that a woman deemed healthy enough 
to carry a pregnancy at age 50 was in every likelihood capable of living beyond her 
70’s to raise the child, and that  women seeking treatment are often wealthy enough to 
pay for help in rearing them if they lose health or energy. Also, they noted that grand-
parents often raise children successfully, even in their old age, while nature carries no 
guarantee that young and healthy parents will necessarily live a long lifespan. 
 104
Some members who took autonomy to be a superior principle insisted that 
many aspects of life and death are out of our control (particularly our control over 
death) making it unpredictable whether or not any parent, young or old, might survive 
to raise his or her children, therefore, the choice of the parents to make their own deci-
sion to undergo late-age parenting should be honored as valid in itself. This argument 
was used to support the request of any infertile woman of varying ages to attempt par-
enting. But the logic of that argument did not win over some (both consequentialist 
and deontologically-oriented) members of the committee who worried about the rami-
fications for society if many parents moved to late-age parenting. The notion that 
autonomy must always play a decisive role, in bioethical decision-making, was not 
taken as a paramount concept to this group. 
Example 4 
In an example of an advanced-age pregnancy, a 50-year-old woman had re-
cently entered her first marriage, with no previous opportunities for pregnancy, and 
wanted very much to carry a pregnancy with a donor egg. Preparing a woman for 
pregnancy at this age cannot be thought of in terms of one trial, it is more of an in-
vestment in setting up a series of hormonally induced cycles in the woman over time 
where certain physical and medical factors indicate readiness. To the physician, it is a 
situation of “following the curve” consisting of an upslope in readiness, followed by a 
downslope, perhaps lasting three or four cycles altogether. This means that a woman 
entering treatment will continue to age as the preparations and treatment commence, 
so that to begin treatment at the clinic’s established limit of 49 years 11 months could 
mean that the date of an actual pregnancy will occur well after the age of 50. The 
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clinic is unwilling to start new cases beyond their self imposed limitation, but is some-
times hesitant to stop an on-going process. In this case, the added sympathy factor for 
the situation of the woman’s “missed opportunity” encouraged the committee to allow 
the treatment even though she was past 50 (1/01, Case 3). 
Example 5 
In another example, where sympathetic responses by the committee led to an 
exemption from their policy, a woman in her late 50’s had successfully carried a preg-
nancy during her 40th decade for her daughter who had lost her uterus due to cancer. 
Now, she wanted to repeat the experience to enlarge her daughter’s small family. Be-
cause it was argued that neither her health nor her physical status were appreciably 
different than during the previous pregnancy, and because she was not going to raise 
the child herself, the consensus of the ethics committee was to allow the late-age ex-
ception to the rule. In this case, the selflessness of the mother’s desire worked to coun-
teract concerns over the amount of risk and the “unnaturalness” of the pregnancy 
(12/01, Case 3). 
Age-Related Issues in Donors and Surrogate 
If it is hard to decide what amount of risk is acceptable for the would-be 
mother, it is even more difficult to make a decision when the person taking the risk is 
a paid surrogate. Age limits are even more restrictive for egg donors and gestational 
carriers than for potential parents, to avoid risk and maintain health. Nevertheless, 
even here, women seek to push the limits. 
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Example 6 
A woman in her late 30s, with a large family of her own, had previously served 
as a gestational carrier, and now wanted to participate again, although she was beyond 
the age guidelines, normally 35. The committee questioned why the age guidelines 
should not be breached for this fairly young carrier when older women with less suc-
cessful health histories are allowed to carry their own pregnancies well into their late 
forties. Other members were more cautious and perhaps paternalistic, considering her 
case to be slightly risky, because there is a reported tendency towards excessive bleed-
ing in women after multiple pregnancies; a few others were unsympathetic because 
her motive was predominantly financial, making the risk seem less worthwhile in her 
case. In the end, she was refused another opportunity, primarily because a perceived 
responsibility to protect women from their own choices assumed importance in a case 
where the risk was not offset by the gain of something presumed to be of more value 
than money, the bearing of one’s own child (3/01, Case 4). 
In this type of case, the problem is larger than whether to prescribe a set age 
rule, how risk can be adequately measured. ASRM guidelines are presumed to have 
been developed with risk in mind, but the supporting premises are not always clear to 
the users.  
Example 7 
Here, a fairly young egg donor had produced eggs in four previous ovulatory 
attempts. She wanted to donate again, but was refused because of ARM Clinic’s rule 
of limiting donors to four. However, it turned out that the ASRM guidelines have been 
recently relaxed to allow five or six donations. It has not been clearly medically estab-
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lished what risk is involved in stimulating ovulation, whatever the number, four or six. 
For the committee, the problem was to find some reason either to back up their origi-
nal policy or to drop it and adopt the ASRM number, and for help with reasoning they 
looked to the context  – especially the donor’s motivation for her request. Without that 
information to “fill out” the details, they simply couldn’t decide, so they tabled the 
case for later review. This was a good example of how, even with clear policies at 
hand, a principle of risk analysis needs to be clarified by attention to personal details, 
or very clear medical reasoning (3/01, Case 7). 
In other cases, reasoning about age limits is less about risk and more about the 
impact on the competency or capacity of the prospective donor to make informed de-
cisions. Many egg donors are strangers to the prospective parents, participating for a 
fee; but occasionally, the donor is known, usually a close friend or family member. 
These cases are carefully screened for coercion to be sure that full and free consent is 
given and also screened for legal considerations to prevent possible future claims on 
the child by the donor. Because of these concerns, the age of consent for donors is 
generally set to be 21, but occasionally a question arises about how rigidly to adhere to 
that age. Comparing two such cases illustrate how contextual issues can frame the de-
bate. 
Examples 8 and 9 
In the first case, a woman wanted to use an egg volunteered by the daughter of 
a close family friend who was slightly under 21. In the second case, a woman wanted 
to pay for the use of a willing, but anonymous, egg donor who was also slightly under 
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age 21. The first case was felt to be inappropriate, while the second one was easily ap-
proved by the ethics committee (5/99, Case 4 and 10/99, Case 5). 
To those who supported both cases, the age limit was thought to be an arbitrary 
standard, and in any event, set too high, because many natural births occur before age 
21, and additionally because the age of consent for such practices as voting, joining 
the military, independence from parents, and marriage is usually 18 and sometimes 
even younger in many states. But those who supported the age limit of 21 worried that 
because the medications necessary to encourage ovulation and egg harvesting cause 
uncomfortable and time-consuming side effects in women, it might eventually be 
found to have some overall health implications; reports have hinted that future cancer 
rates might be found to be increased by these treatments, although no sure evidence 
has so far been produced. To this group, it seemed wrong to encourage the participa-
tion of a young woman under 21, particularly one who was unmarried or childless her-
self. An associated concern was that the emotional experience of donating the personal 
genetic material embodied in an eventual child could be especially psychologically 
harmful to a young woman with no sexual experience at all and perhaps disturbing to 
her as she later embarked on her own sexual and family relationships. Should a virgin 
go through the physical stresses of medicalized ovulation, or even further, should she 
be allowed to bear a child?  Could a young woman under 21 assess these issues and 
make her own decision adequately? 
The committee reasoned that an anonymous donor, by virtue of the distance 
and lack of relationship between her and the prospective parents, was more protected 
against these possible problems. An anonymous situation more closely resembles a 
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business transaction where published safeguards and legal representation provide 
some institutional protection to the donor. In contrast, a known donor has only the pro-
tection of her family for support, which could be positive or negative depending on her 
personal circumstances. Many members, stressing the principle of beneficence, never-
theless support known donors because the young woman is thought to participate in 
something more important than money, the unselfish satisfaction of helping someone 
for whom she cares. However, the possibility of coercion, either blatant or subtle, 
could not be overlooked by the committee in these cases, and an added problem, the 
transgenerational nature of the transaction (to be discussed in more depth in the next 
chapter) proved to be too troubling to the group because it allowed for the possibility 
that the younger women could be too easily swayed or intimidated by the older. Some 
mentioned that such scruples seem overly conscientious, considering that egg dona-
tions are a growth industry on college campuses nowadays, even among women under 
the age of 21, and that sperm donation by young men is fairly routine (although for 
them, the physical risk factor is absent). However, in these donations, there is no rela-
tionship to the prospective parents, whereas in the known donor situation the impact 
for a young woman to experience and watch someone else raise a child with some of 
her genetic input may prove stressful. In these deliberations, one notices how the issue 
of motivation became very important to the committee as it attempted to make an ethi-
cal decision. Also certain background assumptions about the factors that might cause 
psychological harm or prove to make life more problematic to future people were ab-
sorbed into the deliberations, and became more important than the actual psychologi-
cal screening presented by the specific individual whose problem was at stake. 
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Frequency of Attempts 
If the risks in medically stimulating egg donation and/or pregnancy were 
clearer, the ethical answers would also be clearer, since much of the debate, as I have 
shown, revolves around potential risk. No matter the age of the female donors or of the 
prospective mothers, one cannot help but wonder how many times a woman can go 
through the physical demands of infertility treatments, egg donations, or surrogate 
pregnancies safely. Besides worrying that the treatment might cause future health 
problems, women must be concerned about the impact of fertility treatments on their 
current health, and in the case of donors, on their own personal hopes for childbearing. 
One reason to restrict the number of egg donations is that a woman’s fertile years can 
be “used up” serving others, causing a confrontation with her own infertility when and 
if she finally gets around to planning for her own pregnancies. For that reason, both in 
egg donations and surrogacy, ARM Clinic has preferred to use women who have al-
ready successfully borne a child, and are presumed less likely to worry about impair-
ing their later fertility. 
However, the clinic did not maintain or administer its own program for obtain-
ing gestational carriers, and kept only a short list of possible egg donors. More often, 
the client in need had to procure her own donors from known sources, perhaps from 
family members or from presumably reputable companies or agents, contracted indi-
vidually by a lawyer. More recently donors can be located on the Internet, where the 
legal and psychological screening may not be so scrupulous. Known donors, espe-
cially close family members like mothers or sisters, are valuable despite serious con-
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cerns about their age, numbers of pregnancies, and so on, because their desire to par-
ticipate is thought to be based on beneficence.  
Examples 10 and 11 
These two cases were similar in that the egg donors in both situations wanted 
to override the clinic’s limitations of four donor cycles. The difference was that one 
donor simply wanted to go through the process again, presumably for the money, 
while the second donor, who had previously contributed to a successful pregnancy, 
wanted to contribute to the same satisfied infertile couple again after they requested 
her particular services to create a half sibling to their first child. The idea that the sec-
ond woman had a more unselfish motivation, and that the family would gain by adding 
a genetically related child to their family, led the committee to accept the overriding of 
the limit in the second case, while rejecting the first (3/01, Case 7 and 5/01, Case 2). 
The clinic is less conservative in cases of women under treatment for their own 
infertility, putting no limit to the number of tries they might take to achieve preg-
nancy, because the risk, if one exists,  is essentially her own, not one imposed on an-
other agent, either surrogate or donor. The issue of how long to continue treatment has 
more to do with her own body’s success (clearly age-related) in generating eggs or re-
taining pregnancies, or her own current health, rather from any concern about unpre-
dictable future health risks. 
But there is one more reason, other than health risks, to worry about the num-
ber of donations to be allowed by both egg and sperm donors and that is the desire to 
prevent future reproduction among related couples.  
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Consanguinity 
ARM Clinic allows four, or rarely five, egg donations from a single female do-
nor (as I have mentioned, ASRM allows six), which might produce in theory as many 
as 25 pregnancies from a single donor because each donation can average five em-
bryos (although in practice some are stored and left unused). Although not every fertil-
ized egg results in a pregnancy, it is conceivable that since many embryos are frozen 
for possible later use, a possibility for many live births in one geographical area exists. 
It is thought that by limiting the number to about 25, the possibility of future consang-
uineous relationships is deterred. (Consanguineous relationships are those where sex-
ual relations between closely related pairs, such as siblings or half-siblings, might 
produce children). The rule on male sperm donors is to generally restrict them to the 
production of 10 children from their donations in any one geographical area, although 
some clinics allow a far larger number. 
The problem of consanguinity has been assessed by epidemiologists, who de-
clare that both hypothetically and mathematically, it is unlikely to be a problem, even 
in a small locale. Nevertheless, ASRM guidelines are set to limit the possibility as 
much as is feasible. Only in the future will this risk be made more apparent, if DNA 
testing or record-keeping on children born of these new techniques becomes more rou-
tine, so that the knowledge is more readily available. We are only beginning to reach 
the time in which children born of these reproductive practices are reaching marriage-
able ages. 
Overall concerns about risk in reproductive medicine are complicated by the 
fact that even the natural, unmedicated state of pregnancy, and the various hormonal 
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cycles of nature, carry a certain amount of risk: e.g., ovarian cysts, tubal pregnancies, 
blood clots, miscarriages, hemorrhage, toxemia, and so on. So far, I have discussed 
cases of risk avoidance, but at times the committee has been faced with the question of 
how to evaluate the reasonableness of health risks women will accept for a pregnancy. 
Some women have been willing to go too far to protect themselves by looking to sur-
rogate pregnancies unnecessarily. Others have willingly ignored serious concomitant 
health threats to themselves as they proceed with fertility treatments. This introduces a 
strategy used by members of the ethics committee at ARM Clinic: “doing the medi-
cine first.”  This involves an attempt to distinguish medical issues before embarking 
on a conversation about ethical issues. 
Doing the Medicine First: Concomitant Illness 
Physicians believe, in general, that they have a responsibility to protect their 
patients from assuming too much risk, but in a few examples, some women want to 
escape risk altogether. Should reproductive medicine be used to transfer the problems 
of fertility and pregnancy onto other agents without a good reason?    
Example 12 
In one case a woman had previously carried a multiple birth pregnancy, after 
receiving fertility treatment, and she wanted another child. However, she did not want 
to endure the discomfort and inconvenience of stimulating ovulation, with the atten-
dant possibility of multiple births; instead she wanted IVF so that she could control the 
number of embryos. While it may seem reasonable to use caution to prevent multiples, 
the use of IVF as an insurance policy was seen as “over-medicalizing” her problems 
by using more intrusive treatment than was warranted by the features of the original 
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infertility problem. Other contextual issues, such as the woman’s obsessive exercise 
and weight control, seemed to indicate a pattern of attempting to over-control events. 
She was advised to stay focused on the routine inducement of fertility by medication 
because IVF was thought unnecessary if she cooperated in basic treatments (8/99, 
Case 4). 
However, this case led the committee into a discussion on how to distinguish 
between medical therapy versus life enhancement. How far is it appropriate to go in 
assisting reproduction when the issue is discomfort or inconvenience, rather than risk?  
Would complaints about headaches or mental health issues, or perhaps busy work 
schedules, be worthy of enlisting a surrogate to carry a pregnancy?  To the physicians 
at ARM Clinic, although agreeing that no bright line separated correct from incorrect 
approaches to this problem, clarity could be achieved by what they referred to as “do-
ing the medicine before doing the ethics,” because often then the ethical question was 
dissolved. What this means is that the focus should always remain on the physical 
symptoms, medical diagnosis and available treatments before moving toward more 
complex solutions or debating the morality of a problem. Many ethical problems dis-
appear when a medical solution to infertility is found. This might mean that a repair of 
a woman’s ovaries or a treatment to enhance sperm production in the male can inter-
rupt the need for donors or surrogates, for example. Only when all medical or surgical 
treatments have been tried is it necessary to turn to “hard” solutions, so that the ethical 
problem might be resolved or is delayed for later, perhaps more complex discussion, if 
not entirely put off. This approach can be understood by looking at some cases where 
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women suffered from illness but where the level of risk in attempting childbearing was 
uncertain. 
Examples 13 & 14 
In these two examples, each woman wanted to use a gestational carrier to carry 
her pregnancy because of her problematic health history; one had a severe clotting 
disorder, causing bleeding and necessitating the ongoing use of drugs; the other was 
taking the drug Tamoxifen to ward off a future recurrence of breast cancer. Although 
the exact health risks of pregnancy in both cases were unknown, they seemed to pro-
vide reason enough to validate the use of surrogates. ARM Clinic never forgets that 
the use of such carriers  is, in fact, pushing risk onto someone else, but presumably to 
a much lesser degree than was present to the original patient; however, they don’t 
want to embark on a new discussion about the morality of the use of surrogacy in gen-
eral each time the need for it arises. By comparing known similar cases, by investigat-
ing actual medical options, and by assessing statistical known risk (when it is 
quantified) the decision about the ethical implication of using surrogates for these two 
cases disappeared and the outcomes were determined by “medicine” alone (9/98, Case 
2; 10/99, Case 2). Doing the medicine first decreased the tension in the ethical deci-
sion at stake, although the moral problem might arise again in a hard case. 
Example 15 
However, in an opposing example, a woman wanted to create and freeze em-
bryos for use in a future IVF pregnancy, because her husband traveled frequently, 
missing opportunities for her impregnation when her cyclical readiness had been pre-
pared by fertility medications. By starting with “medicine first,” the woman was not 
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seen to be a candidate for the more intrusive and expensive treatment of IVF, because 
her implied need was based on logistics or expedience and not required by her health. 
To the physicians, this case appeared to be “social medicine,” intended to simplify a 
lifestyle problem. And yet, it appeared pregnancy would never spontaneously occur 
for this couple without help, so a compromise idea developed:  to freeze the husband’s 
sperm to be used for insemination when he was unavailable and she was ovulating. 
The hard ethical decision of “social medicine” was deferred, or at least diminished, by 
thinking of the simplest medical solution first (12/01, Case 2).  
However, in many cases, it is difficult to evaluate the risk from concomitant 
illness or difficult to determine the personal risk that an autonomous agent ought to be 
allowed to assume, so that doing the medicine first is not a simple series of steps.  
Examples 16-18 
Each of these three examples were solved by “doing the medicine first,” but in 
different ways. In Case 16, a woman with a history of ovarian cancer wanted to at-
tempt to generate eggs from her only remaining ovary, to preserve for a possible, fu-
ture IVF pregnancy, before the ovary was surgically removed as was thought 
necessary by her prognosis. Her form of cancer was not hormone-dependent, decreas-
ing the danger of its recurrence while being treated, so it was believed safe to allow 
the fertility treatments to proceed (5/99, Case 2). She was at risk, but the medical de-
terminations allowed the ethics of the decision (if she should become a mother, the 
possibility that her life span could be dramatically shortened by the disease) to remain 
on the back burner, so to speak. 
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But in another case of cancer (Case 17), assessing the situation through the 
lens of “medicine first” was more difficult. This woman required a hysterectomy due 
to a “molar” pregnancy, a cancerous condition, but one with a high cure rate after 
treatment; she now wanted to generate her own egg to be fertilized by her husband’s 
sperm and placed in a gestational carrier so the couple could produce their own child. 
For her, and for any possible children, the risk was deemed reasonably low. However, 
the scientific question at stake was whether transferring her egg to a gestational carrier 
might also transfer molar material, increasing risk to the surrogate carrier. Although 
medical knowledge was sparse, it was believed that the process of ICSI40 could reduce 
the risk. Here the difficult problem was that the lack of a good medical paradigm case 
by which to quantify the risk made the ethical paradigm more important. How could 
reasonably informed consent be obtained under such questionable circumstances when 
medicine can’t fully legitimize an opinion? 
In Case 18, a woman with a previous history of Hepatitis C and sexually 
transmitted diseases refused to take an HIV test.  It was easy to dismiss her as a candi-
date for treatment, not because of the difficulty in assessing the risk to her or the pro-
spective child, but because her deceptive behavior or her denial about the reality of her 
health problems made it impossible to calculate the level of risk overall (2/01, Case 5). 
Here, doing the medicine first allowed the question of whether fertility treatments 
should be offered to someone infected with HIV to be delayed; in effect, dismissing 
                                            
40 ICSI is an acronym for “intra cytoplasmic sperm injection,” where a single sperm is injected into an 
egg, increasing chances for fertility in sterile men, and creating a greater likelihood for viable embryos 
to be transferred to the surrogate.  
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the case based on her previous history and poor psychological evaluation by the social 
workers. 
HIV Cases 
Cases of HIV infection are good examples of how “doing the medicine first” 
can contribute to the solution of the ethical problem at stake or delay the necessity to 
decide hard cases. 
Example 19 
An HIV-positive woman wanted to use IVF to attain pregnancy with her non-
infected husband, so as to keep him free of the possibility of contracting the disease. 
The question was whether stimulating an egg from the infected woman was an ethical 
activity even though current medical knowledge indicated a high possibility of pre-
venting disease transmission to a child in pregnancy by aggressively treating the 
mother. Besides the risk assumed by the prospective child, the ethics committee won-
dered about the level of risk that could and should be assumed by the staff members at 
ARM Clinic. They have little experience  and little exposure  to infectious diseases 
from their patients and were worried about whether  “universal precautions” in their 
laboratory and surgical areas would be successful, and whether their current practices 
in labeling charts, medications, supplies, and human byproducts were adequate for 
their protection without violating the patient’s privacy. More scientific experience is 
available about pregnancies in which the male partner was HIV-positive, so the physi-
cians were partly attracted by the possibilities of producing a publishable paradigm 
case from the standpoint of the infected woman (11/00, Case 2). 
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Eventually, by “doing the medicine,” the committee came to the conclusion 
that it was permissible to allow the case, not for their personal interest, but because the 
known risks to the child were slim enough, and the risks to themselves reasonably 
enough prevented, that to disallow it seemed to violate their professional code of con-
duct of providing medical treatment where necessary. The overriding ethical question 
of how much risk should be assumed by medical personnel in treating their patients 
was deferred. 
In a later follow-up discussion of this case, the group noticed that an editorial 
in the ASRM journal “Fertility and Sterility” had been published proclaiming it “un-
justifiable to exclude HIV+ women from pregnancy,” offering a professional valida-
tion for their earlier decision (8/01, Case 5). As an attempt to further refine their 
arguments, supporters pointed out that the clinic did not hold itself legally or morally 
responsible for birth defects or illnesses in the children produced by their treatments, 
although they did attempt to screen out the possibilities for their production. As exam-
ples, techniques have been developed to lower the probabilities of Down’s syndrome 
or of Tay-Sachs disease, but the clinic specialists are not thought to be blameworthy if 
their techniques should fail to prevent these defects. Similarly, specialists do not think 
of themselves as morally blameworthy if they should try but fail to prevent HIV infec-
tion being passed to a child during infertility treatments despite their efforts.  
Example 20 
Soon after this first case of HIV had been presented to the ethics committee, a 
similar but inverted problem arose, where an uninfected woman wanted to bear a child 
using sperm from her HIV-positive husband. Initially this case seemed to include a 
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greater possibility of risk, since the uninfected woman would, by necessity, be ex-
posed to HIV herself, through achieving pregnancy. Data indicated the chances to be 
reasonably low, especially when new techniques for “washing” the sperm were used, 
although ARM Clinic did not yet have the capability to try the new procedure. This 
case was eventually rejected but not because it was found unethical. Rather the clinic 
wanted time in which to gather data, create protocols and policies, and obtain the 
knowledge-base necessary to manage such cases. By beginning with the medicine 
first, they were able to resolve the issues of risk, and delay the consideration of an-
other ethical problem at hand: is it right for an infected father to attempt to create a 
child? (10/00, Case 2).  
Medicine First as a Method 
In the previous cases, doing the medicine first was shown to be useful primar-
ily in risk assessment. Here the main ethical problem was in determining how much 
risk to whom, is acceptable in treating infertility. The assumption is that a medical in-
quiry or an investigation of the scientific knowledge at hand (as in the AIDS cases) 
will reveal determinative facts settling the question as to whether to proceed with 
treatment: danger to the health of those involved; side effects, lack of surety that the 
procedure will be effective, and so on. Presenting medical facts and statistics encour-
ages consensus on problems of this nature. However, in the next section on relation-
ship issues, some cases are presented in which doing the medicine first is not related to 
risk or medical facts, but is more an excuse to avoid treating certain patients, or more 
accurately to avoid discussing some difficult ethical issues, such as gay parenting, or 
whether or when to use the baby creation technique of donor egg/donor sperm. 
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The problem in relationship issues is that not all clients seeking fertility ser-
vices are afflicted with medical problems. In many cases, only one partner in a rela-
tionship is infertile and in some cases nobody is infertile at all, such as when a single 
woman wants assistance from a physician to be enabled to achieve pregnancy through 
sperm donation. The phrase, “doing the medicine first” was understood by some of the 
physicians to mean that their first professional obligation was toward the person with 
the medical problem, but when no medical problem existed, it was interpreted to mean 
that they had less obligation to assist the client. A regularly occurring example was 
how to deal with gay couples, where neither partner was infertile, but pregnancy 
couldn’t be achieved without assistance. In Case 21, doing the medicine first was in-
voked to turn down a request from a gay man who wanted to independently parent by 
use of a surrogate. Single, possibly gay women were accepted as clients, but the com-
mittee was uncomfortable with a single man wanting a child. The argument against the 
case included the idea that the potential parent was not infertile and thus had no claim 
upon the clinic’s services, even though this was inconsistent with the female cases.   
Furthermore, married men with infertile wives were not rejected when they similarly 
wanted a child. The use of the excuse, doing the medicine first, was actually a way to 
ignore focusing on the moral implications of homosexual parenting.  
I found that the position of “doing the medicine first” was sometimes useful in 
resolving the ethical question at stake, especially in quantifying and dealing with risk. 
But it served at least three other purposes for the ethics committee. It delayed the need 
to make tough decisions, it served to defend certain decisions by asserting a medical 
protocol, and it helped to narrow or restrict the ramifications of the problem so as to 
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avoid setting new precedents or fall down slippery slopes. However, each of these 
three purposes sometimes masked the adoption of a strong moral position ( as men-
tioned above in the case of gay parenting) without incorporating the necessity of pro-
viding good reasons or a moral rationale for it. 
In many cases, working through the medical data in this way served to calm 
fears and prevent emotional, poorly reasoned decisions in issues heard by the ethics 
committee. I suggest that it functions as more of a method or procedure for case delib-
erations than has been recognized in the bioethics literature, because while common, it 
is comprised of a multiplicity of responses to problems. Here I offer more details of 
the way this practice allows tough decisions to be delayed, defended and narrowed. 
The first feature in beginning case deliberations by screening out medical is-
sues first is the way it tends to delay the ethical problems at stake until they are made 
more explicit. To health care clinicians, the professional model is to try basic treat-
ments before the more complex (fertility drugs before IVF, for example), or to con-
sider fundamental diagnoses before the more esoteric (for example, they will assess 
common reasons for infertility before moving to the more elaborate diagnostic proce-
dures), until the problem at hand has been clarified. Sure knowledge is sought over 
conjecture, so that experience, statistical options or similar cases from the medical lit-
erature can lead to solutions. By this step-by-step procedure, both patients and donors 
in the world of reproductive medicine receive as accurate information as is available 
for their informed consent, keeping risk levels low, and positioning medical clinicians 
to ward off legal accusations if treatments don’t go as planned. As I have shown in the 
former case examples, this approach sometimes enables the ethical problem to disap-
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pear, become unnecessary, or makes possible a later and more careful evaluation in 
terms of its importance and impact on the overall case. 
For example, one might notice  in the cases presented herein that the ethics 
committee did not re-think the morality of established practices, such as whether it is 
acceptable to use donors or gestational carriers in the first place. Likewise, the moral-
ity of IVF pregnancy production was not debated; it was simply assumed. Old contro-
versies like Louise Brown, the first “test tube” baby, and Mary Beth Whitehead, the 
first prominent surrogate mother, are taken as settled to those in the field, and the use 
of the techniques is taken for granted. The only concern here is to protect all the par-
ticipants from physical harm or legal mishap in their reproductive treatments.41  In 
practice, the re-hashing of the ethics of such basic tools of reproductive medicine can-
not be reconsidered without rethinking the basis for their own use. Their morality or 
lack thereof is no longer a useful consideration. 
A second attractive feature for clinicians in doing medical screening first is 
that by following published medical protocols or policies, the ethical responsibilities 
of the medical clinician, both in diagnosis and treatment, can sometimes be deferred to 
others. Both common sense and professional responsibility indicate that ignoring es-
tablished protocols so as to “reinvent the wheel” in each new case is hazardous, both 
because it wastes time and allows uncertainty when it is unnecessary.42 Few want to 
pioneer a new situation unless it is necessary or the outcome offers a high probability 
                                            
41 See Pence’s Classic Cases in Medical Ethics for his review of groundbreaking cases and their after-
math in public policy; Louise Brown (95-119) and Mary Beth Whitehead (120-144).) 
42 The sort of protocols I am envisioning here are the policies written and introduced by the field’s pro-
fessional association. In reproductive medicine, policies for age limitations, number of fertility trials, 
the use of certain drugs in certain types of cases, and so on, are published regularly by ASRM. 
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of success. Even medical experts begin their work by following sets of established 
protocols, presumably because these practices are set up by an even more experienced 
expert group who have access to more data and more time to consider them. If cases 
don’t go well after following the protocols, the individual physician can at least point 
to his or her adherence to them as a defense. It is doubtful that these sorts of policies 
come about by the application or specification of vague ethical principles: autonomy, 
beneficence, and the like, or even the “do no harm” fundamental principle of the 
medical profession. It may be that such overriding principles are assumed and already 
internalized into the health professional’s standpoint, but it seems more likely that 
these kinds of principles simply don’t lead to anything as specific as the policies they 
require to “carry on” their functions. For example, the rules governing consanguinity 
are produced by statistics, age-related rules by known risk, and so on. The ethical con-
tent is based upon more data-oriented and scientific outcomes. Although the method of 
specified principlism (presented earlier) is intended to produce very specific rules, it is 
difficult to imagine how an agent is to bridge the gap between a general prescription of 
autonomy or beneficence to attain a very specific mid-level policy like ASRM’s 
statement that “44 years 11 months is the latest age that should be considered for IVF 
treatments.” The specific policy may be ethical in its attempt to alleviate harm, but it is 
based on certain medical facts taken from scientific data or beliefs, not from ethical 
principles alone. 
Besides delaying and deferring, a third reason that doing the medicine first is 
attractive to clinicians is that an ethical problem can sometimes be narrowed or re-
stricted, thus avoiding a slippery slope. ARM Clinic avoided situations where they 
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might accidentally find themselves setting a new precedent by engaging in uncharted 
territory. They preferred to be guided by the idea that medical necessity underpinned 
their work, envisioning themselves as providers of treatment for medical conditions 
such as infertility, rather than as random creators of babies. By attempting to keep 
each case specific and reasoned-out, they hoped to avoid any assumption that one case 
could open all barriers to similar cases. If, for example, they were to accept one gesta-
tional carrier, they wouldn’t necessarily want to make all gestational carriers accept-
able, or if they assisted one homosexual couple’s need for fertility treatment, they 
wouldn’t want to imply they would treat every case. 
These type of slippery slope possibilities are diminished by using the method 
of “medicine first,” because the context of each case is used to tie each decision to its 
specific set of reasons, so that not only is the slippery slope avoided, but validation is 
provided to the judgments themselves. The ethics committee considered important de-
tails such as the emotional stability of the clients, their compliance with protocol, their 
intelligence, and the capacity of each involved party to understand his or her own case 
so that each decision was unique to its set of particular circumstances.  
Other facts, such as the reasons for which age limitations might be overridden, 
the level of desire for a child exhibited by would-be parents, the importance of the fees 
and costs (especially in the case of paid donors), the overall fairness to those who may 
not be able to afford the treatments,  the types of relationship issues at stake, the level 
of support by relatives and friends, and many other details are taken into consideration 
in each case, even though this attention to detail sometimes undermined overall con-
sistency in decision-making. The ethics committee at ARM Clinic was averse to mak-
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ing “exceptions to the rule,” although that is often the point of committee delibera-
tions, otherwise there would be no need for group discussion. It is in context and detail 
that the group sought to locate supporting principles and good reasons to override their 
own policies, although they often found it difficult to articulate them. 
I have tried to show how the method of ‘medicine first’ was valuable in delay-
ing, deferring and narrowing the ethical issues at stake in case deliberations at ARM 
Clinic, while allowing for individual and contextual decisions. While striving for con-
sistency, decision-makers can also avoid the tendency towards a slippery slope which 
might be thought of as a result of overly generalizing decision-making. These are all, 
in general, positive attributes of this approach to decision-making, but they are associ-
ated with two conservative side features. One I have already mentioned, that avoiding 
discussing the moral issues in some cases is actually taking a stand, but without actu-
ally constructing a defense. A second problem is that it prevents publicity, which dis-
allows a wide range of opinion on the morality of a problem to enter into discussion. 
The reluctance to engage the ethical issues allowed this clinic to keep its ‘head down’ 
so to speak, avoiding public comment about its policies and practices. 
The tendency to avoid unwanted publicity was an important side feature that 
contributed to decision-making at ARM Clinic. The clinic disdained the frenetic will-
ingness by some reproductive medicine clinics to draw attention to any new experi-
mentation, to offer any new treatment, to grant the desires of every patient who enters 
their door. They referred to this acceptance of publicity and notoriety as the “Daily 
News” factor. In this view, some clinics with poor rates of success in achieving preg-
nancies are thought to venture toward more radical treatments, or engage in more ethi-
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cally suspect areas, because they accept all comers without regard to health-data effec-
tiveness, perhaps driven by the profit motive, or because of a misguided sense of sci-
entific drama. To ARM Clinic, a new treatment breakthrough is also a producer of 
negative publicity, as when the first woman in her 60s achieved pregnancy, or when 
the first child was conceived to produce therapeutic treatments for her sibling.43 
Whether positive or negative, such breakthroughs cause controversy, and produce 
business and social impact on the clinic. ARM Clinic prefers to avoid the likelihood 
that a case might put them on the “front page.” This conservative position can allow 
them to abstain from taking a stand on novel ethical problems, or perhaps pass the 
‘moral buck’, by referring troublesome cases to clinics with less cautious behavior. 
The ethics committee has resolved some cases by the use of such statements as, “Just 
because we can do it, doesn’t mean we should do it,” as an explanation for rejecting a 
case without producing good reasons or “We can always send the patient to a (com-
petitor’s) clinic where their needs can be met more easily.” In this way, they avoid 
making an ethical decision without totally disparaging the patient’s desire for treat-
ment. In some cases, when alternative treatments were known to be locally unavail-
able, ARM Clinic was forced into decision-making, but generally they avoided that 
situation because other more laissez-faire clinics, the type which ignore ethical case 
reviews, were available. 
                                            
43 See the CNN Online report from the University of Southern California Trojan Family Magazine of 
Autumn 1997 for the details of their 63-year-old patient, who delivered a healthy baby after having re-
ceived IVF. Also see the USA Today Online update on the Anissa Ayala story, where the Ayalas con-
ceived a child to use her bone marrow to donate to their older daughter Anissa who was born with the 
genetic disease Fanconi’s Anemia. Since then, other similar cases of conception for donation have oc-
curred although PIGD can now be used to prevent the conception of afflicted children. 
 128
It can also be noted in the cases I have presented here so far that the larger 
principles, if they were to be used, would often be in conflict, just as their critics have 
complained. The practitioners of reproductive medicine are by inclination supportive 
and respectful of the autonomy of their patients, because that principle is fundamental 
to their work. The patients who desire these services do not appear at the clinic doors 
unconscious or ill, but arrive as independent actors asserting their own rational 
choices. It is assumed that the desire and intent to parent a child is rightfully theirs and 
that the reproductive medicine clinic exists to support that basic right. But even this 
strong bias towards autonomy cannot overcome the need for beneficence in fulfilling 
the right, and avoiding maleficence (as when treatments might be dangerous, as we 
saw in the cases of concomitant illnesses like HIV). It is inevitable that paternalistic 
impulses will emerge to provide limits to autonomy, when expert, knowledgeable (and 
perhaps dispassionate) physicians expose and help to weigh the risks to be assumed by 
anxious and desperate patients.  
The value of a procedural solution is here made clear. By setting up rules, 
taken from general sources, such as the rules of the profession, then narrowing them 
by internal needs, the rules generated by the sub-profession or practice are given con-
tent. The protocols developed by professional groups such as ASRM become powerful 
shapers of public opinion, informing scientific ethical choices, because of the group’s 
access to medical data, and the reasoning power achieved by their group expertise of-
fers credibility over the individual experience of a lone clinical practitioner. Profes-
sional associations are presumed to have access to more facts, more varieties of cases 
and experiences, and more expertise for deliberations, so that in their service as repre-
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sentatives to practitioners, they are able to generalize their accumulated knowledge 
and save each clinician from the fall-back position of creating new and ad hoc policies 
for each daily decision, which is apt to be inconsistent and lacking generality. In fact, 
the levels of practice protocols, built on top of association protocols, allow practitio-
ners to put two steps between them and patient demands, deferring the ethical deci-
sion-making even further. The onus is lifted from the physician in the front lines, who 
doesn’t want to take the time to ruminate over every case ramification, or who might 
find it difficult to refuse or turn away a patient with strong desires. Certainly the phy-
sicians at ARM Clinic found it useful in turning away some troublesome cases to say 
that “the ethics committee advises against it.” 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RELATIONSHIP ISSUES 
The cases presented so far have had in common a basis in issues of risk and the 
need for informed consent. I demonstrated how the use of medical data and its dis-
semination to the patient has often worked to delay, defer, and narrow the overall 
moral worry about whether the solutions to the various problems were right or wrong. 
Ethical decisions were either dissolved or could be temporarily shelved. But in the fol-
lowing set of 35 cases, overall moral factors are not so easily dismissed, even after the 
medical issues of risk and consent are dealt with. 
The committee often resorted to another escape clause to try to avoid the moral 
problems: the so-called “yuck factor” or the “argument from repugnance.” 44   At 
times the committee has found it extremely difficult to describe why they find a case 
troubling, or to elicit a specific reasoned principle or policy against it, despite their 
strong emotional reaction. This vague sense of repugnance tends to be thought of as a 
reason in itself, prompting discussants to reject a case because “it just doesn’t feel 
right.” Even evoking the term “yuck factor” could sometimes be enough to kill discus-
sion on a case, although it could not deliver unanimity or consensus on the decisions. 
Sometimes the feeling caused doubt as to the levels of professional responsibility, 
such as when members felt “unconvinced” of their duty to engage with certain prob-
lems, such as treating an HIV case. Others mentioned feeling a floating sense of 
                                            
44 The term “yuck” (sometimes spelled “yuk”) factor is often associated with the work of Leon Kass, 
the University of Chicago bioethicist and currently the Chairman of the President’s Council on Bio-
ethics, who also uses the phrase “argument from repugnance,” to denote cases or situations in bioethics 
that are emotionally upsetting or disgusting. Some evidence points to Arthur Caplan, bioethicist at Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, as the originator of the term (see “In Brief,” in Hastings Center Report 33.1, 
(2003): 8). I will discuss the implications of these feelings in full in Chapter Eight. 
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“wrongness” about certain decisions even though they were logically acceptable. This 
unclear and vague feeling became labeled the “yuck factor,” because of the difficulty 
in articulating good reasons for the lingering sense of doubt.  
 In this set of cases, the unsettling nature of the yuck factor was a block to 
achieving consensus and generating validation for decisions. These cases were more 
difficult than cases of risk because they all involved disquieting and new issues in 
family relationships and because many of them include novel features, lacking prece-
dents for decision-makers.  
I consider the predominant moral problem tying these cases together to be “re-
lationship issues,” because each one presents a challenge to the standard way of look-
ing at family connections. In some cases, family genetic ties are bypassed altogether, 
while in others new ties are forged out of the newfound, highly technical ability to 
generate pregnancies. The moral problem does not disappear when solving the medi-
cal, or risk, problem in these cases, because an ongoing, new type of family link will 
be established among the family members, one which presents ethical challenges.  
One overriding principle serves as a basis for many decisions at ARM Clinic, a 
desire to maintain some sort of genetic link between at least two members of the fam-
ily group whenever possible. There are several reasons for their emphasis on this prin-
ciple. The first is legal: there is always a concern that science is running ahead of 
current adoption laws, which, depending on the state, are not always equipped to han-
dle the complexities of ensuring the legitimacy of parent-child relationships when 
other parties are involved through the donation, purchase, or exchange of genetic ma-
terial. Second, the clinic accepts an assumption that the parental sense of obligation to 
 132
a child may be stronger when actual genetic relationships are in place, so that difficult 
or “imperfect” children can’t be seen as returnable consumer products. Third, the 
clinic sees itself as engaged in an altruistic medical practice, by which they encourage 
reproduction, but reject a vision of themselves as a designer workshop, where parents 
“select” children as products to suit their own preferences. They consider such charac-
teristics as overall health, appearance, sex, or intelligence as part of the natural lottery 
of parenthood, where variations are more acceptable if the child is genetically linked 
to the parent. Of course, would-be parents are allowed to make some of these selec-
tions in choosing characteristics for their children in certain circumstances, such as 
during the process of choosing among sperm or egg donors, for example, where pro-
spective parents are able to sift through a general list of characteristics. But if at least 
one parent is genetically related, it is believed that he or she will tolerate more imper-
fection in the child. It can be argued that the example of adoption refutes those con-
cerns because few people would argue that obligation, love, and concern are not 
equally allocated to children in those relationships as compared to that of natural par-
ents to their children.  However, ARM Clinic believes that they can produce safer rela-
tionships with fewer legal problems by attempting to maintain some genetic ties in 
their reproductive treatments. Nevertheless, many cases appear at the clinic that chal-
lenge this internal principle and must be decided by the ethics committee. Sometimes 
the issue isn’t whether one parent has a genetic tie or not, but acknowledging the un-
derlying medical basis for their need for treatment.  
One set of cases that challenges the notions of family relationships concerns 
homosexual parents.  
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Homosexual Parenting 
ARM Clinic has regularly treated fertile and infertile women who are lesbian, 
without discriminating on the basis of either their single status or their shared parent-
ing arrangement with another woman. But they have been unwilling to assist in repro-
duction for single men, or men with male partners, because in those cases the men do 
not generally present at the clinic with an illness or disease; infertility isn’t the cause 
for their need for reproductive services. Instead these single men or couples are, in a 
sense, using the fertility practice to create a baby without the necessity of a mother. 
Example 21 
One man wanted to produce his own child, with his own sperm, but in order to 
maintain independence and non-interference from any supposed genetic “mother” and 
preserve his sole legal right to the child he wanted to obtain an anonymous donor egg 
and use IVF to transfer the embryo to a gestational carrier instead of by the more sim-
ple insemination of a known female. By hiring the egg donor and genetic carrier as 
two separate individuals with no emotional attachment, he felt that neither would be 
likely to express any parental rights. His request encouraged a lively debate about 
whether men have rights to reproduce independently of women.  The case was ulti-
mately rejected (11/98, Case 1). 
The discussion made clear that most members of the ethics committee, both 
male and female, held a subtle presumption in favor of women’s rights to reproduce, 
whether gay, single, or married, but felt less supportive of the same rights being ex-
tended to men. Committee members expressed doubt about the motivation of men’s 
desire to parent and their abilities to handle the obligation. They questioned this spe-
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cific man’s desire to exclude the female parent from the process (calling it “social 
medicine”), although some women have expressed a similar intent to prevent the inter-
ference from a “father.” 
This case produced the “yuck” feeling. The main reason put forward to reject 
the case was that the man involved had no infertility problem, so it seemed to the 
clinic that they were not being asked to provide a service in the sense of a medical 
treatment or cure, but were put in the position of acting as a factory or business to pro-
vide a baby. In a sense, this was a case of doing the medicine first. It was clear that the 
clinical staff felt their work was more defensible when conceiving it as treating dis-
eases or impairments, but not when it could be taken as a  simple provision of a ser-
vice to someone who disdained the trouble of forging a relationship by which to create 
a family. The prospective father was envisioned as someone who wanted “no strings,” 
rejected female involvement, and was thus irresponsible; at the same time, women 
who wanted children were viewed differently, as being constrained by the lack of an 
appropriate male, from fulfilling their instinctual desire to parent. Such viewpoints 
were admittedly not based on ‘facts,’ but no data was available to counter such feel-
ings either.  
Another reason given to disallow the case was that no risk to the father was in-
volved; instead, he was proposing that two women (the egg donor and the gestational 
carrier) assume the risk of pregnancy for him, whereas when infertile women choose 
to become mothers, they assume their own risk for their own choices. This assumption 
of responsibility gives validation to female parenting and provided a stronger reason to 
reject the case. However, this case was controversial enough to require a committee 
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vote, instead of an emergence of consensus, and the committee members found them-
selves divided, although all members felt weak in their positions. 
Example 22 
In a variant of the previous case, a single man enlisted a female friend to act as 
a known egg donor, and a second female friend to act as a known gestational carrier 
for his child. All he needed was the help of the clinic to put it all together through IVF 
treatments. As in the previous case, the committee rejected his plan, on the grounds of 
his lack of need for medical treatment and the transfer of risk to others besides him-
self. They didn’t recognize him to be a ‘patient’ of the clinic, because he was not in-
fertile, but simply wanted to have a baby without the entanglement of a relationship 
with the child’s mother (10/00, Case 3). 
Example 23 
In a challenge to the presumption that women are more acceptable as patients 
of the clinic by virtue of their supposed infertility, a lesbian woman asked for assisted 
reproduction after having already produced a child by donor egg and donor sperm 
elsewhere; that is, to say, the child did not contain any of her genetic product, although 
she intended to carry the pregnancy. Now she wanted to produce a half-sibling for her 
child by using the remaining frozen sperm along with a new egg donor. This case vio-
lated two policies of the clinic: that the woman herself was not being treated for infer-
tility and that it would be creating a child genetically unrelated to the parent. In this 
case, the fact that the new child would be genetically linked to its already existing sib-
ling gave the committee a reason to “back into” the approval of what would normally 
be a rejected practice of donor egg/ donor sperm. The mother’s infertility added plau-
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sibility to the request, although she was not really personally being “treated” any more 
than the gay men would have been. She was the recipient of a created baby with no 
entanglement by a genetic father, and perhaps being female gave her the benefit of the 
doubt. Many infertile women resort to donor eggs after other fertility treatment fail-
ures, but usually it is in the context of marriage and the use of their husband’s sperm. 
In those cases, it could be argued that they are no longer patients of the clinic, since 
their infertility is no longer being treated; however, it was not seen that way in most of 
these types of cases. 
Example 24 
In a few cases, the parents want more entanglements in their parental relation-
ships rather than fewer. A lesbian couple included one partner who had failed in an at-
tempt to carry an IVF pregnancy (by her own eggs and with donor sperm). Although 
she remained capable of producing eggs, she now wanted to act as the gestational car-
rier for a surrogate pregnancy by using donated eggs from her slightly younger part-
ner. The younger partner was perfectly capable of generating both an egg and carrying 
a pregnancy, so it seemed overly complex to include the older partner in the events. 
The committee wondered why the younger woman would not simply use donor sperm 
to generate a less expensive, more “natural” pregnancy, but apparently both women 
wanted to share in all aspects of the process, so that each had a part in “mothering” the 
prospective infant. The older partner worried about losing the chance to participate in 
the process due to the statistical lessening of her own fertility as she aged. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the ethics committee agreed to allow this case, using the reasoning that 
the egg donor was akin to a “known donor,” accepted non-controversially when a sis-
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ter or other closely related female offers assistance, at least when psychological as-
sessments showed the relationship to be free of hesitancy or coercion on either side. 
Some committee members wondered whether this sort of parenting would be emotion-
ally traumatic for the prospective child, when it later learned the details, or if a later 
dissolution of the relationship between the two co-parents could cause difficult legal 
custody issues in the future. Such questions might be valid, but are actually no more 
challenging in this case than in any other of the ‘new relationship” type cases, and are 
minimized by careful legal contracts written to protect the impact on the child (11/00, 
Case1). 
Example 25 
In a very similar case, the outcome was the opposite. A lesbian couple was re-
fused treatment by the ethics committee, because infertility was not a factor. In this 
case, similar to the last, one of the partners wanted to donate an egg for the other to 
carry in a surrogate pregnancy, with the stated reason of “binding them closer to-
gether.” Neither partner was infertile, so the committee treated this case as more like 
the case of the men who wanted to create their own children. They argued that neither 
a “desire to bond” or a “desire for convenience” in choosing who carried the preg-
nancy were strong enough reasons to compel medical treatment; in other words, there 
was no medical necessity (12/00, Case 3). This case was perceived as analogous to the 
problem in genetic therapy of distinguishing between enhancement and treatment. To 
some, the case was a step down the slippery slope toward “designing babies” for per-
fectly healthy couples, while to others the case resembled that of the men, mentioned 
earlier, who were intent on avoiding the entanglement of the opposite-sex parent in the 
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relationship. The search for consistency introduced additional reasons to put forward 
to reject the case; the risks in pregnancy, while small, was nevertheless more admissi-
ble to an individual or couple whose choices are constrained by infertility, but less 
admissible for the couple who have undertaken the process for an emotional reason 
and not a physical one. Gestational carriers might be agreeable to putting themselves 
at risk, but should only do so because medical indications have made it necessary, not 
just to fulfill someone’s desire for a child (although this reasoning seems inconsistent 
with the previous case). 
The overall difficulty in making judgments on these cases turned out to be not 
only the homosexuality of the would-be parents, but the nature of the medical neces-
sity of the case. Defining medical necessity is problematic in this field, because, as I 
have said, often the person with the medical problem is not under treatment at all in 
assisted reproductive therapies. If the infertile partner, whether male or female, has 
been found untreatable, the assisted reproduction continues through the use of donors. 
In the next section, this problem is highlighted in the discussion of when it is ethical to 
create a baby through both donor egg and donor sperm. 
Donor Egg/Donor Sperm 
The clinic’s policy of “no donor egg/donor sperm” (baby creation) was estab-
lished to prevent the creation of designer babies with no genetic link to the parents. 
Nevertheless, sometimes good reasons (at other times unusual reasons) are produced 
for exceptions to the policy.  
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Example 26 
One woman had tried IVF unsuccessfully; the problem seemed to be her poor 
quality eggs. She embarked on the use of an egg donor, and then added a request for 
the use of donor sperm as well, creating the donor egg/donor sperm situation. Her rea-
soning was that her husband was not sufficiently fertile to support pregnancy. At some 
point her physician realized that her desire for a sperm donor was not based on her 
husband’s supposed infertility, but on the fact that the woman did not want to become 
pregnant with his children, unless they were also created by use of her own genetic 
material, her own eggs. It seemed that she thought of his children, born in a previous 
marriage, as inferior to her own (also from a previous marriage), due to some health 
problems and minor psychiatric disorders. Apparently, it was one thing to take the 
chance of bearing his children when they included her genes, but to do so with an egg 
donor became a bigger gamble for the woman, since the children would then not be 
biologically related to her. Her plan was turned down on the ground that it would vio-
late the “no donor egg/donor sperm” policy, but also because no evidence had been 
presented to suggest that the husband’s biological children had problems that were ge-
netically heritable in nature. The case seemed to elicit a sense of “eugenics” in that it 
was more about “selecting a designer baby,” and less about avoiding obviously herita-
ble health disorders. Furthermore, infertility on the part of the husband was not proven 
to be an issue (10/00, Case 5). 
In some exceptional cases, the policy against donor egg/donor sperm has been 
overridden at ARM Clinic, but only when the decision could be “backed into,” mean-
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ing that other options were tried and eliminated, until the exceptional case became the 
only remaining option. 
Example 27 
One woman had a child from her own egg and a sperm donation, because of 
her husband’s infertility. While still hoping for another child, her fertility diminished. 
The only option available to the couple at that point was to use both donor egg and 
donor sperm, which was approved in their case because, similar to the lesbian woman 
mentioned earlier, they had available to them some of the same (frozen) sperm that 
had been used to create their other child. The prospective child would be a half-sibling 
to their original child, and thus genetically related to one family member, although un-
related to either of the parents. The intent of the prohibition against donor egg/donor 
sperm was thought to be fulfilled by this reasoning; and the exception to the rule was 
“backed into” without a need to confront the advisability of the policy itself. This 
“backing into” is more likely to occur when urgent, on-the-spot decisions become nec-
essary. This type of situation happens, for example, when during the fertilization of an 
egg for the purposes of IVF, a fresh sperm donation is required. Other times male in-
fertility was not recognized until the woman was at her height of cyclical readiness. In 
some situations, the physician might have planned to procure a minimal amount of 
sperm by biopsy in borderline-sterile men to be used immediately, but if the procedure 
fails, back-up sperm must be available or the whole effort, including the time, medica-
tion and money required by the donor to “ripen” her ovaries, has been wasted. In a 
situation like this, the urgency leads to the exception to the policy so that the ethical 
question is said to be “backed-into.” 
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Example 28 
While working with a woman who failed ovulation and hired an egg donor, the 
physician found that only two of many donated eggs had become fertilized in the labo-
ratory, due to unforeseen problems with the husband’s sperm. After such an expense 
and physical strain, the physician didn’t want any more wasted chances, so he asked 
the ethics committee to agree to a plan where  fertilization was again attempted with 
the husband’s sperm (after a more concerted effort to retrieve it), but to have a back-
up sperm donation at hand just in case. The intent was not to mix the final embryos, 
but to assess the options in selecting the best embryos for IVF from both possible 
sperm options. The couple understood their realistic options in the informed consent 
process and agreed to them, knowing that very likely the baby would be unrelated to 
either parent. Although the prospect was planned for, the actual occurrence was again 
“backed into” and therefore granted approval by the committee (8/01, Case 2). 
Known Donors 
Interesting relationship problems occur when known donors are used to con-
tribute either the egg or sperm for assisted reproduction. These donors are usually mo-
tivated to help by familial affection, and are often free or less expensive than paying 
the fees of contract donors, but other entanglements can ensue.  
 Example 29 
A woman who had been found incapable of generating eggs later realized her 
husband was also infertile, so they developed a plan to purchase a donor egg, but have 
it inseminated with sperm donated by the woman’s father, thus preserving a maternal 
genetic link with the proposed child. The woman intended to carry the pregnancy her-
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self, in effect becoming the gestational carrier and adopted mother to her own half-
sibling. This case immediately generated the “yuck factor,” a somewhat emotional re-
action of disgust to the plan under consideration; it simply didn’t “seem right” to many 
of the committee members, although a principle by which to frame the reasoning 
could not be located. They stated and re-stated, as if to remind themselves, that the 
case did not literally involve incest, because sexual relations did not occur between the 
woman and her father, although she intended to carry “his child” in the pregnancy. 
Two rationales were suggested to deny treatment. The first was to cite the clinic policy 
against the “creation of unrelated babies,” the “donor egg/donor sperm” rule, although 
this case was not, strict speaking, a version of that type since the woman would be ge-
netically related to her baby. The second alternative view was to cite the clinic prefer-
ence against “transgenerational” cases, where members of different generational 
cohorts become parties in the same parenting process (9/98, Case 1). This policy is 
generally thought to avoid coercion by the older, more powerful, or more wealthy par-
ticipant, but in this case, it was not coercion, but a discomfort with the idea of a 
woman becoming a mother to her father’s child that evoked the use of the policy. Both 
of the two policies, while valid in a general sense, were useful here in providing a rea-
son to reject the case while avoiding the ethical complexity. Is it really wrong, or im-
moral, for a woman to carry and raise her half-sibling, and if so, why?  In the next 
case, a similar plan did not evoke such strong feelings. 
Example 30 
A woman with an infertile husband planned to be inseminated by the sperm of 
her father-in-law, rather than an anonymous donor, so as to preserve a genetic link be-
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tween her husband, the prospective father and the child. In this case, the woman would 
be carrying her father-in-law’s child, literally a half-sibling to her husband. Here, the 
use of the mother’s own egg meant that the policy against donor egg/donor sperm had 
not been violated, but the problem of a transgenerational relationship still existed. 
However, this case was approved by the committee (after psychological screening was 
completed), and the “yuck factor” did not arise because of the lack of genetic relation-
ship between the woman and her father-in-law (12/00, Case 1). Comparing the two 
cases seems to imply that the “yuck factor” represented a sense that the incest taboo 
had been violated in the first case, but not the second, although the reaction was more 
emotional than logical. Furthermore, in Case 29, the desire of the woman to retain a 
genetic relationship, so that her family line could “carry on,” was thought to be a little 
over-dramatic, and overvalued, while the same desire by the young father in Example 
30 was seen as more “natural,” indicating that we still take male genetic lineage to be 
of greater importance. 
Example 31 
In a variation of this problem, a woman born with functional ovaries, but no 
uterus, had previously attempted to use her own eggs with her husband’s sperm to at-
tain a pregnancy to be carried by a surrogate, but she eventually proved to be infertile. 
Instead of purchasing a donor egg so as to produce a child with her husband, she re-
quested the assistance of the clinic in “creating a child” by use of her brother’s sperm 
and a donor egg from the sister of her husband, to be carried by a surrogate, and then 
given to her for adoption. In this way, she intended to preserve a remnant of her own 
genetic family in the child she intended to raise, still including her husband’s genetic 
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heritage through his sister. He couldn’t participate directly, although he was fertile, 
because to use an egg donor from outside the family would mean that one of the two 
parents would lose any genetic link to the child. The effect of an approval of the case 
would be that both potential parents would adopt and raise their own niece (or 
nephew), and both partners would be equally related to the child (10/99, Case 1). 
The confusing relationship issues in this case stimulated much negative discus-
sion, but also great difficulty in locating a reasonable principle by which to make a 
judgment. To proceed would not provoke a violation of the transgenerational policy 
(everybody involved was of similar ages), and it would not exactly violate the donor 
egg/ donor sperm, no baby creation, policy, because both parents were related to the 
donors. The problem for the committee was that it didn’t exactly violate anything, and 
yet it aroused the “yuck factor” as an obstacle, causing it to be rejected without any 
clear principles asserted 
One way to approach cases of the sort I have been describing here is to con-
sider the effects on the child’s future life and happiness when she or he became of age 
to understand their genetic relationships. It seems possible that a young adult would be 
shocked and embarrassed to realize that an uncle or grandparent was really the genetic 
father, and so on. But such relationship problems have occurred more or less “natu-
rally” in families over history, so one could question how new or transgressive they 
really are. Also, it is not clear how realizing that a genetic parent was actually an 
anonymous paid donor would be any less shocking to the young adult. Some members 
worried that a slippery slope was developing, in which future individuals might lose 
the ability to discriminate among any family genetic link, because of the careless inter-
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reproduction going on. Some comments heard were, “No genetic link may be bad, but 
too much genetic linkage can be worse, causing confusion and narcissism”;  “We just 
want to be conservative and not go too far”; “Just because we can doesn’t mean we 
should”; and finally “Some people are just not destined to have children and should 
face it.” The last comment was particularly interesting from this sort of committee, be-
cause if accepted at face-value, then it would lead one to wonder why such a clinic ex-
isted to treat any infertile patient at all (or why the staff member wanted to work in the 
field of assisted reproduction). 
Some members found it perfectly acceptable to take the case because it was not 
inconsistent with previous cases of known sibling donors (usually a sister-to-sister egg 
donation, or brother-to-brother sperm donation), that were accepted by the clinic. 
Also, because the relationship was not literally incest, the “yuck factor” did not refer 
to anything real in particular. However, even those leaning toward approval could 
imagine some real, tangible family problems as a result of such a case, although these 
problems could be applicable to all cases of unclear genetic heritage. One possibility 
was that the wife’s brother and the husband’s sister, in Example 31, by each having a 
genetic link to the child to be produced, and each, in fact, raising half-siblings to the 
prospective child, could claim legal custody if something (a divorce or a death) hap-
pened to disturb the adoptive parents.  The genetic relatives were in a position to use 
emotional manipulation to cause relationship problems among the whole extended 
family. Furthermore, the child’s potential security and happiness could be imagined to 
be at stake when he or she learned of the real relationship. (Imagine an angry or rebel-
lious teenager proclaiming that he or she wants to live with his or her “real” parents.)  
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Another reasonable approach to this problem was to “do the medicine first,” 
thereby narrowing the medical problem. By that thinking, because the husband in Ex-
ample 31 was not infertile, the clinic had no real reason to bypass him and his genetic 
input in bringing forth a baby. It could be thought of as a case where the overcomplex-
ity was unnecessary; there was no medical necessity to go the route requested by the 
family. This gave the committee a good reason to deny the case. 
This case was eventually put to a vote, because no consensus was achieved, 
and it resulted in a tie. The even split was taken by the physician-owners as a good 
reason not to proceed, since they generally sought to avoid the sort of dissension and 
ill-will that could detract from their overall collegiality. But these three cases stand out 
as illustrative of the methodological problem in formulating ethical advice for unusual 
and novel situations. No maxim or principle governing such a complex interrelation-
ship was available to guide the deliberators and no step by step method worked to ad-
vance the reasoning. 
One problem for decision-making of this nature is the difficulty in extracting 
comparisons from the novel case to any sort of paradigm case. In this situation, at-
tempts were made to show how each case could be compared to more routine cases of 
using known donors, where informed consent, careful legal agreements, and psycho-
logical counseling could ensure a cooperative and loving relationship among the 
whole family set. But the differences in the actual genetic links were too major to 
make the comparisons hold, and without that, the committee members felt adrift, with 
no principles or firm stance to take hold of. They were unable to derive a more spe-
cific mid-level principle, and although the context and details of the infertility created 
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sympathy among members, the casuistic approach did not offer firm grounds by which 
to  evaluate the various standpoints. Here is where the value of the professional asso-
ciation can be seen, when it develops and puts out ready-made policies, allowing the 
clinical ethicists to locate a prepared position. However, in the cases described here, 
no such policies have yet been articulated. 
Mixing 
Another more common challenge to family relationships comes from cases in 
which some form of “splitting or mixing” of donations, either of eggs, of sperm, or of 
the embryos themselves, is allowed. Several variations of thinking can occur. In some 
cases an infertile woman might want to augment her hopes for pregnancy by using a 
mix of embryos, some created with her own egg donation and others with eggs from a 
donor, for IVF, or she might use her own eggs but with sperm taken from one or more 
donors. Besides mixing embryos, one might pool various sperm samples used in fer-
tilization or pool eggs from various donors to create embryos. ARM Clinic’s policy is 
to refrain from genetically mixing the products of fertility together in a fertility treat-
ment, because it causes the genetic parenthood of the child to be confused, even 
though it might augment chances for reproduction to take place. This practice is not 
uncommon in other, less scrupulous clinics, perhaps not only for the sake of increasing 
the prospects for fertilization and pregnancy, but possibly sometimes to confuse any 
legal claims to the child by causing uncertainty as to its genetic parenthood. 
In opposition to that point of view, ARM Clinic takes seriously the idea that a 
potential child has a right to gain access to his or her own genetic make-up, for the 
child’s own future knowledge, as well as the sake of the child’s own future health. The 
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clinic does not try to control how such knowledge is imparted to children born from 
assisted reproduction by his or her legal parents; some are not told of their genetic ori-
gins at all. Children born from such confusing circumstances are still too young to 
have reached adulthood, thus are unable to give us access into how such knowledge 
will be accepted; the science is too new. In any case, should these adults attempt to 
learn their own history, it is considered by ARM clinic to be their right to be able to do 
so. Thus the clinic maintains careful record-keeping and documentation of the per-
sonal and genetic information of their patients. 
A frequent example of this situation is when an infertile man hopes that mixing 
sperm from multiple donors, in addition to his own, will increase his partner’s repro-
ductive success. Sometimes the would-be father’s fertility is diminished but not ex-
tinct, and he still wants to maintain some chance at fatherhood. By pooling his sperm 
with that of a donor, it has been thought of (paternalistically) as a way for him to 
achieve fertilization without having to totally confront the most likely possibility that 
the resulting child is not genetically his. Presumably, his never knowing for sure 
whose sperm fathered the child is a way to ensure his full participation and investment 
in its rearing. Pooling eggs in infertile women is a less common treatment, because 
women must be medically treated to provoke the ripening and retrieval of the egg, 
making it unusual that two women could be stimulated to the same stage at the same 
time so as to enable concurrent embryo production. It is simple for two fresh sperm 
samples to be ready simultaneously. However, in some cases, it can happen that a 
woman and her egg donor’s eggs are both used in the same time period to create em-
bryos that can be mixed together for implantation.  
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Example 32 
In an interesting case where sperm pooling became an issue, a sterile husband 
with a fertile wife had the advantage of having several healthy brothers, all willing to 
donate their sperm. The couple suggested that she be inseminated with a mix of sperm 
from all three brothers simultaneously and anonymously, so as to dodge the possibility 
of confronting any specific and personal interest in the pregnancy and child by what-
ever brother became the successful genetic father. Perhaps the notion of pooling de-
veloped because the prospective parents feared that one brother would brag about his 
fertility to the others, or take an overly familiar interest in the child produced by his 
sperm; or maybe they hesitated to choose among the brothers so as not to hurt any 
one’s feelings. It was also possible that the wives of the several brothers could feel 
less threatened by the interfamilial relationship to another child if it was not made ex-
plicit who was the actual genetic father to the child. Perhaps the husband wanted to 
lessen chances of sibling rivalry or intrusion into his life by the sibling, or perhaps the 
prospective mother didn’t want to be faced with the typical comparisons, where com-
monalities between parent and child are searched for, by friends and associates, and so 
would be happier to be left in ignorance. Perhaps the grandparents were thought prone 
to interfere, or make knowing comments, or perhaps in later life, the child’s 
cousin/half sibling relationships were feared to become problematic. The ability of the 
committee to develop so many of these “what-if” scenarios illustrated how family ties 
are envisioned to be threatened by known-donor pregnancies in general. 
Out of these many issues discussed by the committee, one objective remained 
clear:  the need to deliver a transparent process so that the right of the prospective 
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child to have knowledge of his or her own genetic make-up could be protected. When 
sperm is pooled, so that no one clear father is recognized, it is thought that the adult 
might face undue anxiety about his or her specific health history or genetic back-
ground. Obtaining the facts later by way of DNA testing is possible, but may not be a 
reasonable option, considering the possibility that one of the involved parties may not 
be available or may refuse to consent to participate. 
In screening and counseling the group of brothers involved in this case, they all 
preferred to maintain secrecy, both toward the prospective child and among one an-
other as to which one was to become the genetic father. They eventually came to see 
(through counseling) that at least the clinic ought to know and maintain the record for 
future reference. They eventually conceded that pooling was not an option and instead 
decided to each donate sperm, but leave the choice of whose sperm would be actually 
used for the fertilization to the physician. In turn, the physician agreed to analyze both 
the sperm and the embryos fertilized by it, and select from among them whichever 
seemed to be the most healthy and viable for IVF, while keeping the information pri-
vate. The records could then be maintained for future reference, but the family could 
be left in their desired state of ignorance. This solution appeared to appease every-
body, and the principle of transparency was maintained (2/01, Case 2).  
When embryos are mixed for implantation, similar issues are at stake. The im-
petus is usually to give the infertile parent a chance to participate in the creation, while 
leaving in doubt the final genetic nature of the child. However, besides the transpar-
ency principle, where the child has a presumed right to know his or her genetic line, 
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physicians feel they are forced to make uncomfortable moral decisions if some em-
bryos aren’t used or must be eliminated to create a safer outcome. 
Example 33 
Four embryos were transferred to a woman, causing her pregnancy, but only 
one or two were fertilized by her own husband. All four began to develop creating the 
possibility of a quadruple birth. However, because of the danger in carrying four fe-
tuses in a pregnancy, both to them and to the pregnancy overall, it was planned to use 
the process of “selective reduction” to eliminate at least one embryo. In this procedure, 
an injection into the selected embryo through the uterine wall destroys it, making more 
room for those retained. However, in this case, the parents balked at selective reduc-
tion for fear that the one embryo selected to be eliminated might be the genetic prod-
uct of the husband rather than the sperm donor. The mother already felt more 
attachment to the continued existence of the related embryo, the one fertilized by her 
husband, than to the others, but at that stage of development it is impossible to deter-
mine which one was the genetic product (2/01, Case 6). This case was cited as a rea-
son to avoid mixing in general. Nevertheless, pooling can sometimes improve the 
overall chances for reproduction.  
Example 34 
In this rare circumstance, the laboratory results showed one “good’ embryo 
from a donor sperm and one “good” embryo from the sperm of the husband. (Embryos 
can be graded or ranked by various scientific criteria for their overall healthiness.) In 
such a situation the chances for fertilization are much improved if both are implanted, 
and in fact it is possible, and has occurred, for ‘twins’ to develop, one from each ge-
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netic father. In these cases, it is hoped that the child’s “right to know” is indefinitely 
deferred because of the presumed shock of disclosure of different parentage (8/01, 
Case 3). But because such cases are often “backed into,” or in other words only en-
countered in the medical setting while engaging in treatment, the ethics committee had 
little to say about the future effects, if any, on the children. In other words, the deci-
sion to implant mixed embryos was rarely made in advance, but was a decision made 
“on the fly” by the physician. 
Splitting 
Splitting embryos between two women is another way to occasionally maxi-
mize the chances for the probability of pregnancy, but like mixing, causes similar ethi-
cal questions.  
Example 35 
A woman had two children followed by a tubal ligation to prevent further con-
ception, but later wanted another child. Because she couldn’t afford the necessary sur-
gery, she hoped to earn the money to pay for the reversal of the ligation and the 
possible future pregnancy by serving as an egg donor. However, she worried that in 
donating an egg, her own opportunity to reproduce might be bypassed. She developed 
a plan wherein some of the embryos produced by her eggs could be donated after fer-
tilization to an infertile woman while others were kept for herself, ensuring two preg-
nancies for two different families. This had the potential of producing two full siblings 
who would each be raised separately.  
One of the first worries about this plan was the possibility that pregnancy could 
occur for the donor but fail in the recipient, so that ill will ensued. Also, if successful 
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for both, the children might later be shocked to learn of each other’s existence, or one 
family could intervene in the life of the other.  However, these problems were as-
sumed, in this case, to be manageable by legal contracts, and so the case was accepted 
(10/99, Case 6). 
Example 36 
In a more controversial case, a woman had failed after many trials with IVF to 
successfully achieve pregnancy, possibly due to other hormonal issues. Her plan was 
to maximize her chances of producing a child while retaining some hope of carrying 
her own pregnancy, by splitting some of the embryos between a gestational carrier and 
herself. She was well informed and willing to take the chance that, in a worst case 
scenario, all the pregnancies could succeed simultaneously (if three embryos were 
transferred to each woman, six children could conceivably be born at once!). She felt 
that she could enthusiastically accept any number of children, whichever pregnancies 
were successful. 
The first step in this case was to “do the medicine first” by re-evaluating her 
former problems to evaluate any necessity for splitting embryos. To the physicians, it 
was putting the “cart before the horse” or to assume that the embryos would do better 
in some idealized carrier, when it was possible that the embryos themselves were the 
problem and not the woman as a carrier. On the other hand, for various reasons, some 
women cannot retain pregnancies even with perfect embryos, so in such a scenario 
there would be no need to split the embryos. The case could be resolved by using a 
gestational carrier alone. 
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A concern more related to ethics was that if both women became pregnant and 
selective reduction were required, the pregnant woman might choose to keep her own 
pregnancy intact, gambling away all the embryos if she later failed to carry them. Her 
objectivity would be compromised. Another side worry, if both women produced chil-
dren, was to consider whether the woman or her husband might take more interest in 
any offspring from the wife’s pregnancy, ignoring those from the carrier, so as to later 
favor or bond with some of the children over others. Data on outcomes from splitting 
embryos, or from siblings gestated separately, is scanty. ARM Clinic has done very 
little splitting of this nature, so that no paradigm was available, and the possible rami-
fications for siblings related genetically but gestated separately are unknown. Here, the 
negative decision was made to deny the case using the grounds of the “delay” factor in 
doing the medicine first, and the worry about the “Daily News“ effect, where if the 
plan were to become well-known, it could be the type of case to attract publicity (2/00, 
Case 1).  
Example 37 
In a similar case of splitting embryos, a woman with a defective uterus and a 
history of failed pregnancies wanted to try to carry a pregnancy, but wanted to ‘hedge 
her bets’ by simultaneously using her sister as a gestational carrier. The worries ex-
pressed by the committee in the previous case were glossed over in this one, possibly 
because the likelihood that the patient would be able to sustain a pregnancy was more 
clearly medically improbable so that other concerns, such as multiple births, became 
moot. However, this case could be seen to include other, different concerns, such as 
rivalry and jealousy between the two sisters, whether the patient would be upset when 
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and if her sister established a more successful pregnancy, whether the children from 
the sister’s pregnancy would be treated differently or made less welcome by the hus-
band, whether two or more children might be generated from both pregnancies and if 
so, whether the parents would be more attached to one set more than the other. Al-
though raised, these concerns were taken by the committee as easily managed by 
proper counseling sessions. The “yuck factor” wasn’t raised in this discussion, the 
“Daily News” factor wasn’t mentioned, and the obstacle of “medicine first” was 
thought to be accomplished; so the case was accepted with little more discussion. It is 
not totally clear why, although, the idea of a sister assisting her sibling is assumed to 
be more understandable and less fraught with problems than that of a paid surrogate. 
Also, the second case, by following the first one, seemed to be more easily worked 
through, perhaps because of the experience and insight thought to be gained by the 
previous case. Or perhaps the slippery slope was in place, and the committee’s famili-
arity with the problem had encouraged easier acceptance when encountering a similar 
problem for the second time. Or perhaps the ethical problem in the first case was less 
than met the eye, and the possible problems were actually less important than first 
thought (1/02, Case 2). 
Transgenerational Relationships 
In discussing how age affects informed consent in the last chapter, I pointed 
out how coercion was a special issue to be considered. Similarly, in cases that cross 
generational lines, coercion can be the major harm to watch out for, although the 
“yuck factor” is an unarticulated side-problem, causing inconsistency in some of these 
results. Here, participants in assisted reproduction may be widely separated by age, 
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raising the fear that the older may have too much persuasive or social power over the 
younger. Of more interest in these transgenerational cases is that family relationships 
can also become confused.  
Example 38 
A woman with one child had a long history of trying fertility treatments with-
out success. Finally, confronted with the need for an egg donor, she chose her 18-year-
old sister to act as a known donor, with the sister’s full agreement. The use of sisters in 
such a relationship is generally not controversial at ARM Clinic, since the sibling 
bond usually creates a cooperative and willing pairing, but the committee could not 
accept the 18-year-old as a donor for two reasons. One reason was simply that the 
younger woman was under 21, violating their routine informed-consent policy, estab-
lished for reasons I have already mentioned. But an even greater fear voiced by the 
committee, in this case, was discomfort with an age gap of 17 years between the two 
sisters, because it was thought that the younger sibling could be overly desirous of 
pleasing the elder, or to be in a position where she found it difficult to consider her 
own preferences and say no. The age gap can be equally wide in other egg-donating 
situations, but because the parties are generally unknown to one another, it is less 
troubling. It is believed that this type of case can easily be solved by confidential in-
terviewing so as to identify and intercede in these personal entanglements, even when 
transgenerational relationships put them in particular danger from coercive elements, 
but this one was not accepted (4/02, Case 3). 
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Example 39 
A similar case occurred in which the donor was not underage and the relation-
ship was not as close, allowing the committee to be more accepting. A 44-year-old 
wanted to use her 27-year-old niece as the egg donor, but here the niece was married, 
had children and lived out of the area. Although the age gap was as wide as the previ-
ous case, it seemed unlikely that the elder could wield undue influence on the younger, 
and the younger had more life experience with which to consider her options (4/02, 
Case 2). However, transgenerational cases can be much more complex than the two 
mentioned so far. 
Example 40 
A woman in her 40s wanted to receive an egg donation from her daughter-in-
law, who was nearly twenty years younger. The younger woman was happily married 
to the infertile woman’s son and they had two children of their own. She was appar-
ently willing to donate her eggs, without coercion, but the relationship problems in 
store for the potential child were certainly confusing. The prospective baby, if born, (I 
will assume it is a male to keep the example simple) would not only be a half-brother 
to the man who is the spouse of the egg donor (his genetic mother), but he would be 
the genetic son to his father’s daughter-in-law who will legally relate to him as a sis-
ter-in-law. He would not be related to the woman who would carry the pregnancy and 
become his legal mother. He would be an uncle to his half-brother’s children, but also 
their half brother. The potential father of this child would be thrust into a subtle rela-
tionship with the genetic mother, who was also his daughter-in-law, because of shar-
ing in the genetic parenting of the child, although he would also raise the child, while 
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the genetic mother would resort to her role as sister-in-law, all while living within a 
close family circle. The committee could not help but wonder whether all these entan-
gled relationships might not intrude upon the marriage of the younger couple, as the 
young man would be forced to observe his parents raise a child that was genetically 
the child of his own young wife and his much older father, while the young wife ob-
served her own genetic child being raised by her parents-in-law. 
Initially, the committee gave serious thought about extending approval to this 
case, allowing the family members to take the step of attending required psychological 
evaluations in preparation for their participation. However, time did not make this case 
more palatable. Both the intergenerational and transgenerational factors, and the am-
biguous “yuck factor,” were finally insurmountable to the committee, and the case was 
rejected (2/01, Case 1). (See also the associated discussion from 3/01, Case 2). 
Although lacking clarity, the yuck factor was certainly a big reason for the re-
jection of this case. Although some warned of the “Daily News” factor, it seemed 
unlikely that such a case would be publicized; in fact, it may not be so unusual. Other 
cases of known donors involving confusing genetic relationships certainly exist, but 
the combined effect in this case served to overwhelm the committee with its potential 
for awkwardness in one extended family. In some cases, where the age gap is re-
versed, coercion can go the other way. 
Example 41 
A woman in her 50’s had carried one pregnancy for her daughter and now 
wanted to carry another. The daughter had suffered a hysterectomy at a young age, 
and the mother wanted to help her create a family. It was assumed that some risk could 
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accrue to the older woman, but no concerns about coercion or transgenerational prob-
lems were expressed by committee members, probably because the older had no ge-
netic input; presumably her older and wiser status, and her motherly selflessness, also 
precluded such a problem (12/01, Case 4). Nevertheless, one cannot help but wonder 
how the older mother might refuse to help her daughter without appearing uncaring. 
Example 42 
In another older to younger transgenerational case, a father willingly accepted 
the position of back-up sperm donor to his son, even though he knew it necessitated 
surgery due to his previous vasectomy. The idea was to use the father’s donation just 
in case the son’s sperm biopsy failed to retrieve viable sperm. Although the father-to-
son age gap was large, coercion was not taken to be a problem, as in the last case, be-
cause the father was thought to be motivated by parental selflessness. However, a dif-
ference between these last two cases is that here the father was making a genetic 
investment. The prospective child would be the actual child, although raised as a 
grandson, whereas in the other situation the older mother, because an egg donor was 
used, acted as a non-related gestational carrier although she invested her body, time, 
and risk. Nevertheless, the two cases are similar in that the good will of each elder 
parent was assumed, so that any coercion or other relational issue is more likely to be 
dismissed or overlooked (10/00, Case 4).  
Child Replacement – Child as Treatment 
Among the relationship issues confronted at ARM Clinic are cases that could 
be thought of as child replacement issues. The first is sex selection, which is not con-
sidered to be a valid reason for assisted reproduction at ARM Clinic; neither is it much 
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requested. Public controversy over the possibility of choosing the sex of one’s child 
has given an impression that, if available, many people would not only want to control 
their choice, but even worse, might generally choose boys over girls, creating the sort 
of imbalance said to occur in China today because of its one-child-only policies. How-
ever, only one case of this nature has been brought to the ethics committee at ARM 
Clinic and it evoked sympathy, although not acceptance. 
Example 43 
An immigrant from a country with a high value on male children lost her only 
son in an accident. Although left with other female children, she very much wanted to 
produce a son, to replace, in a sense, the one lost to her. Although sympathetic to her 
plight, the committee rejected the request on the grounds that sex selection is objec-
tionable on its face and that replacement of a lost child may be a poor reason to have a 
child (5/01, Case 3). In this case, another disqualifying reason was that no infertility or 
medical reason for assisted reproduction was asserted, so by “doing the medicine 
first,” none of the sorts of reasons that might have compelled treatment were pre-
sented. 
Sex selection can occur as a byproduct of producing a healthy pregnancy when 
screening out heritable diseases that are sex-linked. ARM Clinic provides the service 
of Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PIGD) available as a tool to screen embryos 
for diseases like cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia. The process can be used for sex 
selection, especially when it is necessary to prevent a sex-linked disorder. However, 
the ethics committee took the stand that to purposely create a child of one sex over an-
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other is superficial, commodifying, and an objectionable reason to embark on assisted 
reproduction.  
Example 44 
Another use for PIGD is to ensure the production of a child who can serve as a 
means of treating the illness of an already existing child. Some cases of children with 
Fanconi’s Anemia, a generally fatal inherited disease, have appeared at ARM Clinic. 
Here the parents want not only to prevent the heritable disease in a new pregnancy, but 
to pre-select a child who can serve as a bone marrow donor to save the life of the cur-
rent child. In one case, the parents wanted to produce, select and freeze enough em-
bryos for their whole future family, not only to treat the child they had, but to ensure 
the health of all their future children (8/01, Case 4). The ethics committee has agreed 
that such medical reasons are reasonable conditions that warrant the use of PIGD as a 
means of selecting healthy embryos. Perhaps because of the well-known paradigm 
cases of this nature (mentioned earlier in this chapter) they no longer raise ethical eye-
brows. 
In Chapter 6, the case examples based on risk and consent were most often de-
cided on procedural grounds, what I called doing the medicine first. However, in this 
chapter, where the cases exhibited new family relationships, elusive footings of a more 
deontological nature provided the basis for decision-making, generally what I have 
called the yuck factor. In these cases, the consequentialist goal of attaining a positive 
outcome (a pregnancy) is not seen to be as important to committee members as an 
overall sense of “wrongness” about how the end result is to be achieved, or the result-
ing family configuration. Although it is rarely mentioned in the bioethics literature, the 
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“argument from repugnance” or the “yuck factor” turned out to be of more importance 
in the bioethical deliberations at ARM clinic than has been known or previously re-
ported. Many members of the committee experienced the sensation of dismay or dis-
gust upon learning about certain novel requests from patients or new techniques 
available to the practice, and they interpreted this feeling as a reason to reject the 
treatment plan, without finding it necessary to produce an argument, or to more fully 
discuss the problem at stake. The question is whether there is a value to this feeling 
and how it should apply to the practical problems confronted by bioethicists.  
 In the next chapter, I present in some detail the views of Leon Kass, mentioned 
earlier as one who takes this feeling seriously and has used the “argument from repug-
nance” to try to retain traditional human reproduction and delay or limit research in 
the field.  While Kass admits that feelings of revulsion are not arguments in them-
selves, he gives them great weight as an emotional expression of a deeper moral 
knowledge. However, I argue that the reaction is often just a sense of shock when fac-
ing something new, and that its actual moral value, whether right or wrong, must be 
gleaned through the more active process of argumentation put forth here as Scanlonian 
reflective equilibrium. Nevertheless, the fact that the proclamation of repugnance was 
used so frequently at ARM Clinic to support the rejection of a case causes me to put 
out more fully in Chapter 8 an explanation and analysis of Kass and his argument from 
repugnance.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
KASS AND THE ARGUMENT FROM REPUGNANCE 
The use of the term “yuck factor” has most often been associated with Leon 
Kass, the University of Chicago professor, physician and bioethicist currently chairing 
the President’s Council on Bioethics. Kass has used his political platform to warn 
against the dangers incipient in modern science and technology, particularly in cloning 
and therapeutic stem cell research. He has stated that the tendency of humans to recoil 
from some of their own intemperate practices (he lists incest and bestiality as among 
the worst) is a natural and important warning sign of moral danger. Similarly offensive 
to Kass are some of the “unnatural” achievements of hubristic science and technology. 
The repugnance felt (or said to be felt by the majority of the population, who accord-
ing to opinion polls are opposed to cloning, for example) when exposed to various 
practices, or their supporting ideas, is supposed to be an indicator that something is 
wrong, that human dignity is endangered, or, at least, that moral qualms have been en-
countered. As one journalist described this emotion, “in the bioethical debates it has 
come to be known, not very technically, as the “Yuck Factor,” the instinctive revul-
sion most people feel toward many prospective biomedical innovations, such as the 
screening of embryos for (say) sex selection or eye color, or the cloning of human be-
ings – for reproductive purposes” (Ferguson 3).45
Kass has developed this “argument from repugnance” into a more general de-
ontological framework by which to elaborate his views on human nature and the level 
                                            
45 See Andrew Ferguson in “Kass Warfare,” The Weekly Standard, 2/4/02, page 3. 
Kass does not use the term “yuck factor” regularly, although he is associated with it (for example, see 
his book review from 9/23/98). He prefers the term, “repugnance,” to express his deep-seated horror at 
these scientific activities. 
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of respect due to humanity. His well-known popular articles against cloning, as well as 
his 1997 testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, may have been 
responsible for elevating him to his current status, giving his argument from repug-
nance special significance and serving to disseminate the notion of the “yuck factor” 
into contemporary bioethics discussion. Certainly, it was more than once used as a 
reason against the acceptance of certain cases at ARM Clinic, as I have reported in the 
last two chapters. 
Some of the strength of Kass’s argument comes from his linking of new tech-
nologies like cloning to abhorrent practices such as murder, referring to highly techni-
cal practices as bizarre, grotesque, narcissistic, revolting and a sign of 
“Frankensteinian hubris.” The arousal of such strong feelings are proof to him of im-
morality: he refers to the powerful feeling of revulsion as something akin to an expres-
sion of human wisdom. In a widely read New Republic article in 2001, he said: 
Revulsion is not an argument; and some of yesterday’s repugnances are 
today calmly accepted – not always for the better. In some crucial 
cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wis-
dom, beyond reason’s power completely to articulate it. Can anyone 
really give an argument fully adequate to the horror that is father-
daughter incest (even with consent), or bestiality, or the mutilation of a 
corpse, or the eating of human flesh, or the rape and murder of another 
human being?  Would anybody’s failure to give full rational justifica-
tion for his revulsions at those practices make that revulsion ethically 
suspect?...I suggest that our repugnance at human cloning belongs in 
this category…repugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to 
defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the souls that have 
forgotten how to shudder (2001, 32-33). 
 
In spite of the drama in this invitation to shudder, Kass recognizes that some-
thing more than the emotion of repugnance is necessary if his point of view is to be 
elevated into a political or moral position; the argument needs to be put into a princi-
 165
pled form. In general, it is less an argument than a declaration, calling for respect for 
the “natural human” against any form of dehumanization. He feels that values once 
accepted as basic to humanity (as recently as 25 years ago) have now been eroded by 
technology. He complains that “once-given natural boundaries are blurred,” that 
“moral boundaries are seemingly up for grabs” and even worse that “man gets used to 
everything—the beast!”  His vision of humanity is deeply pessimistic because it has 
lost a sense of respect for tradition due to “modern notions of individualism” (1997, 
18).  
The use of human reason can be blamed for this “fall” because of its tendency 
to reduce and narrow the bigger picture of humanity, allowing us to slide into “piece-
meal thinking,” simplistic notions of freedom, “compassionate humanitarianism,” and 
“cultural pluralism,” so that economic interests and technological achievements take 
on their own speed to advance, until the means are forgotten in a race for “clever” hu-
man ends (2001, 31). And yet all that has been gained by this approach, in Kass’s 
point of view, is a false separation from ourselves and our natural essences. We have 
become depersonalized as we have slipped into these passive patterns of behavior. 
In 1985 Kass published his overall philosophy in a book46 deriding re-
productive technology. Here he made clear his feeling that the use of anything 
artificial violates “the nature of man himself” (73). As recently as January 
2003, in a New York Times editorial, Kass continued to emphasize the same 
concern about the ability of technology to overrule “natural” human life. 
Speaking about cloning in particular, he said, “It is the first step toward a 
                                            
46 Towards a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs, published by Free Press, New York, 
1985. 
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eugenic world in which children become objects of manipulation and products 
of will” (2003, A-25). 
Kass’s concerns about objectifying children are not totally in opposition to 
some of the attitudes expressed  by clinicians at the ARM Clinic in their defense of 
“natural” physical processes, although it is odd to hear “natural conception” extolled 
as though it is morally superior by those whose work is to overcome “natural” defects 
with “artificial” practices like IVF. However, as they exemplified, even those who ap-
plaud the superiority of the “natural” find it difficult to articulate specific ethical prin-
ciples that imply the artificial is immoral. However, sometimes in the deliberations of 
the ethics committee, the expression of the attitude of repugnance was enough on its 
own to doom the acceptance of an unusual case. Other times it just reflected, in an un-
articulated way, an aesthetic or visceral reaction, feelings that couldn’t be successfully 
verbalized.  
Kass stated that he understood the need to articulate some reasoning to explain 
how his attitude of repugnance is supposed to stand in for real principled objection, 
but his ideas depend upon a traditional pre-scientific standpoint about human nature. 
Before clarifying his reasoning, I set out a review of his earlier work, so as to analyze 
the history and development of his standpoint and show how it applies to my project 
in this paper. 
In 1971, Kass’s attention was focused on IVF, the newest reproductive tech-
nology on the horizon. Steptoe and Edwards had recently reported their initial suc-
cesses in the fertilization of a human egg, its maturation into the embryonic stage in 
the laboratory, and the two had published their intention to implant these early em-
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bryos into human subjects. Kass objected to this research, using terms similar to his 
objections later put forth against cloning, referring to what he believed was the objec-
tionably high risk involved to a child conceived under such circumstances, citing the 
possibility of “deformity,” “retardation,” “gross abnormalities,” and “malformation” 
(1971, 1175). He argued that experimentation should cease until the risk was resolved, 
and he demanded a high standard before any such experimentation should occur in the 
future; the ability to prevent any defect must be proved before attempts at human im-
plantation were to be implemented. (He didn’t say how such proof could be obtained 
without doing any experimentation.)  For him, experimenting on the embryo was un-
acceptable, because he had already collapsed any distinction between the blastocyst, 
the embryo, and the more developed fetus: to him they were all potential human chil-
dren and deserved protection. Kass took experimentations on early embryos to be 
equivalent to human experimentation without consent, because it deliberately imposed 
risks upon potential children who could not possibly agree (1174).  
His framework of risk and safety was supported by three other claims, besides 
potential personhood. First, he argued that parents should not consent to experimenta-
tion on their children for any reason other than the hope of therapeutic treatments, but 
never for scientific knowledge. In the case of IVF, he saw the purpose of embryonic 
manipulation to be the development of a treatment for infertility in the parents, so it 
could not be said to be therapeutic for the child. Thus, no experimentation was war-
ranted. 
Second, he questioned whether infertility could be seen as a disease requiring 
treatment. For him, it was more akin to a desire, a valuable desire to be sure, but one 
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that should not impose any demands on the scientific community as if it were a dis-
ease: 
It is one thing to accept for yourself the risk of a dangerous procedure (or to 
consent on behalf of your child, even your intrauterine child) if the purpose is 
therapeutic. Some might say that this is not only permissible, but obligatory, in 
line with a duty to preserve one’s own health or the health of one’s children. It 
is quite a different thing deliberately to submit a child born or unborn, to haz-
ardous procedures which can in no way be considered therapeutic for him (and, 
as I shall argue shortly, is “therapeutic” for you only in that it “treats” your de-
sires, albeit unobjectionable ones) (1971, 1176). 
 
Here, Kass exhibited a preference for the cellular embryo over a treatment of the dis-
ease of infertility in the mother. He suggested that her condition ought to be endured 
and accepted. He went on:  
If it is any kind of disease, it is a “social disease.” …To consider infertility 
solely in terms of the traditional medical model of disease (or in terms of a so-
called right of an individual to have a child) can only help to undermine, both 
in thought and in practice, the bond between childbearing and the covenant of 
marriage….Just as infertility is not a disease, so providing a child by artificial 
means to a woman with blocked oviducts is not treatment (as surgical recon-
struction of her oviducts would be). She remains as infertile as before. What is 
being treated is her “desire”...to bear a child (1971, 1176-77). 
 
At this point in time, fertility research had not yet resulted in the achievement of preg-
nancy for the participants; it was too new. Kass thought that the hopeful couples who 
cooperated with researchers were being cruelly exploited by the scientific community 
by participating in research that was unlikely to fulfill their particular dreams of fertil-
ity.  
Kass’s third claim was that no distinction could be made between the embryo 
and the fully developed child. He portrayed any scientific manipulations as a purpose-
ful infliction of injury on a fetus and thought it should be prevented by law in the same 
way as the use of thalidomide.  
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These were the stated reasons why Kass asked for a moratorium on IVF human 
experimentation in 1971 (though he would have allowed animal research to continue). 
He called for the establishment of critical professional study groups to assess the fu-
ture for such research, and he sought publicity so that the undesirable social conse-
quences would become widely known. He wanted ethical and legal limitations to be 
firmly established, and he wanted international groups to cooperate in preventing a 
race toward making babies, “evils committed in the name of international competi-
tion” (1971, 1178). 
But behind these concerns for human safety, allusions to deeper fears can be 
recognized in Kass’s writings. He envisioned a dire outcome for humanity by such 
possibilities as: 
• “full laboratory control of human reproduction” by the state;  
  
• a slippery slope toward other reproductive techniques that seemed to him unac-
ceptable to the human condition, especially ectogenesis and cloning; 
 
•  the development of bizarre experiments because of poor medical judgment;  
 
• reproductive capabilities becoming available to irresponsible parties presumably 
in other countries with fewer moral scruples); and 
   
• the accumulation of power by the medical scientific community where the in-
creasing ability to control nature in various ways could incite an “immoderate” 
public backlash (1971, 1178-79). 
 
When Louise Brown, the first “test-tube” conception, was born in 1978, to al-
lappearances normal and healthy, Kass’s opinions remained unchanged.47  However, 
                                            
47 See Pence’s Classic Cases for an overview of the Louise Brown case and its aftermath (93-119). 
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he added a new concern to his list—that confusing human relationships would be de-
veloped and would be socially harmful. 
More important than the risk of bodily harm is the possibility – unique 
to these new procedures – of deliberately confounding the lineages of 
such children…the possibility of donation of eggs from a woman out-
side of marriage, or the use of a surrogate woman to carry someone 
else’s child…The problems caused by confused lineage and identity 
constitute additional possible harm deliberately inflicted upon the chil-
dren-to-be. Moreover such indifference to matters of lineage is a seri-
ous challenge to the whole meaning of the institution of the family 
(1978, 5).  
 
The problem for Kass is that in order to prevent the social harms that he feared, the 
whole notion of the transaction model of medicine, where the goals and the treatments 
appear to be driven by individualistic transactions between physicians and their cli-
ents, would have to be altered. Kass’s view was communitarian, seeking less individ-
ual autonomy in these personal decisions. Furthermore, Kass continued to blame 
women for their infertility, hinting that they caused the problem through their own 
sexual practices. (He didn’t mention the possibility that men might share in the re-
sponsibility of spreading sexual diseases.) He said: 
We do know, for example, that gonorrhea and pelvic inflammatory dis-
ease are perhaps the leading causes of tubal obstruction in women – 
they account for probably a third of the cases. It would be curious if, 
with the aid of federal support, we had a program of Petri-dish babies 
before we had a vaccine against gonococcus. That strikes me as bizarre 
(1978, 7). 
 
At this time, besides insinuating that disease is a natural state, to be accepted 
and endured (and perhaps taken as due blame for one’s lifestyle choices), Kass also 
began to develop his defense of the ‘natural family,’ where repugnance was developed 
further as an intuitive moral position by which to keep limits on anti-family and anti-
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human social behaviors. The value of using repugnance to identify moral behavior is 
illustrated by the following test:   
I have two tests of whether the embryo is nothing – and I do not regard 
it as a full person or a full human being. One, if one of these embryos 
should die, would it be mourned or buried?  Probably not; we do not 
even do that for fetuses. On the other hand – and this is a grotesque 
thought, and I apologize- suppose it turned out that someone discovered 
the human embryo is a delicacy? It would be abhorrent to think of eat-
ing them, wouldn’t it?  Why?  Surely because the embryo is covered by 
the general presumption that things human are not mere stuff. I grant 
that much good could come from embryo research, but to proceed we 
would have to be convinced that we are working on mere stuff (1978, 
13-14). 
 
To take a consequentialist standpoint of evaluating means solely in terms of 
ends is abhorrent to Kass, so he presumed here that to analogize between em-
bryo experimentation (as done for fertility) and the ingestion of embryos as a 
delicacy serves to remind the reader of the importance of human life and the 
repugnance of “unnatural” manipulations of it. 
 By using such a colorful example, Kass hoped to encourage a feeling of revul-
sion toward reproductive experimentation in general, but perhaps to also inspire rhet-
orically a sense of outrage towards the overall primacy of science and technology in 
our lives, and more particularly against the practices he abhorred.  
By 1997, Kass turned his attention toward cloning in particular. He saw the 
possibility of a human clone as the symbolic culmination of the negative consequences 
he had always feared in the slippery slope of reproductive experimentation. That year, 
he gave testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, (NBAC), a group 
organized to report and make recommendations to the Clinton Administration on the 
implications of human cloning (1997b S:99). He stated that his reaction to cloning was 
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informed and molded by his earlier concerns about the practice of IVF, but in recog-
nizing that his emphasis on risk and harm had not been effective then, he now stressed 
“repugnance and revulsion” as the main framework for his objections to cloning. Re-
sponding to criticism that the expression of emotion does not contain an argument, nor 
even a rational justification for an argument, he tried to portray emotion as more 
meaningful than argument. In his testimony, he defended the emotional response this 
way: 
We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because 
of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking but because we intuit 
and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things we 
rightfully hold dear. I doubt very much whether I can give the proper 
rational voice to this horror…But please consider seriously that this 
may be one of those instances about which the heart has its reasons that 
reason cannot adequately know (1997b 140-141). 
 
Besides repugnance he mentioned three other reasons to support his position of 
preventing cloning research, reprised from his earlier anti-IVF work: the immorality of 
experimentation without consent from the embryo, problems in identity for “manufac-
tured” children, and violations of the meaning of parenthood and childhood. These ar-
guments have not changed since 1971 except to add more gloomy forecasts about the 
dangers of the experimentation. Kass now sees the overall culture as having fallen into 
decline, so that a position of respect toward sexuality and marriage is difficult to find. 
He said, “changes in the broader culture make it now vastly more difficult to express a 
common and respectful understanding of sexuality, procreation, nascent life, family, 
and the meaning of motherhood, fatherhood and the links between the generations” 
(1997a, 17).  
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Kass still hopes to defend some “natural boundaries” in our world views. To 
him, nature fixed a deterministic method of situating us in the world; the meaning of 
life is created by our acceptance and participation in the lot thrown to us. Holding to a 
“clear natural grounding” by refusing to tamper or to rearrange the world to suit our-
selves, should be a matter of dignity and pride (21). The creation of new family rela-
tionships, inherent in assisted reproduction, and the way they subvert “kinship” is 
abhorrent, then, because it confuses one’s sense of identity, and lessens one’s sense of 
belonging. In addition, traditional relationships keep the world in its natural order. One 
meaningful feature of parenthood is that the child serves as a replacement for our-
selves and our generation, and a reminder that life is not eternal. It is natural for the 
adult to surrender her grip on life, and recognize its brevity, as her (or his) children are 
born and grow into adulthood. To allow transgenerational fertilization is to cling to 
life unreasonably, by refusing to cede control of the future. For Kass, this is “inher-
ently despotic” in its attempt to use one’s will to control others (1997b, S:143). 
Kass’s overt concerns about the dangers in assisted reproductive medicine con-
tinue to mask a deeper fear, that humans have become “slaves of unregulated pro-
gress” (S:143). By blindly complying with scientific desires and enjoying the 
accomplishments, humans have lost their will and behave as though they cannot assert 
their freedom. Freedom and dignity to Kass lie in the ability to control technology – or 
more accurately to stop technology—and he clearly feels reproductive medicine has 
allowed technology to control us. He doesn’t consider or acknowledge that if success-
ful, his blanket condemnation of technology would itself be a restriction of human 
freedom.  
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His themes of dehumanization and the loss of freedom, written with religious 
fervor, are currently displayed in his work as Chairman of the President’s Council on 
Bioethics. In the introduction to the committee’s 2002 report on cloning, Kass warns 
against our tendency to use utilitarian frameworks for decision-making, particularly in 
our acceptance of “runaway technology” and “the utopian project to remake human-
kind in our own image” (2002a, xvi). Here, such factors as human dignity and some 
sort of “life principle” were said to take precedence over “unintended consequences of 
research” and the use of “dehumanizing biotechnology” (xxi-xxii). Saving lives (the 
“life principle”), no matter how many, is not an appropriate way to measure morality, 
or to show respect for human dignity, according to Kass, because we become “de-
graded” by doing so.  
But Kass leaves unclear exactly how one is to define human dignity and worth, 
an especially important omission since it appears they can be sacrificed in some in-
stances but not others. It is unclear how gaining control over human reproduction is an 
inherent threat to human dignity, instead of a means of ensuring its longevity. 
His assumptions are problematic, for two reasons. First, he assumes that the 
slippery slope must prevail. He sets out no reason to believe that techniques for repro-
duction necessitate that all human procreation will eventually be “manufactured.”  
Second, he does not explain why gaining control over sexual reproduction means an 
inherent loss to human dignity. It seems odd to presume that human dignity lies in the 
random genetic mix that occurs in natural sexual reproduction rather than in the treat-
ment and respect that humans display to one another during their lifetimes, particularly 
in the health care services that are freely given. Perhaps the development of wise and 
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carefully used power over reproduction is a reflection of human dignity, whereas a 
willful ignoring of the powers to diagnose and treat human illness and suffering would 
be lacking dignity.  
By using the argument from repugnance to encompass all his moral concerns, 
Kass faces a two more technical problems. First of all, his original concerns about the 
danger and risk inherent in reproductive research have proved to be highly inflated, al-
though this is not to say that there is no risk at all.48  Bonnie Steinbock reported in 
1994, for the Human Embryo Research Panel at NIH, that “IVF so far has shown no 
higher rate of congenital deformity than coital reproduction,” although a different and 
smaller study in Australia did report that certain birth defects, spina bifida and heart 
abnormalities, were higher than normally expected (Steinbock 32-33).49 In any event, 
the type of defects that have been reported appear to be low in number, minor, and/or 
correctable, and not the major deformities feared by Kass in 1971 when he queried, 
“what if the first “test-tube baby” turns out to be a monster?” (1179). Rather than be-
ing relieved by the fact that the medical scientific community in the 1970s has not 
turned out to be as reckless as he feared, he still maintains the same level of criticism 
towards the risks of reproductive and therapeutic cloning that he had used against IVF.  
A second criticism of Kass’s repugnance argument is that he has continued to 
deny any distinctions in the stages (or better thought of as the continuum) of reproduc-
tive cells as they move towards full-term infancy. Is a four cell organism deserving of 
                                            
48 See “Eye Cancer” in the Washington Post (A9) and Skloot in the New York Times (A-35) for more 
current complaints that some illnesses are more common in children born from in vitro fertilization. The 
most often linked is a rare form of eye cancer; although the studies as yet are inconclusive, finding “no 
confirmed evidence.” 
49 Bonnie Steinbock in “Ethical Issues in Human Embryo Research” wrote that research conducted by 
Roberson in 1986 and Morin in 1989 did not confirm high levels of deformity in infants born from IVF. 
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the same protection as a fetus or a neonate?  Abortion law indicates that a distinction 
is made between pre-born and already delivered infants. Stem cell policy distinguishes 
between the first 72 hours of cell division and the cell thereafter. Does any cell need 
the full protection of the law?  The basis for Kass’s argument against risk was to pro-
tect the potential infant, but he has not demonstrated how such a claim of potentiality 
can be upheld. The body of legal work since 1971 has not demonstrated any principle 
by which parents can be held accountable for negligence, or even intentional harm, to 
an unborn embryo or fetus. As Pence pointed out, “So far, the courts have rejected al-
most all wrongful life suits” reasoning that life is a benefit even when pain and suffer-
ing are present (1995, 196). A problem for Kass is that many children (maybe even 
most children) are produced by parents who do not apply high standards to their per-
sonal health; they eat improperly, fail to exercise, use drugs, pick up sexually transmit-
ted diseases, including the HIV virus; they smoke, drink, and take over-the-counter 
pills; they don’t get married; they become pregnant thoughtlessly and by accident. In 
fact, the most healthy parents are probably those using reproductive medicine, because 
they are so highly motivated in their quest. Kass hopes that our disapproval of un-
healthy practices in pregnancy can be transferred to outrage about embryo experimen-
tation, but he fails because it is counter-intuitive to the public to imagine that 
irresponsible parents should be prosecuted. Perhaps unavoidable harms to a being who 
would not exist otherwise is less upsetting than purposeful harm to an existing being. 
But primarily his analogy fails because it leads to the consideration that natural fertili-
zation is more risky than the laboratory; each home-based conception could be said to 
be an unsafe experiment. Focusing on the possible dangers in conception could en-
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courage the more responsible and careful individuals to choose IVF, or even cloning, 
over natural parenthood, to avoid the risks that normal people take every day. 
While placing so much emphasis on safety in the context of reproductive tech-
nology, Kass does not seem much bothered when naturally conceived offspring have 
poor outcomes. In his 1985 book Toward a More Natural Science, he blames many of 
the ills in society on the intelligent: 
After all, how many architects of the Vietnam War or the suppression 
of Solidarity suffered from Down’s syndrome?  Who uses up more of 
our irreplaceable natural resources and who produces more pollution:  
the inmates of an institution for the retarded or the graduates of Har-
vard College? And which of our genetic mutants display more vanity, 
self-indulgence, and the will-to-power, or less courage, reverence, and 
love of country than many of our so-called best and brightest?  It seems 
indisputable that the world suffers more from the morally and spiritu-
ally defective than from the genetically defective. Thus, it is sad that 
our best minds are busy fighting our genetic shortcomings while our 
more serious vices are allowed to multiply unmolested (46). 
 
Can human disabilities be the solution to social problems, or is he perhaps casting 
about for a defense of the fact that birth defects are a regular outcome of “natural re-
production?” It seems contradictory for Kass to be so complacent about natural risks, 
while being so concerned about experimental risks. If the techniques of reproductive 
medicine can produce healthier children (and if persons produced by such methods, 
when not harmed, are presumably pleased that such experimenting was done on their 
behalf, since it provides them with life where there would have been none), then it ap-
pears that Kass has clung to the issue of risk and potential harm unnecessarily, because 
without it he has a much more difficult argument to make as to why such experimenta-
tion should be thought immoral. What appears to be at stake is his definition of per-
sonhood. 
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His conception of the person is the third problem for Kass’s argument from re-
pugnance. His writings on the topic since 1971 are vague. He has not made abortion 
rights a center of his work, at least in writing, and in his 1985 book, he simply states 
about abortion: “there is likely to be little new that can be said and certainly not by 
me” (83). But without a fuller story of personhood, it seems odd for Kass to speak of 
reproductive technology as unethical because of the impossibility of obtaining consent 
from the “unborn and the unconceived,” as if the fertilized egg has already been taken 
to be a consenting human being (50). Instead of following up on this line of reasoning, 
Kass raised social concerns; the weakening of the family, the way that technology 
might lessen dignity and respect for humans. Is the embryo really fully human, on his 
view?  It is not clear except in the context that embryos can suffer harm and cannot 
give consent. He sometimes seems more concerned with what our treatment of em-
bryos says about us as moral beings. In a recent news article he worries:   
Advances made in science and technology to relieve suffering could 
dehumanize us. Advances in reproductive biology such as in vitro fer-
tilization, can do much good.” “Yet,” these bio-technologies may also 
cause us “to lose our awe and mystery at the coming into being of a 
new life….the risks go beyond safety, efficacy, and cost. The power 
behind these technologies changes the meaning of what it is to be hu-
man. They’re seductive…They don’t come at once. They come piece-
meal. You get used to them without thinking (B9). 
 
Here embryos seem to have status as symbols rather than as the actual means of repro-
ductive success to real people suffering from infertility. To the persons they will be-
come and to their prospective parents they are of immense value, but when not being 
used with that intention, they may have no value at all, symbolic or otherwise. They 
are, in fact, disposable and forgettable, as can be seen by the many “extra” embryos 
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created, frozen, and stored away in reproductive medicine clinics. Like many other 
facts of nature, their value often lies in something other than mere existence, perhaps 
their overall usefulness.  
Kass, then, is unsure what real value to place on human embryos; like 
many of us, he vacillates. In his 1985 book, when discussing the issue of sur-
plus embryos, he admits to being “undecided” whether it is wrong or right to 
discard them. The whole problem of potentiality and personhood does not 
really appear to be the main problem after all; instead, his anti-experimental at-
titudes seem to arise from a different source: its effect on our characters. He 
comments: “Even if there is no wrong done by discarding at the blastocyst 
stage—and I am undecided on this question – there certainly would be at later 
stages. (Those who disagree should at least be concerned about the effects on 
the attitude toward and respect for human life engendered in persons who are 
engaged in these practices)” (1985, 58). As this excerpt reveals, his concern is 
not so much for the potential person, but about the types of moral decisions 
made in what he considers to be our primarily utilitarian society.  
 Kass fails to consider that he may be guilty of dehumanizing the human goal 
of reproduction even while worrying about dehumanization in humanity as a whole. 
The essence of his problem with technology is the way he thinks it destroys personal 
freedom, but he nevertheless continues to ignore or trivialize one of the most personal, 
natural, and basic of human freedoms, the ability to reproduce. Whether or not infertil-
ity is caused by disease should be beside the point; whether or not humans possess a 
“right to reproduction” is beside the point. The real point missed by Kass is how to lo-
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cate where in society personal decision-making ought to be situated, if not by the af-
fected individual. Kass’s stated claims valuing human freedom and dignity do not ap-
ply to private and personal decisions when they don’t comply with his anti-technology 
stance, even those basic to personhood. It seems unlikely that Kass could refine this 
argument to make it more acceptable to the public at large, because he is trying to per-
suade women, in particular, to reject a technology which has offered fulfillment for 
their goals of motherhood, and furthermore to assume personal blame for their own 
condition. 
However, as I have pointed out, feelings of repugnance remain a strong source 
for anti-technological attitudes, even among practitioners in the field of assisted repro-
ductive medicine itself. The yuck factor continues to work as an intuitive reason for 
taking a moral stand even as it fails to persuade as an argument overall. Kass has 
pointed out that many former practices thought to be repugnant are eventually, over 
time, accepted as benign, a situation which Kass takes to be a defeat for morality. The 
process by which people accustom themselves to change over time, even to practices 
previously rejected, is evidence to Kass that we are enslaved by technology, fooled by 
our own desires, and perhaps have taken on qualities of poor moral character. 
The useful case in point, made clear by considering his work over time, is the 
way the public has turned away from revulsion to acceptance of IVF. However, con-
trary to Kass’s position, the message is not that time causes an erosion of the feelings 
of revulsion; it is more likely that disgust was fostered in the first place by an over-
statement of the risk and the dangers to society by critics such as Kass. For example, 
in 1971, he expected “sweeping” and “immoderate” public reactions if “the first test-
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tube baby” turned out to be a monster,” a fear that was not tested when Louise Brown 
turned out to be “normal” (1179). In 1978, he imagined a horrified reaction by the 
public when “scientists fill laboratories with human embryos for experimentation,” a 
reaction that has not materialized (8). In 1997, he used sensational language to demon-
strate the importance of repugnance as a societal reaction, when he compared cloning 
to such horrors as “father-daughter incest,” although the public has not seen them as 
analogous (1997a 20).  
Repugnance, as an emotion, has consistently failed to carry the heavy burden 
demanded of it, even as new stages of technology are reached and then exceeded by 
the next. Kass doubted that he, or anyone, could give “the proper rational voice to this 
horror [cloning],” (1997b S:141), but it may be his lack of rational arguments that ex-
plains why his appeals have not always succeeded in rousing the public. By depending 
on repugnance, rather than proper rational arguments, he has maintained only narrow 
support, while others with more persuasive and more reasonable points of views, or 
with evidence to allay fears, have prevailed. In the case of IVF, emotions changed be-
cause arguments like Kass’s did not hold up to reality. If IVF had turned out badly, his 
emotional appeals would have substance on their side, because these types of appeals 
are only as good as their underlying evidential, logical and reasonable support. In 
other words, the consequences do make some difference in the overall supporting pic-
ture. The next test for Kass will be to see if his attempts to delay or end all cloning re-
search are successful. Even if banned in the U.S., research is likely to continue outside 
our borders, and the consequences of the research will determine its acceptance.  
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A deeper reason to resist using arguments from repugnance is not only that 
they are unstable, but that they are sometimes immoral on their own account, a factor 
that Kass does not capture. It must not be overlooked that at one time in our country, it 
was thought repugnant to eat in the same restaurant, to go to the same school, or to en-
gage in similar social events with persons of other races or cultures, particularly those 
of African-American lineage. It was thought particularly repugnant to establish inter-
racial sexual relations. But we now acknowledge that the repugnance felt at these 
practices was clearly wrong, and those who felt such emotions have had to learn to rid 
themselves of them, because it is now considered immoral to feel them, as well as act 
on them. The instrument encouraging such dramatic social change was a reliance on 
reason, where the evidentiary facts of nature furnished by science provide illumination 
to the shared mutual qualities of our human natures despite differences in skin tones. 
Feelings of repugnance should not necessarily be ignored. On occasion, they 
may serve as indicators and warning signals of some morally important issue at stake. 
However, it is unlikely that they “express deep wisdom,” unless other deeper support-
ing factors are present. The feeling might only reflect squeamishness in facing up to 
the diversity of behavior and actions possible to humanity (as when we see blood or 
observe an injury). Repugnance in itself cannot be a sufficient reason for the creation 
of public policy, at least without the development of moral principle to justify the 
emotion, a fact that Kass has not yet accepted. As Richard M. Zaner argued in a recent 
discussion on Kass’s yuck factor, “anyone disturbed by scientific interventions into 
the ‘natural’ order of things should consider the fact that, for instance, it is just as un-
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natural to read books, drive an automobile, cut up carrots, or wear clothing as it would 
be to clone babies” (16). 
Although Kass has not produced strong enough reasons to support the ban on 
various forms of reproductive experimentations, his warnings may be useful for public 
policy in this way:  if new reproductive technologies are to be accepted by the public, 
particularly those that are refashioning familial relationships, they ought to reflect a 
certain deontological yearning, expressed by Kass, that children (born by any means) 
should be treated with respect, as ends in themselves and not as means for the gratifi-
cation of others. History has demonstrated the difficulty humans have had in comply-
ing with that principle: oppression and abuse of children have existed regardless of 
technology. The deliberations of ARM Clinic showed that when a sound reason or 
principle could not be produced by which to solve the distressing relationship and 
other discomfiting problems instigated by new practices in assisted reproduction, the 
“yuck” factor filled in as a surrogate for those feelings to be given force.  
The point of this lengthy elaboration on repugnance is to show its mostly nega-
tive force in examining and determining moral solutions. On the other hand it fails to 
elicit useful mid-level principles by which to establish general approaches to similar 
problems or to validate the correctness of decisions at hand. At ARM Clinic, the re-
sponse tended to be evoked by novel problems, where more rational, principle-based 
standpoints had yet to be located. It is too much to ask that the localized clinical ethics 
group ferret out and apply new mid-level principles for their novel problems; that is 
more likely to occur in larger, more diverse and more public settings, so as to avoid 
the application of the unconditional “yuck” as a way to avoid considering the real 
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challenges of new technologies. In Part Three, I provide a theoretical basis for solving 
the problem and deriving new principles from a more public use of reflective equilib-
rium. 
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PART THREE 
LOCATING PRINCIPLES THROUGH  
PUBLIC REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
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CHAPTER NINE 
 BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS 
In my presentation of the case examples in Chapters 6-7, I made three observa-
tions about how the ethics practitioners at ARM Clinic attempted to make case deci-
sions on specific grounds without necessarily engaging in deeper, more general moral 
reasoning as experts in bioethics methodology seem to assume. First is the way they 
attempt to solve cases by using narrow medical grounds while avoiding the larger 
moral issues at stake, what I called doing the medicine first. Second, clinicians look 
beyond themselves and their own practice for guidance on moral issues.   Third, cer-
tain background assumptions, although rarely made explicit, are more important in 
ethical discussion than has been recognized.  
As I pointed out in Chapter Six, clinicians at this level of practice do not enjoy 
making novel moral decisions and do not feel equipped to do so. Furthermore, they do 
not want to continually re-think or renegotiate the big moral issues over and over 
again—such as the use of surrogates for pregnancies, the use of egg and sperm donors, 
the selective reduction of embryos growing in the uterus, and so on. They prefer to 
take these issues as settled; otherwise their daily practices would be in constant tur-
moil.  
However, new types of cases continue to occur, forcing reflection, particularly 
in the realm of determining what is to be considered medical treatment or therapy ver-
sus what is said to be more trivially, life enhancement. The patient presented in Exam-
ple 12, for example, who wanted to avoid the discomfort and inconvenience of 
stimulative ovulation, is a case in point. Contextual issues, such as her desire to stay 
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physically trim, put her on the side of choosing enhancement rather than medical ther-
apy. Buy defining her desire that way, the committee was able to deny her case, butde-
fer more serious discussion about when or if enhancement issues of some kinds might 
sometimes be morally appropriate. Why is it necessarily wrong for a woman to want 
to control her body by avoiding discomfort while still producing a child?  Will we one 
day accept the idea of the whole fertility and pregnancy process taking place outside 
the womb so that women’s lives are less disrupted?  Thee committee did not engage in 
these questions, simply stating that their mission is only medical, thus allowing them 
to resolve this case, and put the deeper moral questions to the side. 
Another recurring issue of this type for ARM Clinic was whether or when to 
treat homosexuals. As shown in Example 22, the physicians were not anxious to assist 
gya men in particular, partly because of a sense that it violated a social tradition; partly 
because of a lingering worry that men might not parent children as well as women. 
The committee did not want to decide the morality of such a big social issue, but they 
were able to avoid taking cases of this nature by defining them as enhancement rather 
than therapeutic. The man asking for a baby did not really have any medical or fertility 
problems, he simply wanted a genetically related child. This clinic did not feel they 
were professionally required to assist him since he was not ill or infertile. In this way, 
the clinic could wait and see how the social issue developed over time before engaging 
in morally uncertain deliberations. Of course, their non-acceptance of the client was 
“taking a moral position” but one in which they were not forced into deeper moral re-
flection than they were ready for. 
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This situation also helps to explain my second observation: how clinicians at 
this practice-level seek guidance from above on issues novel to them. Preferably, such 
guidance comes in the form of well-established mid-level principles published by their 
professional organizations. In other words, they look to specific policy specifications 
on participants in infertility treatment: the age limits for patients and donors, the num-
ber of egg or sperm donations thought permissible to prevent risk or consanguinity is-
sues, standards of care to prevent HIV transmission, and so on, to provide a basis for 
their decisions. When cases arise outside this framework of professional policy and 
medical practice, clinicians find it very difficult to make confident decisions.  
Most of the cases I outlined in Chapter Six on risk could be handled by specific 
mid-level principles or policies put forth by ASRM, the professional organization. But 
in Chapter Seven, where relationship issues are set out, the organization is not as 
likely to have developed specific standards or principles. In Examples 26 – 28, for ex-
ample, one can see the problem of when or if it might be acceptable to create a geneti-
cally unrelated baby by using donor egg and donor sperm.  Here the professional 
organization gives little guidance, and the committee’s decisions show their attempts 
to grapple with the issue. On one hand, it seemed wrong to allow a couple to walk into 
a laboratory and choose donors by certain characteristics. On the other hand, certain 
cases demand both donor sperm and egg to be used as a medical decision during an 
urgent episode of fertility failure. Sometimes the patient is in the laboratory prepared 
for insemination when it becomes clear that the embryos are not viable. Rather than al-
low her to go untreated, this is a reasonable time to use donations. 
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As I have shown, the committee’s viewpoint changed over time on this issue, 
eventually formulating a new policy of accepting instances of donor egg/donor sperm 
when they were “backed into” in the way I described here, and can also be seen in Ex-
ample 27. It is likely that over time the professional organization will receive enough 
queries on a problem like this to force them to consider it. At that time a new policy 
statement will appear to help others with similar decisions to make. However, in the 
meantime, each private clinic must work out, case by case, how to go on.  
My third observation, about the importance of certain background assumptions 
in decision-making (to be discussed next at some length) explain how they encompass 
the professional policies that confirm the ethical decision.  
No particular method stood out at ARM clinic to direct or assist in decision-
making. Occasionally, one of the four Beauchamp and Childress principles was men-
tioned as a reminder that principles should be taken seriously. For instance, it was 
brought to our attention that it does not serve beneficence nor does it protect autonomy 
to deny a patient’s wish to use a chosen (known) egg donor, as in Example Eight 
where the woman wanted to use her underage niece’s egg donation.  Similarly, in Ex-
ample 15, where a patient was denied the chance to freeze embryos for use at a more 
convenient time, the principle of autonomy, beneficence and even justice was raised. 
However, in these cases, it was argued that autonomy was overrated and beneficence 
was secondary to the medical policies in place which were thought to protect both the 
clinic and the patient.  
In general the citation of the Georgetown principles tended to cause dissension 
rather than unity, since some committee members always tended to promote autonomy 
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first as the predominant moral principle at stake, while others felt autonomy was 
overly protected and that some patients were allowed too much personal choice in 
these important decisions. The most effective methodological approach at ARM Clinic 
was akin to casuistry, in that cases were “worked up” by looking at the particular con-
text, the local rules, and the professional policies pertaining to it, so that the decision 
was both clarified and validated by the paradigm comparison or stated policy. Cases of 
risk or those concerning concomitant medical problems such as HIV can be effectively 
settled this way. The approach served to avoid the need to draw broad conclusions 
about the overall rightness or wrongness of any specific case, and also to avoid the 
need to develop new mid-level principles to justify their stance. However, the casuist 
approach depended on their having access to paradigm cases or policies, which were 
not available in the novel situations. Many decisions were striking for their procedural 
emphasis with an associated lack of ethical content, such as the homosexual parenting. 
Even when one of these cases stood out in importance (such as the donor egg/donor 
sperm baby creation issue), little or no discussion was devoted to seeking any ethical 
grounding principle, perhaps for fear of creating a new precedent. Locating a grand 
overriding principle was especially avoided, even to the extent of explicating whether 
harm would be produced by a decision, who would be most affected by it, or whether 
the situation could be thought to be “right” in a deontological sense. Discussions 
tended to be more explicitly utilitarian, wherein the production of a healthy baby was 
seen as the overall good to be produced, taking into consideration the weighing of any 
medical factors that might work to obstruct that goal. In general, there was a hesitancy 
to invoke general principles, and if new principles emerged, as when rules material-
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ized out of the practice itself, they were not always articulated or announced. Further-
more, certain background assumptions were implicitly in place constraining any dis-
cussions of method or principles.  
Background Clinical Assumptions 
In all the case discussions, whether organized by the primary features of risk 
and consent or by the issue of relationships, a context existed in which a specific nor-
mative stance was assumed: namely that assisted reproductive techniques are a valid 
means of permitting autonomous women, and, by extension, families, to make their 
own reproductive choices, unless the choices are too risky, or potentially harmful to 
the patient, the prospective child, or society in general. It is this context that makes the 
daily clinical ethics work so differently from that of abstract analysts, and makes the 
full use of the process of wide reflective equilibrium unlikely at this level. This stand-
point precludes any broad version of reflective equilibrium from being applied to the 
specific topic at hand, at least in the Rawlsian sense of bringing a wide variety of phi-
losophical theory and moral points of view to the table. An ethicist whose stance was 
that the creation of embryos, their selective reduction, or manipulation of them was a 
violation of their status as potential human beings, would not be able to engage in any 
meaningful discussion about the various options in the cases I have presented here, 
because to do so would mean that one had already taken a position against most of the 
work engaged in by clinicians in the field. On the other hand, the fact that the health-
care worker involved in reproductive therapy had certain background assumptions, 
taking their work for granted, did not mean that every clinician had sorted through the 
variety of ethical positions possible on the nuances of the cases that they saw, as is 
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easily noticed by the varieties of points of view illustrated by the ethics committee on 
many cases presented in the last section. 
Besides sharing an overall background assumption supporting reproductive 
medicine, clinicians can also be said to see themselves as working within the bounds 
of nature, not coldly manipulating it in the technical way that Kass portrayed such 
work. They believe themselves to be assisting reproduction by correcting diseases or 
malformations, or pushing the natural boundaries of age, but do not see themselves as 
radically upsetting any “intent” of nature. This is why the issues of aging and appro-
priate number of donations are such paramount issues in the field. It is taken for 
granted that some “natural” limitations of the body ought to apply when treating infer-
tility. Certain policies that appear arbitrary on the surface, like the 49 years 11 month 
limit on assisting pregnancy in women, were developed because of a need to work 
within some perceived natural boundaries (in this case natural menopause). The lack 
of good ethical reasons to support such a policy was not enough to change the minds 
of the ethics committee members who accepted this “natural” limit (the new research 
mentioned in Chapter Six, published by JAMA, about the low level of risk in pregnan-
cies over the age of 50 has had little impact on practitioners at ARM Clinic). Likewise, 
the policy of this clinic that sex selection ought not be tampered with seems to illus-
trate an assumption that “natural odds” ought to prevail over this basic reproductive 
outcome, even while attempts are made to screen out other natural outcomes (like dis-
eases and malformations, not basic qualities of personhood.)  For an example, it 
seemed harmless to me to allow a rare case of sex selection, perhaps to fill out a fam-
ily that included only children of one sex, or to replace a dead child. In fact, I pre-
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sented an argument that it might be especially beneficial in countries who have mis-
takenly allowed an overpopulation of male children to now perform some sex selec-
tion to regain a better ratio of males to females. But clinicians at ARM Clinic took the 
“repugnance” position here, refusing to perform sex selection because of a sense that it 
was tampering with nature in a way that could be detrimental to society over the long 
run even while giving balance to particular families. It is even more doubtful that the 
clinic could be persuaded to use its techniques, if available, to enhance any character-
istics of the human race, such as screening for IQ, beauty, or athletic ability. However, 
background assumptions do change over time, and some have become more liberal at 
ARM Clinic; in the next chapter I will provide an example of one important change. 
Methodological Assumptions 
Besides their clinical assumptions, the clinicians at ARM Clinic had certain 
implicit methodological assumptions. They designed their ethics committee to func-
tion with a procedural format, rather than a methodological one. The procedures had 
less to do with ethical content and more with enlisting processes to encourage consen-
sus and fairness in decision-making among members, so that no voice felt excluded or 
ignored. Few of the members (other than myself) were familiar with ethical theory (al-
though as I have said, some were aware of the four Georgetown principles prominent 
in principlism). If and when a large principle was mentioned, it was not then “speci-
fied down” into a more meaningful application, in the sense hoped for by Richardson, 
because it wasn’t apparent to anyone how to make that move realistically for solving 
particular cases. Turning the precepts of beneficence or autonomy into a specific 
maxim that gave a basis for deciding whether to override an age barrier to pregnancy, 
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as was shown in Example 4, or to allow a confusing family relationship to be created 
by using a known family donation of egg or sperm, as shown in Example 30, wasn’t 
plausible. 
A more reasonable action taken by the group was to compare either a specific 
policy at hand, or a mid-level principle, to the situation and draw comparisons be-
tween them by elucidating the variations in cases (which does fit into Richardson’s 
scheme). But the policy or principle had to be available; the most useful policies were 
those published by the professional association, or the examples drawn from well-
known paradigm cases, or from previous professional experiences. In effect, the delib-
erations were a form of casuistry, but not in a text-book style, because sometimes they 
began with a policy or principle to be applied, at other times they did not. In general, 
however, the clinicians did find it useful to compare the current situation to the para-
digm or policy, look for salient differences and distinctions—both in context and in 
the personal details—and then seek out a principled reason for either following the 
policy or paradigm, or adopting a more individualized case response. This approach 
worked quite neatly in some cases, where some original policies and paradigms were 
clear. For example, when a woman started fertility treatment just before an age limita-
tion kicked in, and yet wanted to continue to try beyond the limit, her probability for 
success could be calculated, her comparison to other similar cases evaluated, and the 
particular reasons for or against could be listed, including the all-purpose “for the sake 
of closure.” While not a very strong ethical maxim on its own, it could be seen as a de-
rivative principle of beneficence and was accepted as such in certain instances.  
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Neither principlists nor casuists have noticed, however, how important were 
the constraints I have stated on the practice of ethical case review. These  included de-
laying, deferring and narrowing the ethical problem at hand by attempting to restrict 
cases into a medical model, so that they could be decided through risk evaluation, con-
sent signing, psychological screenings and evaluations, and medical treatments, 
thereby putting off or foreclosing discussion as to the overall ethical implications. 
Members looked outside themselves for resolution of the larger ethical implications, 
especially in novel cases, presuming that better answers would be delivered by exter-
nal experts, the professional organization, or from public debates. The importance of 
the professional policies for their decision-making cannot be overestimated, because 
these replaced the sort of principles and/or paradigm cases expected to be worked into 
a reflective equilibrium procedure. 
Novel cases presented the most difficulty for reviewers, as one might expect, 
especially the type reported in the chapter on “relationships,” where new family rela-
tionships were created through reproductive treatment. It is these cases where very lit-
tle guidance or clarification exist, and where grander principles of autonomy or 
beneficence seem to be of little use. Why is it wrong to disallow sperm or embryo 
mixing as in Example 32, where several brothers wanted to work together to help their 
sibling achieve fertilization?  It doesn’t seem to violate any of the Georgetown princi-
ples, and yet it hardly seems fair to the unborn child to have such a murky heritage. On 
the other hand, wouldn’t the child be grateful to have been given life by people who 
want him or her to badly?  Is it really necessary for a child to know for sure who is the 
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genetic father?  Many children grew up unaware of their specific genetic relationships 
even before assisted reproduction was possible.  
Along similar lines, why is it assumed that a woman will always favor her own 
genetic embryos when they are mixed with non-related, as was seen in Example 33?  
The social workers worried that a parent might not love or nurture the non-related 
child, although there is very little evidence to know, either way. The committee mem-
bers had no more to go on than their own sense that they might feel more attachment 
to their own child, but adoption cases, where the parents produce a genetic child near 
to the time when they adopted a child, seem to belie the problem of favoritism. 
The committee members at ARM Clinic would have always preferred to rely 
on scientific data to obtain more objective policies and paradigms for guidance, in-
stead of guessing by applying their own personal reactions to some of the cases. If 
psychologists  were to produce studies assessing harms to infants born from mixed ge-
netic parentage, or from the use of known family donors, then that type of data would 
lead the way to new and perhaps more morally principled decisions, because conse-
quentialists, at least, would accept that as better knowledge to depend upon. A de-
fender of traditional reproduction (like Kass), who hopes to hold the line against the 
further development of high-tech practices, would be better served by producing sci-
entific studies, which may or may not show evidence of medical harm, instead of de-
pending on his abstract, anti-scientific, deontological standpoint alone. But few such 
studies exist, because the practices are so new, leaving each case to be evaluated on its 
own terms. The lack of policy and paradigm leaves the door open for the less tangible 
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factors to become tools for evaluation: the “yuck factor,” the slippery slope, or the 
“Daily News” factor. 
Occasionally a useful mid-level principle emerged from the deliberations on 
certain types of cases: for instance, the supposed right of a child to its own genetic 
knowledge, otherwise known as the rule for genetic transparency (discussed in Chap-
ter Seven), although it is not absolute. Pooling or mixing embryos from anonymous 
donors is still common; it is only a problem when the anonymous donation is mixed 
with the genetically related one. This principle, in particular, came about through the 
consideration of cases of sperm or egg pooling at the clinic, and by general discussions 
with lawyers and staff members about liability. Differing contexts in a variety of cases 
provoked a need for the principle in the way that casuists have believed would happen 
when such situations are fully deliberated. Here, a viable principle was constructed 
that is generalizable and defensible apart from its role in the specific case at hand. 
More often, using the casuist approach only helped in determining whether or when it 
might be appropriate to override a rule in a specific case—one where the contextual 
circumstances made it reasonable or wise to ignore or make exceptions to their own 
policies. But in the case of genetic transparency, the rule was worked out from the bot-
tom-up, extracted from the variety of similar cases as they were examined. 
Most novel cases did not yield such useful principles; instead they tended to be 
decided in an ad hoc fashion, lacking the sort of developed reasoning that could serve 
to ground the decision in morality. Furthermore, it was clear that in a few cases, fa-
miliarity made a tough decision become more palatable over time, regardless of 
whether a principle had been derived or not. In the first case where an HIV infected 
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couple wanted to conceive, or the first case where sharing an egg donation and preg-
nancy between both members of a lesbian couple, the discussions were negative and 
cases were sometimes rejected, while in the second or third occurrence, as the commit-
tee grew more used to the ideas, acceptance grew. These were not exactly situations of 
“slippery slope’ because the cases did not grow more radical as each step of accep-
tance was taken, but  emotional reactions to new cases became tempered over time, 
just as Kass supporters who proclaim the “yuck factor” have stated they would.  
Overall, consistency in decision-making was not highly valued by this commit-
tee, although inconsistencies were held up as reminders of how regularly their internal 
policies were overridden or ignored. Inconsistent decisions were particularly common 
in age-related cases partly because a cycle of treatment might begin near an age cut-
off and run beyond, or because certain cases of infertility encouraged more sympathy 
from the members of the group allowing them to let the patient have “one more try.’ 
Consistency might be considered one indicator of validity in decision-making, but of-
ten contextual distinctions explained why one decision appeared to clash with another, 
despite surface similarities. In spite of variable methods, assumptions, and inconsistent 
decisions, most case decisions seemed reasonable and usually defensible. How can 
that be so?  It seems that in practice, moral reasoning is less constrained by deductive 
reasoning (as the methodologists I have quoted have asserted), and more dependent on 
modifying rules situationally. However that seems to leave decisions unjustified by 
moral principle. It seems more useful to focus on moral deliberation as it is practiced, 
as an activity involving argumentation and consensus-building rather than some sort of 
prescribed algorithm. As described by Leonard Fleck, it is a “social” activity where we 
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inquire jointly as citizens about the “conflicting social values and interests” impacting 
on us as individuals, families, or professionals (Fleck 133). 
A Theoretical Position 
One useful way to look at the problem of how to justify practical moral reason-
ing at the committee level comes from early Rawls, in his attempt to distinguish be-
tween “justifying a practice” and “justifying the particular actions that fall under the 
practice.” He compared what he called “a summary view,” (which applies to the for-
mer concept of “justifying a practice),” to a “practice conception” of moral delibera-
tions (which applies to the latter concept wherein rules are set up to govern practices 
thereby eventually “justifying the particular actions” that take place under the rules). 
In the summary view, rules are thought of as “summaries of past decisions,” so that a 
rule is formulated to cover “like-cases supported by like-decisions” (1955, 19).50  In 
contrast, the “practice conception” supposes that the rules came first, making up and 
defining certain practices as in an election or a baseball game, so that they are “prior to 
particular cases” (25). The “summary view” describes how one might encounter a 
number of similar cases over time, noticing in experience that cases appear frequently 
enough and similarly enough to require the development of a covering principle, so 
that when a similar case recurs in the future, the principle is ready-at-hand for applica-
tion. The “practice conception” offers an alternative approach; here one sets out cer-
tain rules to govern or oversee a specific practice, much as in setting out rules for a 
game. These rules do not function as action-guides in particular cases (as judged by 
some higher principle); rather they define the sort of cases that make up the practice it-
                                            
50 These ideas are taken from Rawls’ “Two Concepts of Rules” (3-33), written in 1955 prior to his The-
ory of Justice, but applicable to the understanding of ethics as a “practice.” 
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self. As Rawls puts it, “To engage in a practice, to perform those actions specified by a 
practice, means to follow the appropriate rules. If one wants to do an action where a 
certain practice specifies them there is no way to do it except to follow the rules which 
define it” (26). Actions are then justified by their comprehensive linkage to the prac-
tice, rather than by being subsumed by a more general rule.  
When thinking of how clinicians are involved in their practice, and how their 
background assumptions work to prevent re-thinking of their moral standpoints, one 
can begin to comprehend why it is so difficult for practitioners to “specify” or “de-
rive” the sort of mid-level bioethical rules that one might think are required for gener-
alizing over and giving a moral basis to their judgments. In this context, to derive new 
rules would be to ignore the “concept of the practice” clinicians are engaged in, where 
background suppositions about the precedence of human autonomy, the necessity for 
risk avoidance, and the understanding of “natural” human parameters are preset indi-
cators for the practice of reproductive medicine itself. To the clinician, implicit rules 
are already in place, so that it should not be necessary to constantly rethink their posi-
tion or their value for each patient or case, or to seek a fit between their practice and 
some universal moral principle. Only when new problems challenge the fit between 
the implicit rules and the practice does the issue of locating an appropriate new mid-
level principle or rule arise. The natural tendency, in practice, is to look for ways to 
confine the new problem into the comprehensive whole, rather than spend time at-
tempting to locate a new covering principle from a “summary” point of view. 
This also explains why clinicians’ reasoning cannot be said to be exactly “bot-
tom-up” in the casuistic sense either, because without a paradigm case, the casuist (or 
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the practitioner in the Rawlsian sense) lacks enough framework to know how to go on. 
In casuistic practice, when a paradigm case is available for comparison, the style of 
reasoning is akin to an extensive analogizing by “narrative” or “metaphor,” where the 
ethical practitioner works to creatively construct some similarities, some alternative 
principles, frameworks, implications, possible outcomes and so on until the delibera-
tive process churns toward an answer. How this differs exactly from reflective equilib-
rium seems to be both in the lack of big principles to guide the process, and in the 
elevation of metaphor over generalized cases, deviating from the moving back and 
forth between theory, principles, and the case as performed in traditional reflective 
equilibrium. 
One advocate of this more metaphorical approach, who claims it is substan-
tively based on the empirical findings of cognitive science, is Anders Nordgren: 
Ethical principles have their place in reflection and discussion, but one 
has to be aware that they do not have a strictly defined, literal meaning, 
and that it is not a matter of simply applying them to particular cases. 
The principles of medical ethics are important rules of thumb based on 
collective experience. They express what is valid in prototypical cases. 
What should be valid in nonprototypical cases is a question of moral 
imagination. Moreover imaginative casuistry does not imply that moral 
decisions become arbitrary. There is a psychologically realistic human 
objectivity in the sense of transperspectivity, i.e., the ability of a his-
torically situated self to reflect critically on its own moral constructions 
and imagine other points of view (140). 
 
In any event, something like this metaphorical style, or the sort of practice approach 
hinted at in the early Rawls, is a good way to describe the sort of procedurally-based 
method encountered at ARM Clinic, as distinguished from the content-full method en-
visioned by principlism, with its particular style of reflective equilibrium.  
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Although practice approaches can be thought of as similar to reflective equilib-
rium, the style has been criticized by communitarians and virtue ethicists for their em-
phasis on proceduralism, supposedly empty of ethical content. To them, there is 
something “incomplete and inadequate” about a conception of ethics reliant on princi-
ples and rules devoid of the supposed richness of discourse involving character and 
virtue (Buchanan et al 377-378). They further worry that scientific facts are given 
more importance than traditional values.51 Communitarians are not alone in worrying 
that too much reliance on rules and principles like autonomy can obscure other perti-
nent moral issues. Too much emphasis on autonomy, for example, is said to reduce 
medical treatment to a service, available to be purchased by whoever can afford it, 
whether right or wrong. This was a concern expressed by staff at ARM Clinic. They 
did not want to be “driven” by the simple desires of the patients. If that model were 
accepted, the only means to justify the morality of a given treatment or practice would 
be by mutual consent, or by the validity of a contract, between the patient and the 
health care practitioners. The whole point of bioethics is to provoke a deeper work-up 
and examination of the ethical dimensions of these health-care relationships. 
However, proceduralists like Jonathan Moreno believe that moral justification 
can be located in rule-oriented processes, through the consensus that can emerge from 
group deliberations. To Moreno, such modest claims for decisions as “stable” and 
“uncontroversial” are worthwhile and effective results from the reflective equilibrium-
type process, at least when they emanate from groups whose members share common 
                                            
51 Moreno (1995, page 13 and pages 41-45) discusses the kinds of distinctions between scientific facts 
and values in the terms of distinguishing between procedural and substantive consensus. The processes 
of ethical decision-making can be distinguished from their product, but he argues that such strict dis-
tinctions aren’t useful in making progress towards ethical consensus in bioethics.  
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belief systems. For him, democratic, tolerant and diverse groups are the ones most 
likely to accept what he calls “uncontroversial standards” such as mutual respect and a 
willingness to entertain new evidence.” Decisions that emerge from bodies constituted 
by a “background overlapping consensus in a liberal pluralistic society” will forge 
strongly justifiable results, because of the openness and variety of opinions (1995, 64). 
From this standpoint, any effort to locate foundational truths, or absolute rights and 
wrongs, is wasted, because the differences in society and individual aims and goals di-
rect us to more importantly focus on useful and practical decisions. 
Courtney Campbell criticizes the procedural emphasis in bioethics from a more 
virtue-ethics approach by questioning the value of consensus, even while acknowledg-
ing that it can “provide a form of quality control on the process” (150). To him the de-
cisions made in particular cases reflect a “shallow consensus” because the reasoning 
used to back up the decision might vary among the participants even thought they 
came to the same conclusion. He would prefer a deeper consensus that  
“involves examination and agreement about the reasons or principles them 
selves.” To him,  
“it must be asked how valid and authoritative consensus may be when 
it is continually probed by medical technology and by philosophical 
scrutiny. An issue that both Singer and Engelhardt agree on – a higher 
brain standard for death – is a case in point. The societal consensus 
over a whole brain definition that has existed for the past quarter cen-
tury is certainly unstable and shifting with the currents of new technol-
ogy and philosophical concepts (150-151). 
 
If he is right, then the outcomes of ARM Committee are more akin to “shallow 
consensus” in their acceptance of the here and now status of technology as well as the 
“unstable” definitions and values at large in the ever-changing world of reproductive 
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medicine. But one could question why such shallow consensus isn’t “good enough,” if 
it reflects current knowledge. Only the future can tell us whether we are wrong or right 
in basing our values on current scientific knowledge, but working toward a shallow 
consensus can be a stronger basis for reasoning than relying on intuition only. 
One reason for retaining a more procedural model, even if the consensus is 
shallow, is that in our society individual rights and desires are thought to have prece-
dence over government restrictions when possible. Reproduction is elevated in our so-
ciety as one of the most important of these individual rights. For that reason, creating a 
method for decision-making that is filled with rich content of moral principles and 
judgments can be and is a difficult task because individuals vary so much in their per-
sonal goals and desires. Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler use this reasoning to 
support reflective equilibrium as the superior method for reasoning in bioethics, espe-
cially in attempting to evaluate concrete cases (52). They recognize that “the aim of 
systematic moral reasoning is to develop a coherent set of beliefs that includes moral 
principles, other elements of moral theory and beliefs about what is right and wrong in 
particular cases.” However, particular decisions appeal to different elements of the 
systemic whole on different occasions. To them, the best process “aims at what Rawls 
calls “wide reflective equilibrium” because “our moral beliefs are thus held to be re-
visable in light of other things we believe or reasonably come to believe” (22-23). To 
this set of authors, there is no alternative to such an approach in a diverse society, 
where any sort of foundationalist approach is unacceptable.52  However, they do not 
                                            
52 According to Buchanan et al, “Foundationalism is the view that ethical theorizing must begin with 
indubitable or self-evident, unrevisable moral axioms and deduce subsidiary principles and concrete 
judgments from them. It is hard to see how any reasoned approach to ethics that rejects foundationalism 
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attempt to explain where and how appropriate moral principles for novel cases can be 
located, although it may be that they can emerge from the process. Buchanan et al fo-
cus instead on how the process includes diversity in opinion and in knowledge: 
Seeking wide reflective equilibrium is thus the process of bringing to 
bear the broadest evidence and critical scrutiny we can, drawing on all 
the different moral and non-moral beliefs and theories that arguably are 
relevant to our selection of principles or adherence to our considered 
judgments (376). 
 
As I have shown, the actual methods used at ARM Clinic could not be said to 
be so rich as this description of reflective equilibrium in the abstract. Some of their 
decision-making is less defensible and less justifiable than could be wished for, espe-
cially in novel and ground-breaking cases, although perhaps permissible in practice. In 
general, if any broad value was used (as I have said is the case), it tended toward a 
utilitarian goal of justifying the medical means through the end result of healthy par-
enthood. Clinicians did not spend too much time worrying about the motivation of cli-
ents or the effect on other participants in the process, in the sense of weighing their 
emotional risks, or the future psychological or social problems possible in donor situa-
tions. 
Attempting to evaluate their own decisions from a deontological point of view 
proved difficult for participants. To assess the larger rightness or wrongness of the en-
deavor, while being bound by personal, religious or cultural convictions, was not 
really appropriate in the setting where immediate decisions were called for. Only one 
                                                                                                                             
can avoid relying on the process of mutual adjustment between principles and particular judgments, 
each conceived as revisable in the light of the other…Once foundationalism is abandoned, it is hard to 
see how reasoned ethical inquiry can proceed without relying to some extent on the method of reflective 
equilibrium broadly constructed (372). See Buchanan’s work, “Social Moral Epistemology” in Septem-
ber 2002, where he set out his reasoning why reflective equilibrium “is probably the dominant method 
in normative ethics” overall (127). 
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member of the committee, the chaplain, could be said to stand “outside the practice 
viewpoint,” not sharing the clinical mindset. Not having absorbed the disciplinary 
conception and assumptions of the medical practice, he was the one most likely to ex-
press concerns about the big picture: the lengths people were willing to go to “make a 
baby,” their unwillingness to adjust to their infertility and adopt needy children from 
other cultures and ethnicities, and the importance they placed on replicating their own 
genetic make-up. To him, starting from a different perspective, the goals of fertility 
medicine appeared selfish or narcissistic at times, and he wondered what the world 
would be like if everybody acted in such a self-motivated way. However, from the in-
side, speculating about the whole endeavor wasn’t realistic. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 SAVING REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
If bioethical decisions are justified more by their internal practice assumptions 
or by procedural consensus-oriented models, then what is the status of reflective equi-
librium for daily decisions?  I have shown that at ARM Clinic most local solutions to 
problems depended on policies given by the professional association or delivered by 
paradigm experiences, but those pre-delivered policies and paradigms had to be cre-
ated from somewhere. It is my contention that reflective equilibrium can deliver the 
larger, more general, and more justifiable outcomes for which it is credited, but only in 
more public and more general settings. The “commission” level (where public or 
semi-public boards or nationally constituted, institutionally-based expert panels meet 
to analyze issues in a larger social context) can offer a model in which the objectives 
of diversity, inclusiveness, theoretical moral knowledge, practical expertise, and so on 
can be achieved. This is difficult, if not impossible, to do at the local level. 
However, the model of reflective equilibrium that I have so far described, 
based on Rawls’s work, could be improved upon in two specific ways, especially if it 
is to be used in the practical context. Earlier (in Chapter Two), I listed some defenses 
of Rawls’ model against criticisms of relativism, subjectivity, and so on. But more 
should be said about its theoretical dependence on self-interest as the motivator for 
people to put their ideas, beliefs, and moral standards into the churning process, and 
second, its allowance of the results of reflective equilibrium to stand untested by pub-
lic criticism. 
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The best way to re-think reflective equilibrium, at the theoretical level, comes 
from the work of T. M. Scanlon, who has defended a variation of reflective equilib-
rium, one more dependent on consensus, on inter-social negotiations of practical prob-
lems, and one more situated on shared group moral perspectives. Scanlon shows how 
the addition of publicity to the process can substantially increase the impact of any 
consensus achieved, adding to the possibility of a morally justifiable answer as well. 
In his 1998 book What We Owe Each Other, Scanlon articulates some impor-
tant revisions to the contractarian project, improving coherentist frameworks. He ar-
gues that Rawls's contractarianism implies a certain view of human nature, one in 
which the incentive for fair and reasonable human interactions consist in the self-
interest of socially-motivated agents. In the Rawlsian version, self-interested individu-
als negotiate the means for attaining their personal goals just as they bargain for goods 
by negotiating over any surpluses produced by their joint activities. Self-interest is 
also said to provide the motivation for people to consider the attributes of justice from 
“behind the veil of ignorance.” But this view of human behavior is rejected by Scan-
lon, who said that "self-interested bargaining is foreign to my account.” He prefers to 
use the term contractualism (instead of contractarian) for his project, so as to put em-
phasis on the more “other-oriented” idea that agents are “assumed not merely to be 
seeking some kind of advantage, but also to be moved by the aim of finding principles 
that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” (1998, 5) 
Self-interest can be thought essential to the human condition and cannot be en-
tirely dismissed from Scanlon’s contractualist conception. But more important to his 
project is the idea that humans possess, as a core quality, a cooperative willingness to 
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modify their personal and private demands and wishes, when necessary, to create a ba-
sis for shared notions of right and wrong. His conception of a person is broader than 
Rawls’s portrait, where personal autonomy seems paramount and where personal 
choices are thought to comply only with rational desires to achieve one’s own inter-
ests.53  To Scanlon, people are more group-oriented, more socially motivated, and 
more naturally concerned with other people’s feelings, desirous of maintaining overall 
good will. Here, the very basis of reason is more than rational self-interest; it is better 
understood by the ability to consider the concerns of others when making decisions: 
“When we say, in the course of an attempt to reach some collective decision, that a 
person is being unreasonable, what we often mean is that he or she is refusing to take 
other people's interests into account” (33). 
In this view personal moral principles exist to serve this more social purpose, 
rather than simply to be used as individualistic rules for behavior. He goes on to say: 
According to my version of contractualism, deciding whether an action is right 
or wrong requires a substantive judgment on our part about whether certain ob-
jections to possible moral principles would be reasonable…It is not a judgment 
about what would be most likely to advance their interests or to produce 
agreement in their actual circumstances or in any more idealized situation, but 
rather a judgment about the suitability of certain principles to serve as the basis 
of mutual recognition and accommodation (194). 
 
Judging principles as suitable for action is supported when they prove able to serve 
real people in real situations. They also provide justification for moral deliberations in 
a slightly circular way, similar to Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, in the way all the 
facets of deliberation cohere and support one another. Instead of reflective equilib-
rium, Scanlon calls his method a "dynamic procedure," because of its supposed de-
                                            
53 See Rawls’s elaboration of the qualities inherent in his conception of the person in his various works 
from 1971 (407-416); 1975 (283); 1980 (260); 1985 (396-8). 
 210
pendence on moral theorizing, stating that “there is no fixed list of "morally relevant 
considerations" or of reasons that are "morally excluded" (157). 
Here a fundamental principle by which to defend decisions is not necessary to 
the overall scheme, nor is there any need to depend on a sort of contrived standpoint, 
such as Rawls's “original position” wherein special principles were obtained that led to 
justifiable moral judgments. Instead Scanlon envisions a sort of three-level process by 
which people are pressed to provide moral reasons for their actions, in virtue of speci-
fied situations, and where the principles referred to may be implicit or explicit. First, 
an agent must recognize the relevance, both to him or herself and to others, of the con-
siderations at stake. Second, considering the context of the issues should bring out 
various reasons by which acting or failing to act morally become relevant. Finally, re-
fining and revising the reasons, in the dynamic process, should work out the reasoning 
in a fuller way, especially by directing it towards the “others” involved (156-157). For 
Scanlon, this process of reasoning—developing “why” an idea seems to be wrong or 
right—elicits principles, although they may be left unformulated or uninvoked. He 
doesn’t believe that important decisions of this nature are made by “invoking or apply-
ing” principles or rules, but he does take principles, understood more broadly, as still 
necessary for help in validating the reasoning: 
Principles, as I will understand them, are general conclusions about the status 
of various kinds of reasons for action. So understood, principles may rule out 
some actions by ruling out the reasons on which they would be based, but they 
also leave wide room for interpretation and judgment (199). 
 
Thinking of moral principles as “generalizing rules” is simply not helpful to Scanlon’s 
account, because it is in the exceptions and the clarifications where moral reasoning 
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emerges. In examining such principles as “keeping promises,” or “refraining from kill-
ing,” the process of moral deliberations is only thought to have begun, not ended. An 
agent must figure out various courses of action (is it wrong to lie about a health diag-
nosis to protect a patient’s sense of optimism; must euthanasia be ruled out as kill-
ing?), and each act is better expressed in “reasons” given to support or reject the 
available actions. Using moral principles is more akin to the way legal principles are 
used to create an interplay between the situation and various constraints so that com-
plex considerations are entertained. He points out: 
Even the most familiar moral principles are not rules which can be easily ap-
plied without appeals to judgment. Their succinct verbal formulations turn out 
on closer examination to be mere labels for much more complex ideas… 
When, in the light of our best understanding of this moral rationale, we make a 
judgment about the sufficiency of the reasons for an action in a particular case, 
this judgment is guided by, and expresses, our understanding of a moral prin-
ciple. How many moral principles are there, then?  An indefinite number, I 
would say (199, 201). 
 
The attempt to interpret and consider these principles, in context, while taking into ac-
count the interests of others, encourages the development of valid moral principles, (of 
which Scanlon says there are an “indefinite number”), structured narrowly enough to 
have constraining power for the case at hand, but also broad enough to take in the in-
dividual differences in similar cases (201). 
But no given set of principles can possibly “cover” or “apply” to the moral 
complexity of life. Only when we look to one another for guidance – to see who is 
hurt, who gains, whose expectations are diminished, can we begin to formulate cover-
ing reasons for our moral choices. To Scanlon there are “no familiar and widely taught 
principles –analogous to “keep your promises”- that cover these cases” (202). How-
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ever in discussion or deliberation we can recognize “wrongness” in the context of how 
others look at the same problem. Thus the “dynamic procedure” is not in itself con-
strained by selected principles, as in the Rawlsian version of reflective equilibrium; in-
stead principles seem to be constructed by the process, or emerge during the moral 
dialogue. 
In Scanlon’s view, the justificatory process runs both up and down, either by 
beginning with the salient details of a case until applicable principles are located, or 
by starting with a principle to see how it impacts on a case, but always with the con-
straint that the attempt must be justified to others in a way it would not be reasonable 
for them to reject. In general, moving up from case to principle is thought by Scanlon 
to be more likely to achieve defensible results, although he admits that useful discus-
sions are sometimes more reasonably derived from working down from a central idea 
to more specific conclusions. This is not to say he defends a totally casuistic ap-
proach, but he does find it more plausible to start with concrete problems or cases. 
His process is to begin “from cases in which it seemed clear, intuitively, that a princi-
ple could reasonably be rejected and then proceed to inquire how the grounds for this 
rejection should best be understood” (246). But to gain a principle, one must work up 
toward a wider range of conclusions until the argument develops a broader and more 
substantive range. If a principle is developed by considering a specific case, taking 
into consideration its salient qualities, the individual point of view it expresses, and 
then moving towards a more general formulation of considered judgments gained 
from close examination of alternative viewpoints, the moral judgment expressed by 
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the principles can assure that its end result is one that won't be reasonably rejected by 
others. That is moral justifiability at its best. 
Scanlon believes that the "well-known objections to coherence views" do not 
apply to his own account although they are similar to critiques of Rawls’ view (70). 
He lists the main objections as conservatism, relativism, and the mistaking of habit 
and custom for morality. The first objection, conservatism, could be compared to 
complaints about Rawlsian reflective equilibrium in that both depend upon “custom-
ary” moral judgments to get their theories moving from the abstract to the particular. 
Coherentism allows subjective and local beliefs to take on the credibility of estab-
lished norms, because there is no absolute requirement to admit a universal overriding 
principle that might force a bigger worldview to prevail. Scanlon sees that coherentism 
could “seem that I am endorsing a complacent reaffirmation of whatever we happen to 
think" (70). The only way to elevate the process above the customary is to follow a 
Rawlsian dynamic process of case-driven, reflective revision of principles to over-
come established beliefs and judgments and traditional moral principles. In other 
words, Scanlon’s “dynamic process” is a form of reflective equilibrium. The main dif-
ference in the two methods of deliberation is that Scanlon adds his organizing princi-
ple as a constraint on the process: that is, the criterion that any principles under 
deliberation must be non-rejectable by the supposedly reasonable people involved, if 
they are to be defended at all. Since all members must cooperate in locating these non-
rejectable and reasonable principles, a higher level of critical and social analysis is 
reached, discouraging personal or culturally biased outcomes. 
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Scanlon has a similar answer to the objection of relativism. Coherentist ac-
counts cannot rule out the possibility that alternative moral schemes might produce 
similarly good results, undercutting the grounds for one approach to be ranked supe-
rior to others in making value judgments. In fact, because it is a necessary component 
of Scanlon’s version of coherentism to take seriously the varied and unique experi-
ences, knowledge, and relationships that might produce different inputs for moral rea-
soning, one might wonder how the method can avoid total relativism. Scanlon not only 
requires diverse moral inputs, but allows for multiple yardsticks or standards by which 
to appraise moral actions, so as to ensure that it doesn’t fail the test of being bound by 
customary norms. For him, this is a strength, not a weakness, for his version because it 
allows for the details and the contexts of individual cases to be appreciated. Thus rela-
tivism is made acceptable, and even desirable, but at the same time, the relativism im-
plied is "benign," because the overall organizing principle wherein all moral actions 
are held up to one universal requirement, that of being justifiable to others, necessi-
tates that universal human values agreed upon by all members lies at the heart of the 
method (338). Although universal, it is not exactly an objective standard, but it allows 
him to escape a more malignant version of relativism in which, for example, a group 
could use the method to claim a right to harm or enslave some of its members by as-
serting their own special moral standpoint. It is basic to his theory that good reasons 
be provided for disputable actions, and the reasons are the sort that can't be rejected by 
others, unless they are unreasonable, so that immoral exploitation of people could not 
occur without their own reasonable consent, which is of course unlikely. Scanlon said: 
"What [my view] takes as fundamental is not what people actually think or want, but 
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what they have reason to want" (341). Relativity of goals and desires can exist, but 
without radical consequences since the diversity of the group ensures the fundamental 
inclusion of all affected in the decision-making, as long as they are reasonable. This 
leads to a need for a fuller account of what it is, in his scheme, to be reasonable, be-
cause the use of reason is the only way to avoid either of the objections listed so far, 
conservatism and relativism, but also to elevate the whole process beyond mere intu-
itionism. 
Scanlon believes that to seriously evaluate one’s moral judgments is to avoid 
habit or custom, so that an examination of our intuitions to see if any of them "best 
stands the test of careful reflection" is always advisable (98). This is a slightly differ-
ent approach than to insist on the availability of a broad or wide array of information 
in the dynamic process (as used by Rawls for his version of wide reflective equilib-
rium), because Scanlon wants to achieve something more than mere diversity. In the 
Rawlsian scheme, wide reflective equilibrium is one way to move from a simplistic re-
liance on one’s prior moral intuitions to a higher and broader level of possibilities, and 
to test intuitions against broader principles. In Scanlon’s work, intuitionism is not de-
fended as a starting place by any metaphysical claim; rather he depends on "good rea-
sons," as a common-sense product, to be preferred to some "unanalyzable, non-natural 
property" (11). He asserts that it is the use of “reasons,” thought of as an everyday 
process of providing explanations to others, that brings intuition to earth and gives 
credibility to the practical ability of considering the pros and cons of actions. As in 
Rawls, this back and forth procedure of testing one’s beliefs against others, and 
against higher principles, creates a procedure to provide a check at each step of moral 
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deliberation, so that subjectivity, relativism, and intuitionism aren't allowed to run 
wild. 
Important to Scanlon’s scheme (like Rawls) is his concept of what it is to be a 
rational moral agent. He values “reasonableness” over rationality, because he defines 
the quality of being reasonable as an ability to formulate good reasons for one’s ac-
tions, reasons that are defensible to others, whereas rationality is better described as 
people forming judgments that conform to their actions. To Rawls reason embodies 
“reciprocity” and “social cooperation” (1980, 316). Good reasons are derived from 
one’s ability to create plans to further his or her own goals, although unlike Rawls, 
Scanlon does not think of these goals as primarily self-regarding, but as more consti-
tuted by our inherent sociality, so that sometimes we desire to please others over our-
selves. They require an attitude of “judgment sensitivity” if they are to achieve social 
approbation. To be judgment- sensitive is to have the ability to apply evidence and/or 
objectivity to moral problems, to take the perspectives of others, and to "take respon-
sibility," to be willing to be "held responsible" for one's choices, and ultimately to de-
fine them in ways others can accept (23). To those who are skeptical about the 
intelligibility of reasons developed in this complex fashion, Scanlon responds that crit-
ics should not let the abstractions of argument cause them to lose sight of how real-life 
reasoning and deliberation processes actually work: 
Objectivity of such claims [reasons people have] lies not in the meta-
physical reality of some subjective matter independent of us, that they 
describe, but rather in the fact that there is such a thing as thinking 
about such questions in the right way - a process that yields stable re-
sults in which we have no good reason not to have confidence (354-
355). 
 
 217
For Scanlon, the quality of "reasonableness" includes a complex set of information 
and relevant choices applied to problems. Reasons are not 'strategies' put forth to reach 
certain ends (as is implied by the concept of rationality), but are the sort of judgments 
where objections and disagreements for certain actions are considered and taken seri-
ously. Having added the ultimate requirement, for reflective equilibrium, of taking 
into account other people's objections when formulating reasons, one is as likely to 
achieve moral agreement as can be found outside of deductivist approaches, according 
to Scanlon’s justificatory framework (192-194). Reason, according to Scanlon, “is not 
a judgment about what would be most likely to advance their interests or to produce 
agreement in their actual circumstances or in any more idealized situation, but rather a 
judgment about the suitability of certain principles to serve as the basis of mutual rec-
ognition and accommodation” (194). But it is those “principles” that become problem-
atic, because, as I have shown, they are not always easy to identify. What he means by 
asserting the usefulness of "certain principles" is not to deductively apply some at-
hand set of external principles to the problem, but to use those developed as part of the 
dynamic process in his style of reflective equilibrium. Principles are derived from the 
process, and then used to test the judgments pertaining to them. The approach avoids 
total circularity because of the requirement of providing grounding reasons (mutually 
derived), and defending and gaining assent to them, as part of the process of ensuring 
that the best particular principles for the problem are being used. This qualification 
adds a useful component to the reflective equilibrium method in bioethics, both be-
cause of the importance Scanlon attributes to diversity in the deliberative relationship, 
as it has been portrayed, but also the way this method seems to jibe more realistically 
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with actual group processes, at least in my observations of actual case-driven problem-
solving. The ethics committee at ARM Clinic sought out principles by attempting to 
offer reasons for action that were pushed and prodded and tested in the process until 
sometimes a sort of overall consensus could be achieved.  
But the fact that such a process approximates reality doesn’t mean it offers jus-
tifiability to the method overall. One test for Scanlon might be to see if he can actually 
deliver “objective” results; that is, results in which all parties, despite different starting 
places, are moved to agree as a result of a process of refining and revising having 
brought them to some stable position. Frustratingly, he cannot claim any such success. 
He admits that because the authority of moral judgments are derived from reasons de-
veloped by people, their objectivity “lies not in the metaphysical reality of some sub-
ject matter, independent of us, that they describe, but rather in the fact that there is 
such a thing as thinking about such questions in the right way.” The problem is that 
“different inquirers” can arrive at “incompatible but quite stable” conclusions (354-
355). Overall objectivity remains unachievable.  
How can this be so, if the process is to be taken seriously as an actual method 
for action?  As Scanlon has said, such differences in outcomes imply that using a cor-
rect method isn’t enough to move even like-minded groups into consensus, when basic 
goals, aims, attitudes, and commitments are too various and dissimilar. As products of 
different cultures, we approach moral issues with different experiences, circumstances, 
and values, not only cross culturally, in the larger sense, but even from our localized 
situations. One only has to notice the persistence of disagreement about abortion, with 
its associated differences in how to value and respect human life, to realize that when 
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premises are vastly different, any moral methods might fail to achieve stable out-
comes. Scanlon takes this sort of disagreement in stride: 
Persistent disagreements about right and wrong have a similar charac-
ter: they are disagreements about how complex sets of conflicting rea-
sons should be understood and reconciled, and they are most likely to 
persist when people’s differing interests and commitments lead them, 
in different ways, to concentrate on certain of these reasons (and on 
certain ways of understanding them) and to neglect others (358). 
 
Settling such differences is not accomplished by adding more discussion, more educa-
tion or technical advice, more uncovering of self-interest, more imagination, more 
moral points of view, and so on, as some suggest in bioethics. These strong moral dis-
agreements can be incorrigible even when self-interest is not a factor, and even when 
knowledgeable and thoughtful attempts to understand the other side have taken place. 
More likely it is that our grasp of moral truth does not result from “something analo-
gous to direct perception” as Scanlon insisted (359). We can recognize moral signifi-
cance, (sometimes by the yuck factor) but it is far from clear what form this 
significance takes.  
One way to avoid moral disagreement is to work within small, like-minded 
groups, thereby escaping dissent, but of course that approach is only temporary. When 
decisions are made public, different points of view are brought to bear adding more 
dimension to problems. Defenders of wide reflective equilibrium, in general, believe 
that the more diverse and inclusive the process, the more valid. As Buchanan et al in-
sist, “It is very important to understand how diverse the types of beliefs are that are in-
cluded in wide reflective equilibrium, as well as the kinds of arguments that may be 
based on them” (2001, 377). Only by allowing a wide diversity do we insure the con-
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siderations of varying beliefs, motivations, moral development, commitments and so 
on to be taken seriously in particular instances. To Scanlon moral criticism is (or 
should be) a system of “co-deliberation” to “work out principles” that we would each 
accept as a “basis for criticism” (1998, 268). This implies that not only is diversity 
useful in moral deliberations but that opening group deliberations to public scrutiny 
and criticism is necessary. 
It would be interesting to see this applied in the deliberations at ARM Clinic. 
Occasionally some members have compared their own fertility issues to those of their 
patients exhibiting empathy for their desires, but as I pointed out, their desire to avoid 
unwanted publicity and stake out new ground in the field can quickly lessen any desire 
to assist in the more unusual cases, such as in Example 29. In that case, a woman 
wanted to maintain a genetic link to her family by using her father’s sperm to insemi-
nate a donor egg that she would carry through a surrogate pregnancy. The committee 
quickly denied this case with little sympathy for the fact that the applicant was the last 
in her genetic line. One can only wonder what alternative points of view and addi-
tional public input might have meant to this outcome. Some cultures value genetic 
bloodlines, and the idea of carrying on the family name, more than others, for in-
stance, while others might be as shocked as these committee members were at the no-
tion of a woman bearing her father’s child, even though no sexual relationship 
occurred. Only by holding up such novel cases to wider and more diverse perspectives 
will some kind of more reasoned thinking prevail. 
Attaining wide diversity in viewpoints seems very difficult to ensure in the pri-
vate setting, especially when public scrutiny is unacceptable for privacy reasons. The 
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best solution for the small private ethics committee is to look to their professional as-
sociation as a more objective and broadly based group, who set up the sort of policies 
that  can prove useful to private ethical deliberations as guidelines. Broad and wide 
publicity can be achieved when professional groups make their discussions public 
whenever possible. Bioethics discussion at the commission level is to some extent, 
public, their activities reported in the press at times, and sometimes open to testimony 
from the public. However, the “wideness” of public input is variable. It might only 
consist of members of the profession whose issues are at stake, it may take place in a 
somewhat private venue, or by disdaining “political correctness” it may accidentally 
or even purposely screen out members of special groups, minorities, women, or politi-
cal opponents. Of course, inclusion of these groups does not guarantee moral decision-
making, but in the case of reproductive decisions, where eugenics-type decisions are 
sometimes feared, those concerns could be allayed if minorities, or other widely af-
fected groups, are represented in the overall deliberation, or are able to add public 
commentary. 
 Scanlon is not alone in advocating the inclusion of public criticism and diver-
sity as an important means of providing support to procedural methods. In a method 
like reflective equilibrium, where process is given status over content, it is imperative 
that the rules and procedures be as open as possible, so that overall fairness is not 
compromised, particularly in large scale institutional or governmental decision-
making. Buchanan et al point out that principles are given credibility by public sup-
port: 
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Principles are needed to evaluate existing institutions and to guide insti-
tutional design; reliance on the judgment of virtuous individuals (even 
if we could identify them without recourse to principles) is no substi-
tute for principled public debate about the ethical character of our 
common institutions (2000, 378). 
 
Henry Richardson is another who has noticed how the absence of public deliberation 
can skew even the most well-intended ethical process, so that even good decisions are 
invalidated by a lack of public backing. To buttress his early form of coherentism, he 
later added the new requirement of publicity, as a means of further strengthening his 
method. His plan is directly related to Scanlon’s approach: 
Justification is a matter of making arguments in both directions…to be 
justified in overriding one of the moral rules, one must have grounds 
that a rational person can impartially and publicly advocate. Putting 
these two aspects together, reflective equilibrium and publicity – we ar-
rive at Rawls’ idea of public justification, in which each rational (and 
reasonable) individual accepts as reasonable the basis on which each 
other person supports them (2000, 294). 
 
In Richardson’s scheme, similar to Scanlon’s, broad principles are specified down 
into more specific ones and the structure is supported by the coherence of the total set 
of norms involved, their argumentative support, and their practical consistency with 
actions. This form of coherence only escapes relativism and conservatism by adding a 
broad array of public input.  
 Norman Daniels has argued that too many health care decisions are seen as il-
legitimate and unfair to those who are affected, but he believes that improved out-
comes can be obtained when features of what he calls “deliberative democracy” are 
integrated into the deliberative process. For Daniels, like Scanlon and Richardson, a 
key feature is “the provision of publicly accessible reasons, that is, a public rationale, 
for decisions” (1997, 307). He acknowledges that publicity has costs, but the gain is a 
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sense that outcomes are fair and legitimate. Another key feature to Daniels is the in-
clusion of “mechanisms for considering challenges to decisions that are made for re-
visiting those decisions in light of counter-arguments” (307). Leaving moral 
judgments open to challenge seems to be reasonable, and yet the possibility causes 
discomfort among deliberators who are seeking principles, rules, or definitive solu-
tions to problems. Members of ARM Clinic valued consistency and disliked making 
“exceptions to the rules.”  A good way to respond to that problem comes from 
Daniels’s final condition: that decision-makers accept some sort of “voluntary regula-
tion” of the deliberative process to ensure that the other conditions, “public accessi-
bility” and a “mechanism for challenge,” are met (323). The addition of voluntary 
regulation seems to a worthwhile impetus to encourage an occasional overview of 
past decisions to see how they fare over time.  
In a fascinating example of how broadly public discourse can reset or re-
specify the grounds for certain decisions, ARM Clinic recently changed one of their 
most strongly endorsed internal rules: their policy against “baby creation” or no donor 
egg/donor sperm (discussed in detail in Chapter Seven). Over time, the physicians be-
gan to question the policy as they interacted with disappointed patients whose only re-
course to parenthood lie in access to both donated sperm and egg. Furthermore, the 
disappointment was exacerbated by being confronted during treatment; it could not 
always be predicted in advance, such as when a husband’s sperm was found deficient 
just as an egg was ready for fertilization causing the donor to suffer unnecessary pre-
paratory treatment. The refusal to resort to donor sperm at this stage began to seem ar-
bitrary and lacking in empathy to the patients; it seemed to violate principles of 
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beneficence and autonomy. Physicians hated to stop treatments and face the anguish at 
this stage. 
The original policy had been erected due to the “yuck factor;” the reasoning 
emerged out of vague feelings that it wasn’t right to create a baby with no genetic link 
to either parent. For some, it had conjured a mental picture of a commercialized prod-
uct, a supermarket of embryos to be picked over and discarded if they didn’t match 
expectations. Nobody wanted parents to purchase an embryo for its characteristics, 
like a commodity. But in the cases confronted in the clinic, these factors were not real-
istic. In one sense, the egg or the sperm donation were already available as a market 
choice since prospective parents could sort through facts about donors to pick the one 
that beset fit their needs (usually physical resemblance), but in allowing for the dona-
tion of both egg and sperm, the clinic was not exactly putting out embryos for sale. 
The full slippery slope had not been instigated. 
More importantly, opinions were changing at a higher level. Other clinics for 
assisted reproductive medicine were not so firmly opposed to the procedure, causing 
ARM Clinic to doubt the point of their adherence, and the specialty organization had 
not found it totally objectionable. 
Recently, the physician/owners took the problem back from their own ethics 
committee and discussed it among themselves. The result was the adoption of a less 
restricted policy allowing for the use of both donor egg and donor sperm in certain 
medically necessary situations. This modification was akin to their “backing into” a 
decision, because the new policy would only affect those patients whose need was dis-
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closed during treatment. The change in policy is not intended to be advertised or made 
easily available as a marketing device for new patients. 
This example seems to me to illustrate how public and professional debate at a 
higher, in this case a national level, served to produce a new guideline at the lower 
level, one that differed from their own locally produced viewpoint. The way was sof-
tened by the contextual issues that had arisen in particular cases leading to a relaxation 
of the formerly stringent rule previously taken. However, one cannot overlook the 
possibility that market considerations (losing patients to competitive practices) had an 
effect here, so that reflective equilibrium was not purely an ethical deliberation. If so, 
that problem could nevertheless be mediated by more publicity. 
The example shows how a process of reflective equilibrium can work to assist 
in producing localized ethical guidelines and perhaps in specifying (in Richardson’s 
terms) a norm down for practical application. It also shows how opening up back-
ground assumptions and non-moral concerns can cast light on moral questions. The 
procedural approach keeps the options open for new information to add useful infor-
mation to the inquiry. The example also shows how principles develop out of novel 
cases. Information flows in both directions, from the details of particular cases up and 
from more abstract deliberation down. The public process of reflective equilibrium al-
lows new principles to become accepted as public policy. Richardson tried to show 
how his specifying approach was superior to Beauchamp and Childress’s because it 
provided a means to move beyond the clashing of principles thought to be inherent in 
their method.  
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However, in Richardson’s emphasis on publicity, it is not clear whether he in-
tended the “initial” principles in his method to be taken from the well-known list al-
ready publicly accepted, such as Beauchamp and Childress’s, or should be attained 
otherwise. It is also unclear whether they are supposed to be “action-guides” which 
must be able to stand up to public debate, or simply be guides for reflection. Further-
more he noted that there is a difference between “potential public expressability” and 
“actual public expressability” (286). Only when actually expressed, can reasons garner 
the diversity and publicity necessary.  
However, a criticism of the publicity requirement is that in general, such a 
process may not get off the ground in a public arena without some common back-
ground assumptions or premises among the participants, the sort implied by a common 
membership in a procedural public arena. As Moreno has pointed out, the moral con-
sensus developed by a group is “extended” into a broader “overlapping consensus,” 
but this can only occur when the participants share such fundamental background val-
ues as “respect for the personal autonomy of those who disagree and a willingness to 
consider alternative points of view” (1995, 62-62). When decisions are made in a vac-
uum they are less likely to achieve validity because of the suspicion that they are 
thrust onto, rather than developed out of, public discourse. Moreno insisted that the 
stability of principles depend on the liberal values of the society from which they 
emerge. He believes they must include “nonviolent methods, mutual respect, and a 
willingness to entertain new evidence and alternative points of view. These are stan-
dards that are themselves objects of an overlapping consensus in a liberal, pluralistic 
society” (63-64). If these standards are not taken seriously, then the principles, al-
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though accepted, might not be morally correct. Some decisions made in government 
settings to create public policy might not be specific enough or realistic enough to re-
flect the goals of particular citizens. 
 An important point to be taken from this perspective is that bioethical deci-
sions can vary in their acceptance depending on whether they are applied to public or 
private settings. For example, the Bush administration policy to restrict stem cell re-
search to a small number of already developed lines was intended to apply to only 
publicly funded research, but did not impact private research. This is probably because 
our culture has a strong adverse reaction to government interference with private be-
havior, especially scientific exploration. The distinction between private and public 
helps to explain why reproductive research in the private sector remains mostly un-
regulated, and perhaps why the abortion debate seems to have mostly ceded to the side 
of abortion rights. Buchanan et al suggest that the heart of the values that back up re-
flective equilibrium as a method include moral individualism, equality of persons, and 
similar typical values generally thought to be at the heart of democracy (2000, 379). 
They said:  
Institutions that reflect a recognition of moral individualism, the moral 
equality of persons, and the capacity of persons to be critical choosers 
of ends will create and protect a significant private sphere in which in-
dividuals, either as individuals or as members of communities, can 
freely pursue and critically revise their own conceptions of the good. 
(And hence there are significant limitations on the use of public author-
ity and the power of the state, including, on some accounts, the re-
quirement of state “neutrality” (379). 
 
Retaining the freedom to conduct scientific and ethical choices in the private sphere 
does not entail a repudiation of public deliberation and debate about those choices, or 
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presume they shouldn’t be moderated by controversy. In two fairly recent examples, 
publicity, in the sense of public scrutiny, but also in the sense of obtaining more di-
verse representation to supply criticism of scientific research, has forced a revamping 
in some scientific procedures. In the first, feminists challenged the scientific validity 
of research in which women were not included, pointing out that the findings of re-
search projects that excluded women impaired the generalizability of that research and 
denied women the benefits that should apply to them. In the second, homosexuals, as 
research subjects, but also as full participants in critiquing the administration of AIDS 
research, asserted their political power to both reorganize and control the format of the 
scientific agenda.54  Research conducted privately might or might not be acceptable 
ethically, but it cannot be determined so without admitting public deliberations into 
the process. Even though many scientific practices remain private, as in the reproduc-
tive clinical activities that I have presented here, publicity provides a means to audit, 
oversee and perhaps put a check on more radical practices. But even more, this is the 
arena in which the policies and mid-level principles are created to assist the private 
practitioners in making justifiable local decisions. 
Scientific practices in general are an example of how publicity provides credi-
bility. Scientific results take their validity more from coherentist standards than from 
foundationalist platforms. When research results earn the attribute “objective,” it is 
more likely because they survived a procedural and public process, earning their 
                                            
54 See Sandra Harding’s classic The Science Question in Feminism, Cornell University Press: (1986), 
for examples of how the inclusion of women into scientific disciplines has promoted change in research 
outcomes; also see Courtney Campbell’s “Ethics and Militant AIDS Activism,” in Aids and Ethics, ed. 
Frederick G. Reamer, Columbia University Press, (1991), for examples of how scientific activities in 
AIDS research changed due to the activist inclusion of interested and affected members of society.  
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credibility from the process of experimentation and production of evidence. Helen 
Longino, the feminist philosopher of science, has argued that even the best scientific 
results would be considered “hopelessly subjective” without some set of external crite-
ria to support them. She named the familiar historical criteria— consistency, simplic-
ity, fruitfulness, scope, and accuracy—to be virtues long associated with giving 
credibility to some scientific theories over others, but she maintained that an overall 
ability to withstand publicity ought to be a virtue added to the original list, because in 
the modern world it provides the most consistent way to test the truth standards of sci-
ence. Historically, criteria like these have provided standards and constraints to scien-
tific projects so that they are credible to others: 
Among values the standards can include are such elements as empirical 
adequacy, truth, generation of specifiable interactions with the natural 
or experienced world, the expansion of existing knowledge frame-
works, consistency with accepted theories in other domains, compre-
hensiveness, reliability as a guide to action, relevance to or satisfaction 
of particular social needs. Only the first of these constitutes a necessary 
condition that any research program must meet or aspire to meet, and 
even this requirement may be temporarily waived and is subject to in-
terpretation (1990, 77). 
 
But Longino goes on to point out that without public debate and criticism, the tradi-
tional demarcation between projects thought to be scientific and those considered non-
scientific are left undetermined. It is in publishing scientific results, allowing for at-
tempts to replicate them, opening the way for them to receive peer criticism, and sub-
jecting them to public discussion that the activities of science are distinguished from 
other endeavors, so that the findings of the former are seen to be superior to any com-
petitor. In science, participants accept common styles of reasoning and assumptions 
about nature that allow for open deliberations about their meaning and usefulness, just 
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as ethical deliberations are said to do through the process of reflective equilibrium. 
Longino suggests that scientific inquiry attains credibility over other forms of knowl-
edge because publicity allows for wide levels of criticism “in 
a way that is not possible, for instance, for descriptions of mystical experience 
or expressions of feeling or emotion.” The only way to accept the testimony of 
others about their emotions is to experience the same feeling, although even 
then we cannot be positive. However, producing evidence, testing, and opening 
ideas to peer review gives authority to critics and credibility to outcomes. As 
Longino says, “It is the possibility of intersubjective criticism, at any rate, that 
permits objectivity in spite of the context dependence of evidential reasoning” 
(1990, 70-71) 
When an idea can withstand peer review, publicity and criticism, then its 
grounds to be taken seriously are secured. Just as some scientific ideas have histori-
cally lost validity after public criticism (their inability to be replicated, their overall 
characteristics, or their inability to stand up to evidentiary challenges), so can some 
moral ideas stand or fall when put under public scrutiny. This is the crux of the coher-
entist approach to bioethics: that inclusiveness, diversity, publicity, and open delibera-
tions provide the most reasonable solutions to both everyday and to novel problems, 
and that well-founded mid-level principles can emerge from the process so as to cover 
similar cases and problems. 
It is my contention that the best way to deliver valid bioethical decisions at the 
committee or local level is to create useful mid-level principles at a higher and more 
public level. By putting the procedure of reflective equilibrium into practice at the 
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higher levels of deliberation, especially at the professional association level, practical 
rules are made available to the practitioners at local levels who do not, by themselves, 
have the necessary tools to build a substantive process of reflective equilibrium. In this 
way, reasonable and useful maxims, principles and paradigms can be passed on to us-
ers who will continue to add justification to them as they work to solve real cases or 
dispose of them if they do not. This can only happen when open public procedural de-
liberations occur, among inter-social deliberators, over time, using reasonable argu-
ments that, in a Scanlonian way, “can not be reasonably rejected by others, similarly 
motivated.”  
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